# De Kevieu Metaphysics ...

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## The Review of Metaphysics

A PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

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### MONROE BEARDSLEY

Philosophy, wrote Whitehead, "will not regain its proper status until the gradual elaboration of categorial schemes, definitely stated at each stage of progress, is recognized as its proper objective." I am one of those who believe that philosophers have never lost sight of their "proper objective": philosophers of every persuasion can agree that, in the plainest and most useful sense of the term, philosophy is the "elaboration [that is, the formulation and critical examination] of categories."

A category is at least a way of dividing up the world, whether it is formulated in the object-language, like final cause, or in the meta-language, like individual concept. It is always (in the nonpredictive sense) an anticipation of experience as well, since it provides a pair of pigeonholes that future experience is to be put There is no handy way of deciding what degree of generality a predicate must possess in order to be called a (philosophically interesting) "category"; presumably event and cause are categories, but apple and hominoid are not. In any case, it seems that if we make any distinctions at all in the world, they will begin to order themselves in terms of relative generality as soon as we reflect upon them, and those distinctions that appear to cut most deeply across the variety of things will give rise to specifically philosophical questions about their consistency, coherence, clarity, and justifica-This is, then, the point at which we divide into schools and tion. programs.

Two main issues arise in the process of "elaboration."

The first question is whether the proper objective of the philosopher is merely to propose a way of sorting out the things in the world, or whether it includes the invention and postulation of new entities, such as *eternal objects* or *noumena*, to fill out gaps introduced by a particular categorial scheme, or to keep

certain derivative categories from being empty. The second question is whether the superiority of one categorial scheme to another can be, or how it can be, justified. What is the connection between a categorial scheme and a system of empirical knowledge? If a set of categories is a proposal to sort things out in a certain way, it is not itself, of course, a hypothesis to be tested by experience. On what grounds, then, is one set to be preferred to another?

These questions are answered in one way by those who conceive the elaboration of categories as explication of distinctions implicit in common words or normal syntax of a natural, or what they call "ordinary," language. The test of a categorial proposal, according to this view, lies in its concordance with the categories of ordinary language. That natural languages do categorize, in the sense spoken of earlier, is agreed upon by all, yet even within this first group of philosophical analysts it is necessary to distinguish two different views of the natural-language categories. The Descriptive or Taxonomic Analysist proceeds upon an a priori assumption (it is hard to see how it could be defended in a general way) that the categories implicit in ordinary language constitute a consistent and complete set for disposing of common experience; they conclude that the philosophic categorizer can do no more than remind us of these implicit categories and make clear to all of us that they are quite sufficient for getting about in the world, so long as we steer clear of natural science. The Taxonomists differ among themselves, of course, about what is sufficiently "ordinary" to be free from reflective taint-whether, for example, the "language of appearing" is ordinary language-but they appear to hold that when it is shown that a category is embedded in ordinary language, or, conversely, is not traceable to ordinary language, everything possible has been done to determine its validity.

The Explanatory or Constructive Analyst proceeds upon the somewhat different assumption that, though there are important categories implicit in ordinary language, they are there only more or less imperfectly and incompletely. Thus it is necessary to get behind ordinary language, to discover the meaning of "good," or the correct analysis of "the," or to set up logical models of the counterfactual conditional that will provide what ordinary

language, in its fumbling way, is attempting to achieve. The Constructors do not merely stand and gaze, like the Taxonomists, but their categorial constructs are regarded as validated by reference to natural language.

We might question this appeal to ordinary language on two grounds. First, as soon as we talk about ordinary language we are changing it. To point out an ambiguity in a term, or to call attention to different functions of a syntactical device, is to force users of the language to be conscious of a distinction hitherto not sharply made, and hence to force them to make new decisions in using the language. Second, the distinctions made by ordinary language are distinctions that grew hand-in-hand with the growth of pre-scientific empirical knowledge. Such categories as it exhibits before the philosopher gets hold of it may then be regarded as categories that have permitted a significant arrangement of the results of inquiry at a common-sense level. But when the "elaboration of categorial schemes" is thought of as connected with the process of gaining knowledge, ordinary language can no longer be regarded as a last court of appeal for the acceptability of a set of categories.

Thus besides the Taxonomists and the Constructive Analysts we have the Reconstructors, who are quite clear that when they talk about the "analysis" of ordinary language or, as they do more often, of the language of empirical science, they are not merely describing, or collating, but recommending improvements. To them it is evident that this is one of the ways philosophy got started in the first place, out of the need to avoid the problems ordinary language gets us into by the confusions in its categories. The "elaboration of categorial schemes" for them, then, whether it be in proposing a formalized semantics, a view about the interchangeability of proper names and descriptions, or a new definition of "implication," consists in offering concepts that will be found more usable for particular branches of inquiry, or for empirical science in general, or for the comparison and synthesis of all types of knowledge. Hegel's categories and Hume's analysis of "cause" claim to tell us, not what we "really meant," but what we would be well-advised to mean if we are to get on with the discovery of truths.

The Reconstructors themselves, however, divide into two groups, like their analogues in Social Reform. There are the Gradualists, who see their task as a progressive and continuous re-arrangement of concepts in relation to the growth of reliable empirical knowledge. Whether they deal with old categories time, space, causality, mind, self, person, or freely and imaginatively invent new categories that seem worth trying on, they aim to discover what concepts and what interconnections of concepts are called for by new information as it is obtained. In other words, if the "progress" Whitehead speaks of is really to take place, then, as Professor Hofstadter put it, "Both the categories and their systemization must be developed in close correlation with each other and with the state of insight afforded by empirical knowledge so far as it has advanced."

But there are also the Wholesalers, and their conception of elaboration is to remap the world completely, building complete sets of categories from the ground up, to replace, all at once, the ones in current use. Their problem is to design some new primitive concepts in terms of which the shift can be made, and their obligation is to convince us that the lines they draw are more noteworthy than the lines they erase. Generally they are philosophers who would take Whitehead's stipulation that categories must be "applicable" and "adequate" as clear enough to go ahead with, not needing analysis, and, since they cannot, by hypothesis, justify their schemes by reference to any limited inquiry or body of fact, it is often hard to discover in sufficient detail what criteria they do use for deciding that their schemes are better than their rivals'.

As our first exhibit, let us take Mr. Buchler's recent, small but ambitious book. Mr. Buchler holds that philosophy "lays the basis for the most intimate sense of critical awareness by developing the most general of categories" (p. 80; see also p. 122), and he has provided us with a fresh set of categories which, he

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Albert Hofstadter, "The Question of Categories," Journal of Philosophy, XLVIII (1951), p. 185.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> Justus Buchler, Toward a General Theory of Human Judgment, (Columbia University Press, New York, 1951).

hopes, "lay a conceptual foundation for the understanding of such phenomena as symbolism and language, meaning and representation, communication and method" (p. vii).

The most general category in this scheme is that of the "procept" (Ch. I). Proception is "the interplay of the human individual's activities and dimensions, their unitary direction" (p. 4); the individual is described as a "proceiver," or "proceiving animal": a "moving union of seeking and receiving, of forward propulsion and patient absorption" (p. 4). Whatever "either modifies or reinforces his proceptive direction," whatever relates to him in any way as a proceiver, is part of the individual's "proceptive domain" (pp. 7-8).

The second important category is that of "communication" (Ch. II). Communication is more than "causal impact"; it involves "signs" (p. 30), but not necessarily intention: "the ocean communicates its vastness" (p. 29). Communication presupposes, and is presupposed by, "community," which exists when "some natural complex [is] a dominant procept for more than one individual in the same respect" (p. 33). "Whatever emanates from any proceptive domain" is called a "product" (p. 47), including actions, assertions, and things made. Moreover, "every product is a judgment" (p. 47), because it is a "commentary on the proceiver's world" (p. 47), and "can function to communicate" (p. 47).

There you have the basic categories: the subordinate ones are derived and discussed in later chapters. "Compulsion" (Ch. III) and "convention" (Ch. IV) are modes of judgment. The "perspective" of a judgment is defined (Ch. V), and "validation" discussed (Ch. VI): "A judgment may be said to be valid in a given perspective if there is no reason, desire, or need to alter it. This definition is imprecise, but at present I do not know how to better it without sacrificing its generality" (p. 158). (Nor, he should add, does he know that it can be bettered without sacrificing its generality.) In this remark, one sort of category-constructing impulse is well revealed.

The foregoing bird's-eye view of Mr. Buchler's categorial scheme takes no notice of the numerous distinctions within the sub-categories. Some of these will come up later. So far, we

have before us a set of familiar English words, plus one neologism, each assigned an unfamiliar, and in most cases a much more general and vague, sense. The question is: what is the gain?

Consider first the category of proception. Mr. Buchler claims that this category is superior to such categories as "experience" and "behavior" because of its greater "metaphysical adequacy," which appears to be the same as "comprehensiveness" (p. 3), and because it is free from certain misleading connotations, such as the "narrowing mentalistic overtones" of the term "experience" (p. 4). One question we might ask, then, is this: does Mr. Buchler's basic category contain any misleading implications? Evidently if "proception" is defined as the "unitary direction" of a human individual's "activities and dimensions," it remains a null category until it is shown that human individuals have a unitary direction. Mr. Buchler recognizes the implication, but inverts the logical order, for he says: "From the definition of 'proception' it is seen to be a metaphysical fact that there is one proceptive direction for what we ordinarily call and wish to call an 'individual' " (p. 10). Thus are metaphysical facts extracted from definitions. Later (p. 22), Mr. Buchler worries again about this point; perhaps it may be thought, he says, that some individuals "lack direction" (there is also, he admits, "proceptive drift" [p. 105; see pp. 21-22]). "The term, it must be confessed, lends itself easily to misinterpretation." But what can we make of the superiority of "proception" when it is admittedly defined in terms of a key term that is "easily" misinterpreted? However, says Mr. Buchler, if "direction" were intended in any normal sense, it would be an empirical question whether individuals have direction or not, "but proceptive direction has nothing to do with direction in this sense": "proceptive direction concerns the potential course and outcome of what at any moment is the net integral effect of an individual's history" (pp. 22-23). I don't know what that means, for it is never explained, but it seems clear that to say an individual has a proceptive direction is not to say anything empirical about him.

Granting the comprehensiveness of the category of proception, a category represents a distinction of some sort, and the whole point of it is to draw a line. There are always two questions

about any such proposal; the first one is whether the categorizer has succeeded in drawing a line at all. Consider two of Mr. Buchler's examples. If a fly lights on a sleeve, and is observed, though with utter indifference, it is a procept, "for it reinforces" a "habit of expectation"; but the rotation of the earth affects everyone, and every one of the individual's actions, so it is not a procept, because it doesn't "affect his proceptive direction." This would make sense if the proceptive direction were something distinguished from the sum total of the individual's states, characteristics, and relations, but there is no clear evidence that this is supposed to be the case, unless the mysterious word "potential" in the last paragraph can be taken in that sense. Since each individual occupies a different position on the earth's surface, and is therefore affected differently by its rotation, or may potentially be, why is not everything that is or happens in the universe a procept for every individual? It would have serious consequences for Mr. Buchler's subordinate categories if all proceptive domains collapsed into one, but it seems to me that the system is not adequately protected against this danger-at least so long as "proceptive direction" remains fuzzy. Several of the other categories suffer from a similar vagueness; for example, a judgment is said to be "compulsive" if it can be regarded as the "sole product congruous with a given proceptive domain" (p. 60), but no criteria of congruity are suggested.

But even if a categorizer has succeeded in drawing a line somewhere, the more ultimate question is whether the line should be drawn at that place. If a man's metaphysics permits him to hold that he is carving nature at the joints, and if he has reason to think that the grammatical or logical distinctions in ordinary language at least point in the direction where the joints are located, then the very sharpness and obviousness of the distinction (as between men and brutes, substances and attributes, or Greeks and barbarians) is its own warrant of importance. But a Wholesaler like Mr. Buchler has already abandoned common speech. He has to have some purpose for chopping here rather than there, and this purpose can only be stated in terms of some theory that makes the cut important. One difficulty in judging Mr. Buchler is that his is not a theory, but a framework for a

theory, and we must await his promised next book to see whether it will provide theories that make the present distinctions worth while.

But as we wait, we may have our doubts. For there are symptoms that the method used for constructing the categorial scheme is fundamentally confused, and that the project is selfdefeating. One symptom is the way familiar distinctions, having been robbed of their usual names by broadening of verbal usage, turn up under assumed names, looking about the same as ever. Mr. Buchler proposes, for example, to make the term "judgment" denote not only assertions, but all products. Our usual distinction between assertions, actions, and artifacts reappears now as the distinction between "assertive judgments," "active judgments," and "exhibitive judgments." It is hard to see what is gained by this rebaptism. Apparently it depends on the discovery that actions and works of art, like verbal utterances, "communicate," in the very thin sense Mr. Buchler attaches to that term. In some sense, he holds a communication theory of art, but it is dimly sketched, and no reasons are given (pp. 31-32, pp. 75-78)—it remains a series of mere assertive judgments whose truth requires to be established before, rather than derived from, the decision to collect works of art together with all other sorts of human performance under the general term "judgment." The verbal extension itself doesn't guarantee common characteristics; in the last analysis, it is like the definition of "valid" quoted above: Mr. Buchler confesses (p. 158) that once he has decided to use the term "valid" to apply to arguments, statements, statues, movements of the hand, and manufactured articles, there is nothing really interesting or helpful he can say about validity.

The same is true of the two dimensions of proception. "Manipulation" and "assimilation" are stretched to cover all the ways the individual proceives; walking is an example of manipulation, getting hit on the head of assimilation. But (p. 18) these turn out to be new names for an ancient distinction, agent and patient, doing and undergoing. And while no doubt one can make a rough division here, it is hardly more than the merest beginning of philosophizing, and affords no new insight. It can be no great merit in a categorial scheme that it provides new

names for old distinctions without making them sharper or more significant theoretically. In short, it is hard to know exactly what Mr. Buchler was up to, despite his brief statement of his conception of philosophy (pp. 106-107). "The minimal requirement of achievement in a philosophy," he says (p. 134), "is that it compels imaginative assent and arouses a sense of encompassment even where it fails of cognitive acceptance." But encompassment without articulation is empty, just as distinctions without theories are blind. Despite some isolated thought-provoking remarks scattered through the text, Toward a General Theory of Human Judgment is chiefly noteworthy as an interesting objectlesson in how not to set about Whitehead's "elaboration of categorial schemes."

Mr. Kaiser, in his *Essay on Method*,<sup>2</sup> does his categorizing with another end in view, and he has his own procedure. Convinced that current educational theory and practice are handicapped by the lack of a clear and correct conception of the relations among distinct fields of study, he aims to provide a "map" of the "fundamental disciplines," or a set of succinct comparative "definitions" of those disciplines.

This problem he assigns to the field of study he calls "methodology." And he begins with a description of the method of methodology. The methodologist aims to define such terms as "art," "philosophy," "religion," and "science." (It is assumed at the start that these are the four basic disciplines, but this proposition is defended in the last chapter.) In doing so, he must satisfy four criteria. First, he must avoid "polemic methodology," or the relative evaluation of various disciplines; this question belongs to "education," which is separately discussed in the last chapter (pp. 7-8). Second, he must make his definitions conform to common usage (p. 10). Third, he must formulate the definitions in such a way as to reveal clearly the relations among the disciplines (p. 10). Fourth, he must transform the definitions into "ideal definitions" that will provide

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> C. Hillis Kaiser, An Essay on Method (Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, 1952).

clear distinctions where common usage is vague or wavering (p. 13).

Mr. Kaiser claims that the disciplines are ordinarily conceived as classes of activities, and therefore it is types of activities that are to be categorized by the methodologist. "If we ask, 'Is this design a work of art?' we are asking, 'Should the activity of making this design be classified as an artistic activity?' " As an explication of common usage, this is implausible; I can surely ask, and answer, the question, "Is the Willendorf 'Venus' a work of art?" though I have no evidence about, or interest in, the activity that produced it. But Mr. Kaiser fears that this distinction is a source of confusion, and so his first step in pursuit of an "ideal" definition has already left common usage behind.

The next steps require distinctions (a) between human and non-human activities (p. 20), (b) between "playful" and "serious" activities (p. 22)—"playful activities" are those undertaken "for the sake of" the pleasure that accompanies the activity itself—, and (c) between activities that do, and those that do not, "eventuate ideally" in an "act of judgment" (p. 30). Art is then classified as (a) human, (b) playful, and (c) non-judgmental. This last classification is, of course, extremely important, and we may wonder on what grounds Mr. Kaiser makes it. Does art "aim" at judgment? he asks. "The answer, according to common usage, is No. The products of sculpture and of musical art are not statements nor do they necessarily involve aesthetic judgment, since aesthetic judgments are merely reactions of liking, disliking, or preference, and are therefore not judgments which can be expressed by statements as we have defined them. The proper words to express our aesthetic judgments are phrases such as 'Bah!' or 'How lovely!' and these are not statements" (p. 31; my italics).

It would be hard to find a passage that begged more philosophical questions in the name of "common usage." The errors are so thickly packed, and the light they throw upon Mr. Kaiser's entire enterprise is so discouraging, that it may seem useless to discuss them further. But there are very good reasons, it seems to me, why such attempts to "map" the disciplines are in demand and become influential among those who do not examine the quali-

fications of the cartographer. As with the early charts, so few are available that even inaccurate ones are thought to be better than none. And so it seems to me important in this case to give Mr. Kaiser warm praise for attempting the task, but also to examine carefully his success in carrying it out.

First, then: Is the question, "Do works of art contain propositions?" a verbal question, to be settled by appeal to common usage? Certainly it is not; an appeal to common usage on this point can only elicit a dogmatic answer to a very subtle and difficult question. Again: even if we did appeal to common usage, what would be its verdict? Its verdict, I believe, would be (and this is not a report of usage, of course, but popular opinion, whether correct or incorrect, about works of art) that the verbal arts generally do make assertions, and the non-verbal ones generally do not. (Mr. Buchler said that all works of art are judgments. Mr. Kaiser says none; but I don't find that either of them has offered any substantial evidence for his view.) It seems to be essential to Mr. Kaiser's methodological method that we can only make certain distinctions; he requires us to ask about Art, not about verbal arts, for example, and his answer is that since "The Harmonious Blacksmith" doesn't make assertions, then assertion (or, in his term, "judgment") cannot be "necessary" to Art, though, in fact, it may be "necessary" to verbal works of art. Again: aesthetic judgments, he says, are "merely reactions," and thus he not only disposes of a difficult question with classic simplicity, but even goes so far as to correct the man in the street who says, "Paintings by Baziotes are ugly," and to legislate the "proper words" for expressing himself, namely "Bah!"

A good deal more could be said about Mr. Kaiser's treatment of art, and analogous questions can be raised about his treatment of science and religion, though I think he goes less wrong in these cases because in science he has more common agreement to go on, while in religion no one expects a "description of common usage" in a short chapter defining "religion" to be anything but a new, and perhaps interesting, suggestion of what is thought to be important about religion. But Mr. Kaiser's neo-Aristotelian method is clear enough from what has been said. First, you claim only to classify; you introduce admittedly "arbitrary"

distinctions, and then ask where the activities fall in terms of those distinctions. But then you treat your categories as though they corresponded to some natural essences; you regard each species as though it had a final cause, and introduce such phrases as "the end of Art," "that for the sake of which," "the function of Art," and so on, and before long you are safely pronouncing normative statements about what artists ought to be doing and scientists ought to stop doing. This is the technique of squeezing normative recommendations out of descriptive classifications. The mapmaker begins by asking people where they fix the boundaries of their lands, but before long he is adjudicating disputed territories and even deducing from his maps the nature of the terrain and the goods it is desirable to export.

It is refreshing, though, to hear Mr. Kaiser say that contemporary philosophers have given far too little thought to the methodology of their own subject, the "philosophy of philosophy" (p. 15, p. 90). But this turns quickly into the familiar accusation of "betrayal": "modern 'philosophy,'" says Mr. Kaiser, "in its attempt to ape the methods of science, has merely succeeded in driving genuine philosophy from the stage"—thus serving notice that in seeking his ideal definition of genuine philosophy he intends not to consult his contemporaries' common usage.

Genuine philosophy, then, is the dialectical search for "absolute presuppositions" of thought and action—those assumptions that one must make (p. 99); not that everyone must make the same ones, for "philosophic truth" is different from "scientific truth" in that it is "always intensely personal" (p. 100). Thus it is "stupid and irrelevant" to complain that philosophers disagree; they have done their best when they have examined and made explicit their own necessary presuppositions. So far one might say that Mr. Kaiser has characterized philosophy as either a hopeless inquiry (since it must discover that there is only one set of presuppositions from which all of a particular philosopher's beliefs follow), or one that cannot miss (since the philosopher's conclusions need apply to no one but himself). But Mr. Kaiser has further distinctions. Unlike the scientist, "the philosopher is content if he 'sees' intuitively that his premises are true" (p. 101), since they are not empirical but "transcendental." The entities

and relations he is after are "objects of thought," not experienceable (p. 105); "thought is the origin of all philosophic knowledge" (p. 106). The "test" of philosophical truth is always thought itself—never sense experience or action. The mind converses with itself, "and with nothing outside itself"; "it is thrown back on its own native resources" (p. 107).

Philosophical knowledge, says Mr. Kaiser, is a priori; the philosopher thinks what "must" be thought, when he perceives the necessary connections between his thoughts. Is this connection an analytic or synthetic one? To this question, he replies that "we need not distinguish between analytic a priori knowledge and synthetic a priori knowledge"—and excuses this default by alluding to Quine's argument in "Two Dogmas" that no sharp distinction can be made. This, however, is fatal to the whole project, for Quine's argument, if it casts doubt on the analytic-synthetic distinction, applies equally to the a priori—a posteriori distinction, and if Mr. Kaiser agrees with Quine, it is nonsense for him to define "philosophy" as "the study of the a priori" (p. 107). He is as far as ever from mapping this fundamental discipline.

As I hinted above, I am very sympathetic with Mr. Kaiser's aim, which is high, and I should like to add that he makes many good points about particular matters, independently of his thesis. It is evident that too few educators have a clear idea of the way their own fields of study relate to others: consider the number of incompatible prevalent views about the "nature of history," for example. Nor do I deny that there are strictly methodological questions about the various fields of study, some descriptive, some normative, and that they have to be treated in close relation to each other, though at the same time kept distinct. But the trouble with Mr. Kaiser's methodology, it seems to me, is that it is not empirical enough, and its goal is misconceived. He will have a tidy pattern of the grand, awesome names of human culture: Art, Science, Philosophy, Religion; and to this end he is apparently prepared to sacrifice almost everything. His conceptions of Art and Philosophy are not derived from a study of the actual objects in these fields, but are freely invented to make a symmetrical pattern with their two fellow-disciplines. True to his own conception of the philosophic task, Mr. Kaiser turns from experience and action, and falls back too much upon his own a priori resources.

The categories Mr. Nathan Isaacs is concerned with, in his Foundations of Common Sense,\* are those involved in the problem of knowledge: causality, truth vs. falsity, real vs. illusory. His object is to clarify these categories, where they need it, and to justify their application to the world. His problem is thus a philosophical one, but he argues that the usual practice has been for philosophers to pick up their epistemological categories haphazardly from outmoded psychology. Instead of this, he proposes to review the available psychological knowledge about the way we become acquainted with the world and form our beliefs about it, and then in the light of these facts to show that the categories developed by common sense in the process of forming beliefs are indispensable and therefore have the only sort of justification possible. Mr. Isaac's idea might be put this way: he offers an empirical "deduction of the categories," and holds that they are susceptible of no other sort of deduction.

Mr. Isaacs' review of the process of acquiring empirical beliefs shows a subtle sense of the complexities it has no room to develop. A "field theory" of perception (and experience in general) has very different implications for philosophy, he believes, from earlier "atomistic" theories. He does not present the evidence for his psychological generalizations, even the more disputable ones, but his challenge has a considerable force, and it raises anew the question what is the relation between the *de facto* and the *de jure* problems of knowledge.

In Mr. Isaac's book the question turns up this way. We can get nowhere with the philosophical problems of knowledge until we have "an adequate description of our experience as we actually experience it" (p. 11), and an explanation of the process of forming beliefs; but it turns out that description "finishes up by validating in the most decisive way all those assumptions of our ordinary physical world, causality, induction, etc., which all

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Nathans Isaacs, The Foundations of Common Sense (Roy Publishers, New York, 1950).

sciences are said to take so much for granted, but which philosophers put so severely on trial" (p. 11; but this is apparently contradicted on p. 79). The phenomenological description of common sense beliefs "goes a remarkably long way not only towards explaining but towards justifying our ordinary 'common sense' belief, or rather set of beliefs" (p. 46).

Mr. Isaacs' method is best observed in his discussion of the external world. It consists, first, in running over the factors in experience (see summary on pp. 64-66), such as the correlation between data in different sense-modalities, that cause us to believe (as he holds) that there is a physical world distinct from and independent of sense-experience; and, second, in claiming that this description explicates the content of our belief in an external world, so that if anything is left over it is small and "marginal" (p. 48). Whereas Hume (whom Mr. Isaacs does not mention) took the question "Is there body?" to be askable only in vain, Mr. Isaacs merely requests its postponement; once we know "what causes induce us to believe in the existence of body," we automatically know "whether there be body or no."

The twist that makes this claim plausible consists, it seems to me, in a double way of taking the proposition, "There is an external world." Mr. Isaacs' general point of view, which puts the psychology first and the epistemology second, enables him to make what epistemological assumptions he wants, and to employ what epistemological categories he needs, from the beginning, without apology, since it follows from his thesis that no genuine epistemological propositions can be presupposed by psychological ones, and therefore that no epistemological questions can be begged by starting with psychology. But his interpretation of the proposition "There is an external world" is itself an epistemological assumption, and a very important one.

He takes the proposition as a straight empirical proposition. Not a simple one; he doesn't invite us to observe our hands and conclude that the existence of the external world is sufficiently evidenced thereby. Yet his view (though, again, he makes no mention of Moore or his followers) is not so very different; to believe there is an external world is, as far as I can make out, to believe that there are hands, feet, chairs, tables, etc. Now if we

take, say, the conflict between phenomenalism and realism, and formulate it is an empirical question, "Whether or not there are either hands, feet, chairs, tables, etc.," I suppose it does not take a review of contemporary psychology of cognition, or a "field theory of experience," to persuade philosophers to give a sensible answer. It is curious to find Mr. Isaacs saving, much later, that of course no amount of evidence can "exclude entirely the hypothesis that our whole 'real' world might only be a collective human dream—or perhaps my single individual one" (p. 184). We may even all be mad—a "terrifying hypothesis" (p. 185). He thinks these "hypotheses" are improbable, and that they would not "work" (pp. 52-53); although at the same time he says that even if they were true we could still make workable categorial distinctions between "fact" and "fantasy," for the purposes of practical life—it being the main function of epistemology to supply such distinctions (p. 107).

It seems to me that there is a clear moral to be drawn from Mr. Isaacs' struggles. He started out on the right track; unlike our two previous categorizers, he was going to examine the basic categorial distinctions in terms of the way they arise in experience and the role they play in sorting our experience for us. Thus the categories were to be examined in close relation to our empirical knowledge about the knowing process itself. But, first, his discussion of them is almost entirely retrospective and genetic, rather than prospective and functional. The more fruitful questions are: what depends upon these distinctions? what can we do with them? And, second, he has an oversimplified view of the connection between category-making and inquiry. They are not the same activity, nor is the former a direct function of the latter. Mr. Isaacs' conception of categorial elaboration is at the opposite extreme from Mr. Kaiser's, and commits the opposite mistake. The question whether physical-object propositions can be analyzed into sense-data propositions will never be settled by the phenomenological description of experience, however full; the two questions are of a different order."

See Roderick Firth, "Sense Data and the Percept Theory," Mind, LVIII N.S. (Oct. 1949), LIX N.S. (Jan. 1950).

Mr. Isaacs does make some very good contributions toward the clarification of some categories; so much he might have done without, in his last chapter, getting in so deep. For there he raises this final question: when the psychological study of cognition is accomplished, what is left for philosophy? At first he thinks maybe there is the question whether there are any non-empirical sources of knowledge (pp. 151-152)—but on second thought that is really a psychological question too, almost entirely (p. 164). Perhaps there are some questions left over for metaphysicians (p. 170)—those involved in the "pursuit of comprehensive explanatory hypotheses" (p. 175)—but there is no work for the epistemologist there. He scans the horizon and finds no epistemological tasks to be done; but he does not look down to see them at his feet.

Mr. W. Donald Oliver, in his Theory of Order, has a more positive conception of philosophic method. He holds that "thought cannot function in any field in which limits of one kind or another have not been established," that one task of metaphysics is to settle on "categories that will set definite limits both to the meanings we ascribe to our words, and to the entities to which our words refer" (p. 334), and that the determination of such categories must reflect human needs and the conditions of scientific knowledge at a given time. Metaphysics consists in making explicit and systematic the concepts and assumptions we employ in dealing with the world (pp. 82-83), in inventing alternative sets, and in choosing the best available. Mr. Oliver's criteria for deciding among available categories are not clearly presented, but they are avowedly pragmatic, in a broad sense.

The concept that Mr. Oliver selects for the central theme of his discourse is that of order; his aim is to analyze this concept thoroughly and to explore some of the consequences of applying the re-conditioned concept to the world (p. vii). It turns out to be a broad category indeed, and the discussion of it involves some attention to other categories, such as causality, space, time, substance, and potentiality.

<sup>\*</sup> W. Donald Oliver, Theory of Order (Antioch Press, Yellow Springs, Ohio, 1951).

(It may be remarked parenthetically here that Mr. Oliver's book is hard to read and to be confident of having understood. It is tightly argued but bafflingly organized. The point of each paragraph is usually fairly plain, and there are some good examples to clarify the abstractions, but there is practically no reference to other contemporary philosophers and their concerns, so it is hard to tell which of Mr. Oliver's puzzles are significant in a general way and which are merely accidental difficulties of his own verbal framework; one cannot help suspecting quite often that a point he takes pages to make in his own terms is merely a truism in disguise—one tries in vain to think of a philosopher who might have denied the proposition in question, Still, it may be said that some of Mr. Oliver's discussions are stimulating and seem to contain important suggestions, if only those suggestions can be transferred to other contexts.

An entity is defined as anything that can be referred to and re-referred to, that is, anything that is self-identical and distinguishable. A thing is an entity that is "arrangeable" (p. 8). An entity is arrangeable if it can be separated physically or conceptually from its immediate environment without losing its self-identity (p. 47), or, in other words, if some of its relations to other entities are external (p. 10). Thus a series of entities that are wholly defined by means of the successor-relation would not be a set of arrangeable entities, since these entities can be conceived only as uniquely related to their predecessors (pp. 13 ff.).

At first this looks clear enough, but (p. 272) the distinction is not as definite as it seems. Since, by definition, any entity can be "re-referred to," it must, to that extent, be capable of existing in a number of different relations at different times, and is therefore arrangeable. "We, therefore," Mr. Oliver confesses, "cannot regard any entity as absolutely non-arrangeable." One might expect him at this late point (p. 272) to narrow the definition of "arrangeable" so as to exclude references to an entity among the relations to be counted in determining whether it is arrangeable or not; but this would prevent one use he makes of the definition (pp. 58-59). And the resulting obscurity or indecisiveness carries over into the definition of "order."

An order (pp. 19-20) is "an arrangement of a set of entities

that is produced by the correlation, according to a rule, of one arrangement of those entities with another arrangement independent of the first." Thus a row of people from left to right, going from the shortest to the tallest, is an order, since it correlates one arrangement (left to right) with another arrangement (shortest to tallest) by means of a rule (that the next spatial position shall be occupied by the next taller person). The series of integers is an order, for the same reason. An order, in this analysis, always involves at least two independent arrangements and a rule to connect them (p. 28). Thus another puzzle arises, this one about the term "independent.". Mr. Oliver is himself aware of this difficulty, which he puts this way: "An order is produced by a correlation between arrangements that, to start with, must be assumed to be independent, but the correlation itself is, in effect, a negation of their independence" (p. 167). This consequence, if not averted, would make "order" a null concept, and Mr. Oliver makes an attempt to deal with it. Yet it is hard to say exactly what his solution is. Evidently he holds that the correlation must be contingent or "precarious," but no clear analysis of this perennially puzzling concept is given, so its shortcomings, too, carry over into the definition of "order."

Both of the foregoing problems are involved in the consequences to be derived from the analysis of order. Mr. Oliver seeks to throw fresh light, from his new angle, upon the nature of various possible "ontological orders" (p. 37), and here the main drive of his thought is plain enough. His book is moved by the spirit of Jamesian pluralism-an open, contingent world, rather than a "block universe." He does not believe that there is "only one way in which our experience can be brought to order" (p. 186); the world must be known "bit by bit," and we may have to be content to use different theoretical frameworks to cope with different parts of it, and to abandon hope for "one all-inclusive system" (p. 187). We cannot deal with experience unless we first categorize it in some way (p. 188), but we can always be ready to think of other possible categories and shift from one scheme to another. There are no absolutes (p. 334). This is the pervading spirit of Mr. Oliver's conception of the elaboration, or shuffling, of categorial schemes, and in keeping with this spirit he regards determinism as his particular foe.

"Classical mechanistic determinism" is first introduced by Mr. Oliver (p. 33) as a type of ontological order. And he has two basic objections to it. One is that deterministic order is, by his definition, no order at all. The classical particle is defined as an entity distinct from space and time (independent of position in space and time), but arrangeable in space and time in accordance with certain laws (p. 76). But these laws correlate spatio-temporal positions with one another, and when the category of causality is applied to the whole universe, the positions of the particles become the only ones possible to them; thus the particle is not an arrangeable entity any more, because it is not independent of position (p. 168). It follows that determinism is not an order at all (p. 55).

It strikes me that this argument is made plausible only by the ambiguities of the term "independence," noted above. In his analysis of mathematical order, Mr. Oliver permits the integers to constitute an order, because they are "conceptually" arrangeable, though not physically arrangeable; in his analysis of physical order, however, even though completely determined particles can be conceived as being in different places (parsnips imagined as growing on pear-trees), since the laws are not analytic, this is not sufficient to preserve their arrangeability. I call this a double standard of independence; either determined particles are ordered, or the integers are not. And faced with the second alternative, there would be no choice, I should think, except to suppose that there must be something wrong with the definition of "order."

Mr. Oliver has many interesting things to say about space, time, and causality (Ch. 8), and the interconnections between them as they are used to "bring our manifold of experience to order" (p. 155) when it is "properly categorized under them" (p. 156). But he seems to suggest (p. 178) that traditional philosophers have been wrong to conceive of causality as admitting of no degrees: causal connections are, he says, "not all of the same weight." He does not explore this line of thought. He seems to hold that the concept of potentiality is indispensible to our thinking about the world (see pp. 224 ff., pp. 321 ff.), but his

treatment of this concept, especially considering the questions that have been raised about it in recent years, is disappointing. Taking it all together, it might be fair to say that Mr. Oliver's book looks at some old categories in a new way and he has thought hard and carefully about them in terms of their connection with his concept of order. But that concept itself is still not fully determinate.

The most fundamental theme of Mr. Paul Kecskemeti's book, Meaning, Communication, and Value,' is the connection between normative and non-normative propositions. Philosophical analysis, flushed with successes in analyzing "formal deduction and empirical fact-finding," has been, in some quarters, unable to see "rationality" in the realm of value. Mr. Kecskemeti believes that, though judgments of value cannot be completely subjected to rational techniques of argument, nevertheless they cannot be regarded as wholly arbitrary and non-cognitive either. (See pp. v, 2, 147.) This conclusion he reaches by way of a careful and almost continuously interesting argument, which begins with an analysis of meaning. For it is by means of a new way of fixing this category that M. Kecskemeti hopes to bring closer together, and place in the same perspective, value-judgments and scientific propositions.

To interpret a sign is not to respond to it or to describe actual or probable responses: it is to say that a certain response would be good, in terms of a specific standard, if the sign occurred (p. 8). The act of interpretation issues in a "judgment," which has the form: "The facts being such-and-such, the good response to the sign in this situation is such-and-such, by such-and-such a standard" (p. 40). Interpretation, though "not a matter of emotion" (p. 95), is a matter of evaluation and decision, whether the standard employed be correctness of grammar and diction, warranted assertibility, or survival, as these standards, or others, are applied, let us say, to the utterance, "Cheese it, the cops!" In this way, Mr. Kecskemeti draws a heavy line between what he calls "mere fact and its description" on the one hand, and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Paul Kecskemeti, Meaning, Communication, and Value (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1952).

"meaning and its interpretation" on the other (p. 22), and it is one of the prime purposes of his book to say what this difference is. Interpretation, he insists, is an "autonomous method" (p. 21).

In terms of this distinction, Mr. Kecskemeti characterizes the difference between two sorts of science. The natural world, animal behavior, and some of human behavior, can be explained in purely descriptive terms: the animal eats because it is hungry. But much of human behavior cannot be accounted for, he says. without employing the irreducible category of meaning, and the method of interpretation, with their attendant concepts such as sign and standard. When we say that A uttered a sentence in French, "this is no mere fact statement, for it involves a judgment to the effect that A's speech behavior conforms to our understanding of a set of rules about language" (p. 59). It is peculiar to social science, Mr. Kecskemeti holds, that though a social science theory need not, and indeed should not, be itself an interpretive judgment, "the variables entering into the theory and the data to which the theory can be applied can be 'given' only by being interpreted in terms of some standard or other" (p. 224). He is not dogmatic about the possibility that a way may be found to predict human behavior in value-neutral, non-interpretive, terms (pp. 220 ff.), but he considers this very unlikely, and, in the meantime, he thinks that the promising line for social science inquiry is to work with the interpretive categories.

It seems to me that this is one of the less clear and cogent parts of Mr. Kecskemeti's argument. Sometimes he appears to admit that the social scientist can study the interpretive behavior of his subjects without interpreting things himself; he must study the behavior with reference to standards, but he can employ the standards of the subjects themselves, and study their own application of them, without committing himself to the same standards. He need not, in other words, have the preferences he describes (p. 222). His statement that A's French was "correct" might be made with reference to A's standards of correctness, or that of other members of his group. But in another crucial passage (pp. 189-191), Mr. Kecskemeti shows that it is essential to his philosophy of science to insist on the impossibility of carrying on social science without active interpretation. When

we have looked up A's grammar in a book, and pronounced it correct, there is still the decision to be made, namely, that the book is to be accepted as authoritative. This is more than mere observation, and makes the case utterly different from the verification of a natural law, such as "The west wind always brings rain." In the former case, but not in the latter, we have to employ a definition of "correct usage," and we commit ourselves to this definition; "it is not a matter of observation but adhesion"—the rule must be incorporated into our own behavior (p. 190).

Whether or not Mr. Kecskemeti's apparent vacillation can be made consistent, there is surely a mistake here. Either "interpretation" includes the act of judging according to a hypothetical standard that the interpreter does not necessarily subscribe to himself, or, if interpretation is always implicit evaluation, then many things that Mr. Kecskemeti calls "interpretation" (including much social science) are not interpretation in his sense at all.

Mr. Kecskemeti assigns a special role to philosophy in his general scheme. Philosophy is a supreme interpretive activity, concerned with inventing and discovering "patterns of interpretation beyond the accepted routine" (p. 95)—patterns, or categories, that may be used to define new ways of thought and new "types of warrant" for belief (p. 92). He shows, especially in a remarkably fresh and interesting discussion of Plato (pp. 92-95), that this general aim has been present in most forms of traditional philosophy, even when the categories employed were seemingly most remote from experience. Such terms as "substance," "essence," "absolute," "which today arouse the scorn and indignation of undergraduates of all ages have been selected, at one time or another, to differentiate 'warranted' beliefs from 'nonwarranted' ones" (p. 91), and they have contributed to this task principles and distinctions that are part of the permanent possession of philosophy (p. 92). Mr. Kecskemeti seems to me to have by far the clearest and most defensible conception of the category-constructing function of philosophy, among our five representatives in the present symposium. For he sees the construction of categories, or "patterns of interpretation," in terms of their potential role in the growth of human knowledge and human rationality, and he provides a standard by means of which we can estimate the usefulness and fruitfulness of such categories as "proception," "real," and "order."

By putting a normative element into the analysis of meaning itself, Mr. Kecskemeti has built a bridge between the most neutral activities of scientific inquiry and the act of ethical decision. So the last part of Mr. Kecskemeti's book tackles the nature of value and the problem of justifying value-ascriptions.

He first considers the value-predicates of our language as belonging to different "value-languages" (Ch. 8). There is a "language of immediately felt relevance," containing terms like "pleasurable" and "painful," a language of utility, and a distinct language containing the "higher" value-predicates. The words "right" and "wrong," for example, belong to this "higher" language, and Mr. Kecskemeti does not believe that the characteristic meaning and use of these terms can be reduced to terms in the "lower" languages. Of all the theories concerning the correct analysis of ethical terms, which he discusses briefly, he finds himself closest to Kantian formalism, the prototype of an "emergent" theory, as he calls it, of "higher value judgments" (p. 201). "If a language contains right-wrong predicates, this means, I think, that the members of the language group intend to communicate about matters of individual conduct in terms permitting commendation or rejection from a point of view independent of the agent's own preferences" (p. 203). Such terms signify the resolution of their users, not necessarily to agree on specific ethical rules, but to criticize and justify their rules in terms of some general principle of impartiality, or justice -that is, the principle that what is right shall be invariant for changes of preference from party to party (p. 207). The "higher" language constitutes an "autonomous value-language" (p. 208), an irreducible category.

A value, in Mr. Kecskemeti's analysis, is a property in terms of which "possible goals of objects of desire" are ordered with respect to "possible conflicts among these desires" (p. 241). Values are not simply "objects of interest" or preference; value-judgments contain an implicit reference to some actual or possible conflict of interests, for which they propose a way of resolving the conflict (p. 242). The "higher" values (p. 277) are those

that involve a claim to impersonal status, and are applied to situations from the ideal viewpoint of the detached or neutral onlooker; they include truth, justice, beauty (see Ch. 10).

The "principle of impartiality" in ethical disputes is parallel to the commitments that underlie empirical inquiry (p. 312). That evidence is to be admitted and logical deductions made correctly are guiding principles of inquiry; that ethical disputes are to be resolved in accord with the principle of impartiality is the analogous principle in the realm of values. Now, having drawn this similarity, Mr. Kecskemeti raises two further, and fundamental, questions about the relation between the two fields. First, to what extent do the guiding principles of each field guarantee a solution of any problem whatever? Second, to what extent can the guiding principles of each field be rationally justified?

As regards the first question, there is a big difference between normative and non-normative disputes. A non-normative dispute may be held up from want of decisive evidence, but the scientific method itself provides a general "decision technique" for any particular disagreement, and it apparently guarantees the gradual convergence toward agreement of those who agree to employ it. This cannot be claimed for the principle of impartiality (p. 315): in a given dispute, there may be two incompatible solutions that are equally in accord with that principle, and where the relevant facts are agreed upon, the method itself cannot guarantee a unique solution.

As regards the second question, it is first necessary, says Mr. Kecskemeti, to separate the factual from the normative (or, as he calls it, "postulational") element in ethical disputes. He insists that the postulational elements are not simply demands and feelings, but proposed standards. Where the two disputants agree in their postulates, then, of course, they can settle their dispute by scientific means. Where they disagree in their postulates, they cannot continue the dispute, but this does not mean that further discussion is cancelled and the matter left to arbitrary preference. Here we come to the central notion in Mr. Kecskemeti's theory of value. "For third-level standards, though mere 'postulates' from a logical point of view, define the

'meaning' of a type of social situation; and their rejection, though it cannot be shown to involve either a logical contradiction or a factual error, nevertheless has a *stringent* consequence, namely, that those who reject them can no longer participate in the type of social situation which the standard defines" (p. 316). This is quite analogous, he holds, to the scientific situation: if a person refuses to follow the evidence or conform to the principles of logic, he cannot be argued into it by evidence or logic, but he can no longer maintain that he is taking part in the cooperative social enterprise known as "science" (p. 316). Similarly, as those who employ the autonomous ethical language commit themselves thereby to the building and preservation of a society in which conflicts shall be, as far as possible, settled according to the principle of impartiality, so those who refuse to employ this language thereby exclude themselves from such a social process.

It is impossible to indicate, in a brief space, the subtlety and suggestiveness with which this thesis is developed and its implications unravelled by Mr. Kecskemeti (see Ch. 11). There are several highly challenging and debatable discussions—for example, his distinction between "goals" and "norms," his criticism of utilitarianism, his distinction between various "levels of conflict," his analysis of rationality—that contribute to the value of the book, which is rich in original reformulations of old problems and in suggestions for solutions. The gist of his view of the problem of validating value-judgments is that their rationality consists in the extent to which they embody the principle of impartiality, the rationality of which, in turn, consists in its capacity to define a certain type of society and social co-operation (pp. 317-19).

Evidently Mr. Kecskemeti's position is close to that recently defended by Mr. A. I. Meldon in his symposium with Mr. Frankena on Human Rights.' In Mr. Meldon's terminology, the "significance conditions" of utterances about human rights (such utterances would be part of Mr. Kecskemeti's autonomous value language) are not part of the *meaning* of such utterances, but they specify the conditions that must obtain in order for such

<sup>\*</sup> Science, Language, and Human Rights, 1952, pp. 167-87.

utterances to have any "use" at all. To justify a value-judgment, then, is to point out that its significance conditions are fulfilled. Mr. Kecskemeti's analysis is more thorough and complicated, and by introducing the principle of impartiality he at least goes some way to remedy some of the defects of Mr. Meldon's analysis: among them, for example, being the apparent consequence that two contradictory rights-claims, since they have the same significance-conditions, and no truth-conditions, are justified by the same reasons. Mr. Kecskemeti has done a good deal to work out and lay open for inspection an interesting type of meta-ethical theory, which assimilates formalistic elements into an instrumentalist framework. With regard to the general theme of his book, it may be said that his theory imports as much rationality into ethical decisions as is compatible with the view that all ethical argument rests ultimately upon certain non-rational decisions. Whether or not Mr. Kecskemeti succeeds in bringing together, by his theory of meaning, the factual and the normative. his categories are worked out in close and instructive relation to the methods and results of social and natural science, and there is much in them that others can take over and use and elaborate in even more fruitful ways.

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THERE are at least eight serious difficulties which a theory of ethics must overcome. 1. An ethics reaches its apex when men intend the good. But the ideal ought not only to be intended; it ought to be realized through the use of bodies and instruments outside intent, and thus not subject to ethical categories and control. 2. Ethics is a science appealing to man's reason. a man ought to act even when he lacks adequate thought or knowledge. An ethics demands for its existence and practice the use of powers, which, because outside and independent of reason, it does not and cannot know. 3. An ethics is a universal discipline whose laws are binding on all. But then it neglects vital differences between men; infants and idiots should not be as tightly or as completely bound by the requirements of ethics as are those who are reasonable and sane. 4. An ethics states its principles formally, making no reference to any specific content or situation. But an ethics holds only for specific situations. It both is and ought not be a formal discipline. 5. An ethics directs us to a good which is not vet realized, which does not fit inside the world as it now is. The demands of the ethics transcend the present; but an ethics has to do with what is valuable here and now. 6. An ethics says that the good is an inescapable objective for man. Still men do evil. Their inescapable objective seems avoidable. 7. An ethics commends self-sacrifice. It thus advocates the use and denial of the individual, the most precious of goods. 8. For ethics there is no higher good than justice. But mercy is a higher good. The good of ethics is not good enough.

These various paradoxes can be viewed as variants of a ninth

<sup>\*</sup> The Wingate Lectures, delivered at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, April, 1954.

to the effect that men ought to do what is absolutely right, although none has sufficient power or knowledge for the purpose. It is to this last paradox that I shall devote the major part of my discourse. I will try to show that the paradox is inescapable, that a number of commonly accepted answers to it are unsatisfactory, and that an adequate answer to it will require a consideration of activities and categories which are outside the province of ethics. Only after these steps are covered will we be in a position to justify our basic contention that ethics and religion are independent and even sometimes incompatible enterprises.

Man in the obligated animal. On this all thinkers must, I believe, agree, even those whose explicit doctrines affirm that there are no obligations, that values are all relative, and that all constraints are bad or arbitrary. Unless men be perfect and thus gods, or imperfect but beyond all improvement and need, and thus without potentialities and appetites, there are things they ought and things they ought not to do.

Man is a being who ought, because man is a being who is improvable. Animals and even plants and inanimate things are also improvable. Some might even feel the force of a demand; they might be so well habituated that they feel uneasy if they do not do certain eminently desirable things. But they do not know that some things are right and some things wrong, for they are not aware of an obligating good which defines what it is that ought now to be done. Man alone knows of his obligations. He alone can be said to be ethically obligated because he alone can be aware of the fact that there is a good he ought to do if he is to do justice to his nature, needs, and promise.

Each of us is fully a man here and now. But no one of us is fully the man he ought to be. Completely human, none is a perfect man. Each one of us, no matter how excellent, ought to be better; each one of us, no matter how virtuous, ought to do more good than he has already done. It is the task of all of us to adopt, realize, be one with the ideal good. We are ethical beings so far as we take it as a standard, an ideal which it is our duty to make real, more determinate, concrete. Apart from us the ideal

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good would be nothing more than something that might be. By accepting it, man makes it into a that which ought to be.

In a way, then, the relativists and positivists are right when they insist that ethics comes to be with man. There is no ethics until man comes on the scene, for only he assumes responsibility for seeing that what ought to be is realized in fact. Deny him that responsibility and you reduce him to the status of an infant, an animal or a thing, unreflectingly realizing some limited ideal in the face of the competing efforts of others to realize different and sometimes antagonistic ones.

The realization of the good is man's responsibility. Because he has this responsibility he stands apart from all natural beings as an individual whose interests, tasks and reach extend beyond himself, his kind, or his environment. The very nature of the good, as universally pertinent, requires that he be in harmony with all others in the best possible world, and thus that he concern himself with the welfare of all the others as well as of To the extent that he dedicates himself to the realization of the good he becomes one who is good in promise, supreme in dignity. To the extent that he fulfills his obligation to perfect whatever else there be, he makes himself into a good being, living in a good world. To the extent that he fails, and then so long as there are defective, conflicting things in the world, he is himself defective, one who does less than a man ought to do, one who brings about less good than there ought to be, a man who fails to do his full duty.

So far as a man voluntarily accepts his responsibility, he is a being of good intent. He is more if he does what he rightly intends. He will then be an excellent being, in accord with other excellencies. Unfortunately, no man can fully realize the good. No one has enough energy, vision, persistence or objectivity to make it possible for him to realize the good everywhere. Each is responsible for realizing a good too big for him. No matter how well intentioned, no matter how persevering, no matter how strong or well-favored he never does all the good that ought or can be done. Man is the guilty animal.

It is man's task to do the good and nothing but the good. But this is beyond any individual's power. To see this clearly, let us imagine a man at his best. Let us credit our paragon with every virtue. Let him be wise, altruistic, well-trained. Let him be one who combines courage with tenderness, justice with kindness, adventure with humility, one who has a splendid, alert mind and is the master of all available knowledge. Let him have exquisite sensitivity and also skill enough to make excellent use of whatever traits and tools may be needed to bring about what ought to be everywhere. Let him even be a Faust to whom a God or devil has given the boon of having all his faculties at their peak, and also grant him opportunities to exercise these excellently. Or more realistically, let him be Aristotle's happy man, a man of virtue to whom has been given "good birth, good children, beauty, friends, riches and power." It makes little difference whether the picture is nothing more than ourselves idealized or something better. We are bound to find, no matter how resplendent our man, that he has serious and insuperable defects revealing him to be one who has failed and must fail to do all the good he ought.

No man has or can have every virtue and to the right degree. The different virtues are not all compatible. Innocence stands opposed to wisdom, justice to mercy, caution to generosity. Those virtues which are compatible, moreover, are not forever in perfect consonance with one another and the course of existence. No man is altogether at home in this world; even the noblest specimen will be intruded upon, frustrated, denied, opposed by others. Each is faced with thousands of things going their own way, without regard for the needs, natures or presence of the rest. Also, no man can act without then and there omitting much that he might and ought to have done. To concentrate here it is necessary to ignore what is there; proper help now requires attention and energy which is also needed for other work. Nor can any man act without doing some harm. He cannot avoid using up some things and treating others as mere means. And in order to produce something as good or better than what is, he is forced to transform, reject, modify still others. To bring about the good some values must be reduced, some positive wrong must be done now.

For the ethical man the ideal is what he intends to have be real everywhere. He identifies himself with it as a good pertinent 34 PAUL WEISS

to all else. As not yet elsewhere, it is an incomplete, indeterminate possibility, less good than it ought to be. It should be made determinate, part of the ongoing world. This a man does when he prefers, chooses and wills, when he acts intelligently and when he loves, for these are different ways in which he identifies himself with, makes himself identical in nature with the ideal and thereby enables the ideal to be realized. These activities, however, have but a short span and little compass. In the end they are defied and blocked by the world about. None of them succeeds in making a man into nothing but the locus of the good, or in so transforming other beings that they are wholly good. The good cannot be entirely realized through the avenue of a man's efforts alone.

Sometimes men find others weaker than themselves, and sometimes they overcome them by acting on them for their own good, by treating them with sympathy and care. The desire to do good sometimes makes possible an opening where force and guile could not prevail. Occasionally, too, others give in to men a little, particularly when men serve as carriers of a good which those others need. Men do good quite often. Yet it is a fact that the strongest and most virtuous finds himself, no less than the rest of us, constantly frustrated.

A man cares for only a few things deeply and then for but a short time. His purest love is alloyed, bearing some mark of self-regard and self-need. He can do but a few puny things in a tiny corner of a stupendous whole. No matter how hard he tries, a man fails to do justice to the ideal. This is beyond his power. Who knows enough, who is in sufficient control of things to be able to do all good and nothing but the good to just one other being? No man is ever so saintly or so wise or so constrained that he does nothing but the good and all the good he ought to do even to but one other.

Not even a paragon can do all a man ought. And any normal man will of course fall even further short of what a man ought to be and do. The ideal can never be fulfilled if it has no other status but that of the good which a man tries to realize through individual action. Due to ignorance and weakness of will, due to the limitation of his energy and the fluctuation of his attention, due to the excitation provoked by more immediate, intense but limited goods, subject to the conditioning of his time, place and class, every man fails again and again to attend to and bring about the good to which he is pledged. Consciously and deliberately he may even prefer to be in this state. It is pleasant to take a moral holiday, to be free from cares and responsibility. There is good in the experience and good in the result. Those who are much in earnest about their duty are also often dull and stultifying. Still what ought to be, ought to be. It is man's task to realize the good in fact. If being in earnest about his duties is a way of preventing the full realization of the good, then he should become less in earnest. The point is to fulfill his duties. If constant occupation with the idea of duty stands in the way of fulfilling a duty, a man might need a moral holiday so as to be able to do what ought to be done.

A man can come closer to realizing the good at one time than at another, here rather than there, in this rather than in that; he can never come close enough to do full justice to it. No matter how narrowly he confines its scope, he never does justice to its imperious dignity. Because the good is beyond his capacity to realize entirely he is one who cannot possibly be or become perfect—and conversely. Even when most virtuous, he is radically guilty of giving the cosmic good for which he is inevitably responsible, only a limited entry into the world.

No matter how excellent a man may be and how narrow the range of his responsibility, a man cannot realize the good completely. But then why should these things be expected of him? By what right can we say that he has obligations he cannot possibly fulfill? No one would blame, criticize, judge him, charge him with failure for not swallowing an ocean, for not growing an extra head, for not being as magnetic as iron. It seems foolish, wrong and futile to ask him to do these, for him, impossible things. But then is it not as unjust and idle to charge him with a failure to perfect himself and the world as it is to charge him with a failure to swallow an ocean or to grow a surplus head. Is it not a blunder to say that a man is obligated to do good everywhere, when this is so evidently quite beyond the furthest reach of his powers? An ought to be which cannot be,

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is this any more than an ought to be for nobody, nowhere, at no time? Can a man be obligated to do what is impossible for him to do?

Men ought not to be asked to do the impossible. But if that be the case, either (a) the ideal must moderate its demands, (b) men must not be required to do good everywhere; (c) men must have greater powers than we have said they have, (d) there must be a being which forgives the guilt that flows from a man's inevitable failure to do what he ought, or (e) men must be able to count on the exercise of more powers than they natively have.

(a) A long and honorable tradition maintains that the ideal is identical with perfect human pleasure. Another tradition identifies it with happiness. A third identifies it with human welfare. These and similar views cut down the claims of the ideal in radical ways. They do not assert that men are responsible for the realization of a universal good, but claim instead that the good is one whose realization is well within the reach of human power. To be sure there is misery, pain, frustration everywhere today. Each man walks a cobbled path, brinking on stinking holes. Tragedy stalks at the side of all. But there is no need that this should always be. Nothing in the nature of reality requires that there be pain, injury, sickness or even death. It seems possible then, remote though the prospect now seems, for men to realize the good fully, if this be one with pleasure, happiness, welfare or the like.

Alas, not even these can be realized, no matter how strong a man's will, how wide his knowledge, how well adjusted he be to the ways of the world. Happiness, pleasure, and welfare are horizon values. They can never be fully realized, for their attainment always involves their reinstatement in new, still to be realized forms. To attend to them is to have them still beyond oneself, still to be attained. To give a man pleasure, to make him happy, to provide for his welfare is to establish a new base, and to point to new distinct forms of pleasure, happiness and welfare still to be realized.

If in sympathy with the subjectivist temper of recent times one were to suppose that all values are produced by or are relevant only to men, it would still be necessary, if one intended to be just to the facts, to affirm that human pleasure, happiness or welfare do not exhaust the nature of the good. The good is richer than any or all of them. It has a dignity, an ideality these do not have.

The good, also, provokes us to action on its behalf, sometimes sacrificially. Rarely though does one willingly die to give pleasure, happiness, welfare to others. Genuine goods, they are but parts of the whole good which a man ought to bring about.

Also, the more that pleasure, happiness, welfare assume the shape of a good which a man ought to realize in himself, the more surely they assume the shape of a good which must be realized in others as well. But then it may well be that those others are outside man's reach, or that their improvement is beyond man's capacities. A good that pertains only to men is not attractive or demanding enough for men.

No theory can be adequate, which denies values and thus rights to non-human beings. We are moved by animal cries, we suffer with them. When we sense their hurt we grasp something of the wrong to which they are subject. We know we cannot identify the good with what satisfies a man, since we know that if he found pleasure in animal pain it would still not be right to make animals suffer. Nor can we stop here. The life in plants, half-quiescent though it be, also has worth; he who extinguishes it destroys a value, goes counter to the ideal. And there are beauties in nature, in no way created by man, though apparently appreciated by no one else. To suppose these beauties are not objective, inherent in the world, is to confound appreciation with what is appreciated.

Subhuman beings are not so alien to men in nature, being and destiny as to place them outside the range of man's need to attend to their good. This universe is no set of distinct realms having no bearing on one another. Every being makes justifiable claims against the others that its nature be preserved and its virtues enhanced. Man's obligations extend so far as there are beings, no matter what kind they are or where they exist and what service or disservice they might render him.

Let us ignore this thought for the moment, a thought so congenial to the East but not too congenial to the West. Let us say 38 PAUL WEISS

against our own good judgment and experience that a man is obligated to do good to himself and to no one else, that this good is not a horizon value. Even this narrowly confined obligation is completely beyond his power to fulfill. No man ever did and no man ever can do full justice to himself. Each neglects some potentialities to concentrate on others. None has ever made himself into a perfect man, and none ever will. The most narrowly confined of obligations is beyond his capacity to fulfill. And if, as seems evident, we are obligated to do good at least to those we love, it becomes painfully clear and disturbing that we men are obligated to do what is far beyond our individual capacity to do.

A good that pertains also to others is even further beyond a man's reach than one which pertains only to himself. The first of our alternatives, that a man might be able to fulfill his obligations, if only those obligations were more narrowly defined, is untenable; it goes counter to the facts and leaves us with the same problem nevertheless.

(b) A man's inability to bring about the good does not reduce or cancel his obligation; it makes it only more onerous. Yet it does seem absurd to say that a man's obligation is so great that he cannot wipe it out by any conceivable exercise of his powers. It seems absurd, too, to claim that he has an obligation assumed moreover without reflection, without choice or desire —to benefit all other beings, particularly since some of these are beyond his present grasp. It does not seem to make sense to say that it is man's task to improve the distant past or beings galaxies away. The objects in the distant past and the distant galaxies cannot now be reached in their substantiality. (Plays such as "Berkeley Square" in which the hero somehow gets into a previous century, or fantasies such as the Time Machine which allow time to be reversed, seem to allow for a conceivable recovery of the past. But they absurdly suppose that there is a definite finished past into which one can actually enter. Yet to enter the past is to change it from a past-to-be-entered into an entered-past. The latter is evidently not the past that had been, but an entirely new past. The past-to-be entered is a past for the being who had not yet retraced his steps-presumably in the future-and that being must in that very act of retracing change the past into which he enters. He cannot enter into what had been in fact past to him.) There is a possible recovery of the meaning of the past, no possible recovery of the past in itself. But then it would seem foolish to say that it is a man's task to improve everything, if this includes the past, since this at least is unreachable and unalterable.

Then why should we not also say in accord with traditional doctrine that a man's responsibility does not extend beyond the reach of his knowledge or power? Why say that his obligations extend beyond what can be known and what can be done by him? What he does not know, what he cannot in principle know, what is beyond his present ability to realize or what is beyond his capacity ever to realize, why say this is binding on him? The reply must be as before. The demands of the good do not lose their insistence, their legitimacy or their applicability because they are unknown, unheeded, outside one's competence. The good has needs and rights which cannot be jeopardized by man's incapacities. A man's obligations to his children do not disappear because he forgets them. He cannot make his debts vanish by paying no attention to them, by not having the money, or by being unable to get the money to pay them. Were a man required to pay his debts only so far as he was able to pay them, the less provident he was, the more he was mired in debt, the less of an obligation would he have to meet. The "ought" does not dangle from the "is"; its strength does not wax and wane with changes in men's powers. Otherwise a man could borrow money, spend it on drink, lose his job and thereupon, because he thereby was without any prospect of repaying the money, become free of his indebtedness. Either we must say that no one who borrows may dissipate or invest badly, or in any way endanger the money he borrows—and then it would be a question why he should borrow at all—or he would still owe the money though his use of that money might be such as to preclude his ever repaying it.

A man's obligations are not limited to what he knows or can do. His obligations extend far beyond his knowledge or power, not only because the nature of the good does not await on the progress of his inquiry or the increase of his strength, but also because he is in fact no mere local being. Nothing is in 40 PAUL WEISS

principle alien to his mind, foreign to his appetites, without some bearing on his nature, destiny and value. He is a cosmic being unable to live inside the narrow circle of his place, time or friends, no matter how satisfying they appear to be. His relations, needs, rights and duties extend endlessly outward, everywhere. And wherever he extends he has tasks to perform, a good to realize.

To say that a man is not responsible for the conservation or enhancement of every item in the universe is to cut him off from part of the world to which he belongs and with which he is involved. It is to say that the good he intends or for which he is responsible is not the ideal, a possibility needing realization everywhere. Were a man's obligations to extend only so far as neighbor, family, class, nation, or age, or even to all mankind or all living things, his stature would be reduced, and unjustifiably.

A man cannot be freed from the need to improve even what lies in the remote past. Such improvement must of course be in consonance with, must not contradict the nature of the past. No one can be obligated to do what is self-contradictory, to make circles have corners, or to make the past into something present. But men can be required to know circles or what is past, and thereby appropriately improve them. Knowledge places things in a better context, gives them a new destiny, purges and harmonizes them, allows them to function free from the dross and confusion of daily existence, and in this way to be better than they were. A knowledge of the past does not and need not get into the past. The past is all that it can be. The classical Greeks are Greeks, finished, completed, all that those Greeks are or ever can be. Their meaning, though, can be dramatized, improved, glorified by being brought within the orbit of current knowledge. It is because knowledge makes it possible to do justice in this way to the needs and deserts of what is past that men are under obligation to inquire and to reflect on what has happened. Instead of being obligated only so far as his knowledge extends, a man rather is obligated to extend his knowledge without limit.

Knowledge improves all things, giving them careers and destinies other than those they would otherwise have had. Men therefore must seek to know whatever there is. But knowledge never does full justice to the needs and deserts of what now exists.

If a man cannot act on as well as know contemporaries he does less than justice to them. He ought therefore to act on the star now millions of miles away. He cannot, but this is because he failed to make ample provision for doing so. Knowing that it is his task to do good to all that is, it is his duty to make ample preparation for doing this without limit. The case seems far-fetched, perhaps even absurd. Let it be forgotten, and let us concentrate our attention on cases closer to home.

Right now I cannot help a dying man in Tel Aviv. I cannot now wipe out the slums of Jerusalem. I cannot now reform the hardened criminal who perhaps is walking outside this building. I cannot now act on any of these properly. But this does not reduce my responsibility toward them, erase my guilt, alter the fact that the ideal is to be realized in them. My incapacity to act properly with respect to these things and any other objects near or distant but points up the fact that I should have acted earlier in such a way as to make this later action possible. Incapacities with respect to contemporaries point up moral failures yesterday.

To cut down a man's responsibility is to cut down his promise, dignity, value. His basic right is the right to become guilty, which is but to say to be responsible. The more things for which he can be charged with guilt, the greater is his stature. Subhumans are free from guilt because they are below man in value and promise. He is superior to them because he alone is responsible for a cosmic good. Take away his responsibility for realizing the good everywhere and he will no longer be the tragic figure he is. But the price that will be paid is that he will not have the value and promise that is rightfully his. He will be on a level with the rest of the beings in nature, only one among many instead of also being, as he is, a one responsible for enhancing that many, a being obligated by a cosmic good.

A man is a better being, by virtue of his capacity to be guilty, than he would be were he free from such a prospect. In theological terms this means that it is man's special privilege to sin. Deny him this and you deny his superiority to the rest of nature. The "sin" is his apart from all volition; it is a natural outcome of his inseparable connection with an obligating good and his incapacity to do it full justice.

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Man is superior to all else in nature because he is capable of guilt, because he alone has the dignity of being obligated to realize the good. And when a man becomes guilty in fact he attains a still higher status, for guilt marks the encroachment of the good inside a man, infecting, qualifying and subordinating the evil that he is and does.

It is better to be guilty in fact than to be merely capable of guilt. That is why a new born baby, capable of guilt but not yet guilty, is less a person than an adult, no matter how wicked. Of course, it is better to be a good man, than a bad one, not to be guilty than to be guilty, providing the guiltlessness is a consequence of the excellence of actions, and not of the failure to get to the stage of action at all. Guilt is desirable thus only as evidence of the relevance of the idea of good to an evil of omission or commission already produced by men. It is not desirable in itself. The thing to do is to avoid the stain of guilt by both intending and doing the good.

It is man's task to realize the good to the full everywhere. It is his task to give the ideal its needed determinations. This he is able to do because the ideal first makes him its fief, makes him receptive to it as a good for others as well as for himself. Anyone who reduced it to his own dimensions so as to make it conform to his own interests, knowledge or capacities would do wrong, for he would thereby minimize, not preserve or enhance it. He would also subject it to the risk of being modified privately and capriciously and in that way bring himself into possible opposition to others. The good remains outside men, beyond their right or ability to reduce to their dimensions. Any failure to meet its demands leaves the demands still to be met. Men then ought not to try to reduce their obligations even for the laudable purpose of having no obligations unfulfilled.

(c) Might it not be the case though that men have greater powers than we are claiming they have? Have we not ourselves already spoken of man as a cosmic being with an unlimited range, whose mind and curiosity cannot be rightly confined within any pre-assigned limits? His mastery of nature seems to increase constantly; his tools and techniques seem capable of endless improvement. What now seems to be outside his control may

sooner or later be his to use as he would. Thus speaks the true Humanist, best represented by the Marxist with his stress on technology and his insistance on the world of practice as the source and test of all ideals.

The humanistic view has great strength. But it is trapped by five difficulties which plague it throughout its career and to this very day. Firstly, it makes no provision for the reality of the ideal good. Yet this is presupposed. It is at this good that the Marxist and other humanists direct their attention; it is this they pledge themselves to bring about. If there be no provision for such a good, they then require for their thought and acts the existence of something which their views cannot accommodate, thereby revealing those views to be inadequate, even self-contradictory. And they can make no such provision since it is of the essence of their view that the good is a changing, dependent function of the world which cannot therefore prescribe or demand anything of it.

Secondly, the number, efficacy and purpose of instruments depends on the nature of the material out of which they are made, the character of the world on which they are employed, and the objectives they serve. Before it can be claimed that man has the power to do all that must be done on behalf of the good, it must be shown that there is material available for the production of the needed instruments, that the instruments have an opportunity to operate effectively, and that they can be used to bring about the maximum good everywhere. But this is precisely the question at issue. Man's involvement is world-wide. But that does not mean that he has or will ever have available instruments enough to permit him to deal with all there is, or which will enable him to realize the maximum possible good.

Thirdly, on this theory the kind of instruments that can be produced, the problems they are designed to answer, the results that they can accomplish is a matter not of human decision but of a cosmic force which uses men as pawns for its own ends. But then it could conceivably weaken or destroy what they accomplish. It could conceivably stand in the way of the production of the maximum good. Unless we can say that the cosmic force, despite such facts as war and pestilence does nothing but good, it may

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prove to be the very power which prevents men from doing all they ought.

Fourthly, the doctrine claims that men, art, science, government, technology and all theories are functions of place, class, society and time. But such theories as the Marxist are themselves intelligible as sound and stable views only if they be understood to be free from the limitations of the class and time of their authors and advocates. These men and their theories presumably are not conditioned by date and class. When the date changes or some other class is dominant, their view, these men believe, will still be true. But then it is not the case that all theories are functions of class or need.

Finally on this view the whole good could be done only when the world reached a climatic fulfillment. It is doubtful though that there is such a climax; it is certainly unquestionable that a fulfilling climax has not yet been reached. And in any case until the world changes radically from what it now is, no man, even on this humanistic view, will have the power, with or without the help of technology and science, to do all the good that should be done.

Men can become more detached, objective, more reasonable than they are. They can become stronger in will and skill, and surely can bring about much more than they already have. Human knowledge is but a fragment of what it could be; human capacities are an almost unexplored and surely an unexploited terrain. It would be wrong for anyone to deny to men the promise or the right to go on and on in knowledge, growth and mastery. It would be wrong to set a limit beyond which inquiry, self-correction, skill and good works can go. But none of these observations affects the fact that man's capacities fall far short of what is needed in order to bring about the whole good.

(d) Being finite, a man is unable to realize a cosmic, universally applicable good. But he is obligated to realize it, and is therefore a guilty being, one who does not do all he ought. Much of this that he ought to do he cannot do. But it is paradoxical to say that a man ought to do the impossible. And there is injustice in the demand as well. It is unjust to say that a man is guilty for failing to do the impossible. And this paradox we have seen

cannot be overcome by supposing that the claims or application of the good have a smaller range than the cosmos, or by supposing that the powers of man have an unlimited, effective scope.

It is not true that men are innocent of wrong so long as their failure is inevitable. Guilt describes the state of a being who fails to do what he ought. One need not be conscious of it; one need not allow it to disturb his equanimity. But so long as it is true to say that a man ought to do the good, and that he is guilty so far as he fails to do what he ought, it is true to say that guilt is his unavoidable lot.

A man, though inevitably guilty, might be forgiven. But by whom? Such forgiveness is not within the power or the right of man, and this for three reasons. Firstly, no man can forgive another for injuries to anyone but to himself. Yet forgiveness of injuries to oneself falls sadly short of the forgiveness which is needed if a man is not to be guilty at all. He is at the very least guilty for his delinquencies with respect to relatives, friends, and neighbors, not to speak of all men, and the hosts of subhuman beings that make up this world of ours. He cannot forgive himself for failing them. And since they do not forgive him, he continues to remain guilty of wrongs inevitably done them.

Secondly, if a man forgave only wrongs against himself but left as much wrong as before, his act would be futile; if he forgave but left a greater wrong—which would be the case if the proper guilt were wiped out but the harm it answers to were untouched—he would but compound injury. Forgiveness requires the production of those very results whose absence defines the guilt. But man's guilt is inevitable.

He can excuse, overlook, forget, but forgiveness is evidently quite beyond his powers.

One might of course speak of forgiveness as reinstating the good in the very position which is denied to it by the fact of guilt. But this supposes that guilt is the product of acts of commission and never of omission. It supposes that there has been only a dislocation of the good and not a failure to realize it. And in any case, men have neither the power nor the right to change the status of the good. They have not the power, for the good stands apart from them, a center of imperious demands. Nor

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have they the right to make such a change, for then they would have the right to deny to the good demands it properly makes.

Thirdly, forgiveness must take place after, at the same time as, or before the guilt occurs. If after, there will always be a period of time when men remain guilty. Whatever injustice there be in the fact of such guilt at time  $t_0$  will not be cancelled because the guilt vanishes at time  $t_0$ . The injustice would merely be given a date, a temporal end as well as a temporal beginning. Nor is there evidence that forgiveness occurs at the same time as guilt. If it did it would involve the wiping out of the guilt at the very instant in which it occurred, and one would so far not be guilty at all. Yet if forgiveness were given in advance it would not be forgiveness in fact, but an alteration in the nature of man, since it would make him one who could never become guilty.

Men have not the power or the right to forgive their failures to do good everywhere, all the time, without remainder. Such forgiveness is possible only to some power superior to man, perhaps a God. Indeed a God might be said not only to have the power, but alone to have the right to make guilt cease to be any longer. But the forgiveness of God, like the forgiveness of man, must either anticipate, keep apace with, or follow on the guilt to which it is pertinent. The difficulties just found with all three are in no may diminished when the author of the forgiveness is taken to be God rather than man, for what is at issue here is the relation of the forgiveness to the guilt, not the nature of the source of the forgiveness. A forgiveness that anticipates the guilt precludes its occurrence; one that operates just when the guilt occurs allows the guilt no status; one that operates after it occurred allows the guilt to exist for a time.

Also, a God powerful enough to be able to forgive everything is one who should be able to make things such that there is no need for forgiveness in the first place. If God always does forgive, why should he ever have allowed the guilt to occur? It is strange that if he made men he should so have made them that they are unjustly subject to a guilt for inevitable wrongs, and then arranges to have the guilt wiped out by him, the very being who originally made that guilt inescapable. And most important, his forgiveness will allow for and must allow for the continued

presence of guilt. Otherwise his forgiveness either would involve a divine alteration of man, preventing him from being one who is or can be guilty, or it would be a way of annihilating the distance between what a man does and ought to do, thereby denying rights to the good.

Forgiveness is an act by which not guilt but the consequences of guilt are cancelled, an act in which only the price that guilt should pay is refused or returned. God, in short, might be merciful. Such mercy allows guilt to remain but cancels the debt guilt owes. But if this be so, men even when divinely forgiven, will be stained with a guilt, and this though they did all in their power to do nothing but the good. The paradox and the injustice seem still to remain even on the hypothesis that God forgives all.

There is no forgiveness of guilt by either man or God which does not presuppose the existence of guilt, and thus the injustice of having men blamed for what they could not possibly avoid, or which does not involve the neglect of the right of the good to be realized everywhere, and thus requires itself to be forgiven. The right of the good to be realized everywhere, and man's responsibility to have it so realized belong together. The paradox of human impotence in the face of the cosmic obligatory good is inseparable from the injustice of a guilt which is man's because of his failure to do what he cannot possibly do. No forgiveness, divine or human, alters the paradox a bit.

It might be thought possible though to have oneself forgiven not by man or God but by a state or similar social whole. There are statues of limitation for monetary debts; after a certain date some debts are legally non-existent. We are all satisfied that it is good law and good politics for the state to arrogate to itself the right to say that after a time debts are non-existent and in this sense forgiven. Why should it not be good ethics as well? May it not be true that every debt has a finite career? May it not be true that society rightly requires that every debt, even ethical ones, cease to be after a period of time, if not paid off by then? But were this the case it would still be true that men would be guilty for a time, and if the guilt were unjustly theirs, that there would be injustice at least for a time. The problem of the injustice would not be removed by having the injustice come to an end. Also,

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no social unit has the right to cancel a debt unless it assumes and pays the debt itself. But no society assumes all debts. None seems able to take all ethical debts on itself, for some of these—particularly those relating to the affections and emotions—are beyond its abilities to assume or to fulfill. Only men can love, sympathize, appreciate; societies can merely allow, condone, forget.

We are left with nothing more than the alternative: men must be able to count on the exercise of more powers than they natively have. Just what these can be, it is our next task to determine.

(To be concluded.)

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## THE NATURE OF COGNITION: MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR A PERSONALISTIC EPISTEMOLOGY

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1. The Person and the Experiential Situation. Knowing is a dynamic process which activates the person. Each person is a unitas multiplex of sensing, remembering, reasoning, feeling, willing, oughting, and evaluating—in brief, an evaluating-willing being. In constant interaction or responsive rapport with beings other than himself, a person does not first "know" what "that" is and, then, evaluate it. His full cognitive response is evaluative. For him: What "exists"? or What is "real"? is part of the question: "What difference does it make to me as a thinking, wanting, oughting, willing, appreciating being?" In other words, to know is to transform whatever the metaphysical interaction would otherwise be into the individual person's search for the dimensions of truth, goodness, beauty, and holiness.

For a response to be personal, then, is for it to be a total response in which aesthetic, moral, perceptual, rational, and religious dimensions may be discriminated, though one particular dimension may be in focus or dominant at any one moment. In the remainder of this paper we shall focus on that abstract phase of the total response which we call perceptual, without prejudice to evaluative responses accompanying it. The "situation experienced," to use E. S. Brightman's terminology, is an undeniable complex within which most of these factors-in-response can usually be distinguished.

¹ An abridgement of this paper was read to the Metaphysical Society of America on March 19, 1954, as part of a Symposium on the Nature of Cognition. It should be added that the term "personalistic" here does not mean, fortunately, that all the views expressed below are either exclusive contentions of Personalism or even that I am speaking for all personalists. All that is meant by the use of this label is that this is the basic approach to epistemological problems developed by pluralistic personal idealists, like Bowne and Brightman in America.

Thus, within complex, phenomenological situations-experienced, the person finds data upon which he bases his knowledge not only of the world in which he lives, but also of his total person. Within the situation experienced, claims are made as to what should be believed, but the situation itself as experienced is cognitively innocent, that is, it yields no unambiguous justification of any particular belief about the person or the world.

- Criteriological Postulate. The truth either about oneself or about the world is to be discovered by coherent organization of all of the knowledge-claims made in, and on the basis of, the situation-experienced. No aspect of the situation experienced, and no claim made about it, is to be ruled out of court arbitrarily. At the same time, no one aspect is to be given cognitive priority, or left without question as infallible revelation. Any claim made about any part, or about the whole of experience must be treated as an hypothesis. To be considered true, any hypothesis must not only be self-consistent and consistent with other claims and presumable facts, but it must also be able to correlate the different aspects and phases of experience better than any other hypothesis. This criterion is not the criterion of logical coherence, as found in such absolutists as Bradley, but the criterion of growing, empirical coherence. Again, in accordance with it, that hypothesis is regarded as true which, better than any other, illuminates or clarifies the relationship between the data of experience without distortion either of fact or of logic. The conviction underlying the use of this criterion is that, unless the course of investigation reveals some indubitable fact, we are more likely to find truth when we trust the coherently organized whole of experience than when we trust any one part, or any one "deliverance."
- III. The Principle of Objective Reference. The situation experienced is conscious experience of complex awareness. Now, it is the unique characteristic of any act of awareness that it claims to be an awareness of something not itself. To repeat, any act of awareness, in addition to being a mental event (like any emotion or a feeling or an act of will), claims to represent, to be valid of, something other than itself as an act of awareness. In Borden P. Bowne's words, "our thoughts, though mental

events, claim to be valid for an order of fact or reason which our thoughts do not make but discover, and which is common to all and not merely special to me." <sup>2</sup>

This personalistic tenet, it may be said in passing, finds common ground with all attempts to draw a sharp distinction between mentality and non-mentality. In the non-mental, there is no place for, no meaning to, "objective reference." No other kind of activity has this capacity of being itself and yet pointing beyond itself. This is a distinctive quality of mind, and one which must frustrate all attempts to reduce mind to the non-mental.

But a fundamental issue between a personalistic and a realistic epistemology, concerns the exact analysis of what the experience of objective reference reveals. When Professor Parker, for example, says: "All awareness presents itself as revelation of something other than itself," he hears a hearty "bravo" from personalistic quarters. But a personalist becomes uncertain when Professor Parker goes on: "In addition to the fact that the object of every awareness is different from the awareness of it, there is the additional fact that whenever we are aware of anything we are aware of it as being independent of the precise act of our own awareness of it." Here everything depends on the meaning of the word independent. If the word simply refers to the fact that in any act of awareness we are aware of something which is independent of it as a particular act of awareness, this is true. It then merely spells out the meaning of the words, "objective reference."

But the realist means more than this by the word independent. He means not only independent of the act of awareness as such, but "independent" of as in no way affected by the act of awareness.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Borden P. Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge (New York, American Book Co.), p. 14.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> Francis Parker, in Return to Reason, ed. by John Wild, p. 154.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> That this is what he does mean is clear from Professor Parker's paper "The Nature of Cognition: Minimum Requirements for a Realistic Theory," read March 19 before the Metaphysical Society in Cambridge. Here he says that "every act of awareness presents its object as if the latter were independent of the former. But such presumptive independence does not guarantee actual independence." Actual independence needs further argument; we take note of this argument at the end of this paper.

Thus Professor Parker says: "All experience presents itself to our inspection as a revelation into the lives of things which are wholly undisturbed by that revelation." Here a personalist takes another look at experience and still wonders whether it is experience or theory which presents any such conclusion about the nature of the object's independence. It may be true that things known are not disturbed, or are "wholly undisturbed," by the act of knowing, but this is certainly no unimpeachable deliverance of consciousness, nor is it implicit in the act of awareness.

The experience of objective reference, to use Bowne's term, or of intentionality in realistic terms, is indubitable. But the independence involved in the act of objective reference is not necessarily the *specific kind* asserted when the realist says that the object referred to in knowledge is "wholly undisturbed by that revelation." It would seem clear to a personalist that, since realist and non-realist alike must recognize, sooner or later, that there are fictions and conceptual entities which do not have such independence, we should suspect the concept of knowledge as undisturbed by the act of knowing.

In other words, a personalist thinks that the realist is merging two different stages in the knowing process. He merges the experience of objective reference with a particular view of what that reference entails, a view which may be the correct description of what is involved in many instances of objective reference, but is not as transparently clear as is the fact of objective reference itself. Whether I experience the bent stick in the water, or the straight stick outside, I do, in the act of objective reference, attribute both objects to something not the act of attributing. But I certainly do not know that what I have attributed is "wholly undisturbed" by the attributing. I know simply that I attribute my object beyond the act of attributing, and nothing else. Everything beyond this point is interpretation, and, so far as I know at this moment, the realistic interpretation may be correct, or some other may be correct.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Parker, ibid., p. 154.

<sup>&</sup>quot; Ibid.

IV. The Epistemological Object as Joint-Product of Creative Knower and of Metaphysical Agent. A personalist would affirm as vigorously as any realist, neo-realist, or critical realist that the metaphysical object, to be referred to as x, is not created by knowing activity in any of its forms. x presumably interacts in numerous ways with other metaphysical x's, and the effect that it has on them, presumably, is peculiar to the nature of the affected object. Thus a red-hot poker alters the molecular action in the pail of water into which it is dipped in accordance with the nature of the water. The water in turn has an effect upon the molecules in the poker. The effect of this interaction on both water and poker is a joint-product of each other's nature, and, of course, of all other interacting factors.

A personalist finds no good reason for supposing that the situation is different with regard to interaction between x, the metaphysical agent, and another kind of being, namely the evaluating-willing person. The x produces in the knowing being alterations in its nature consistent with its nature, that is, the complex unity of knowing-appreciating. Accordingly, when x interacts with the knowing person, whatever its subliminal and other effects upon his total nature, it is responded to cognitively. That is, the agent responds according to his nature, having taken the action according to his cognitive capacities and dispositions. The effect upon him is an effect in him which it could not have on any other being of a different nature. When, therefore, by gross abstraction, we say: "He senses heat," we are saying that he, a being with the capacity to sense, is now experiencing the qualitative sensation, heat, which is a joint-product in his cognition of three sets of events: (1) the nature of his own being, including his cognitive act, (2) the factors outside him in x, and (3)whatever media may exist between this cognitive effect in him as knower and the stimulating situation (the x situation).

To summarize, the sense-datum, heat, is a joint-product in the sensing knower of whatever activities and changes have gone on in himself and beyond himself up to the point of his sensory consciousness of heat. Such analysis forces a personalist to become an epistemological dualist. The epistemological object in awareness and the metaphysical object x known are two

separate entities, and are in no way identical with each other, or copies of each other. The epistemological object could not exist apart from the knowing act, however. To explain the epistemological object we must always refer to activities beyond the knowing act, in the metaphysical object, which we infer, and describe on the basis of coherent interpretation of the experienced data.

Even in what is sensed, then, a personalist holds that his own active nature has left its imprint. But in sensing experience, as opposed to imaginative, memorial, and intellectual response, the knowing person is essentially passive; he has to "take" "what is given." To go from the sensory experience of "heat" to the statement, "the poker is hot," involves the use of memorial, categorial, and universalizing activities of the active, thinking person (all of which need elaboration not possible here, of course).

These other responsive activities of the knower are mentioned here to underline the fact that, in personalist epistemology, the cognitive response of the self is creative, and never merely one of contact, or one of assimilation to the metaphysical object, or one of copying. In any act of knowing, the knower is not only affected by what occurs to him willy-nilly, but he thinks or knits his experiences together in accordance with his own cognitive capacities. A personalist insists that whatever it is that is to be known can never be known as it is. The mind does not "rub noses" with its object, it does not "embrace" its object. The mind cognizes its object, and this means that the epistemological object is always a dynamic product, and never identical with, the stimulating process. Thus, if there is heat in the poker, the experienced heat is effect and not identical with the productive cause, x-heat. Since the experienced heat is the response in the individual's mind of all that intervened between what is in nature and what is in the knower, it is inconsistent with everything we otherwise know about causal interaction to say that the heat-experienced is the x-heat, presuming there is Take the knower seriously, take the intervening processes seriously, and it seems impossible to be an epistemological monist, or an "undisturbed" realist.

V. Personalism and "the Egocentric Predicament." If the cognitive act never reveals the object known as it is, how do we know (a) that there is one, and (b) what it is? Are we not forced into skepticism? How do we ever know that what we know is the metaphysical object?

The personalist cannot resort to animal faith for his belief in the existence of a world other than himself. For animal faith, he finds, is "loaded" with a metaphysical thesis that what is independent of the knower is non-mental. The empirical personalist at this point in the argument does not know what the metaphysical structure of the object is. He is neither guilty of the fallacy of initial predication, the hasty conclusion to the mental nature of the metaphysical object from the ego-centric predicament, nor of the metaphysical dogmatism involved in the claim that the given is non-mental. He asks himself: What evidence is there in my situation-experienced for the assertion that there is some sort of being independent of this experience (but not necessarily mental or necessarily non-mental)?

His reply, briefly, is this: Within many situations-experienced, analysis reveals "brute" qualia or sense-data which are refractory to my will. Not only are these data refractory, but there is an order and sequence which I frequently would prefer to have otherwise. Prima facie, then, my cognitive experiences have objective reference, but some of these experiences of objective reference are further reinforced by the compelling quality and order that I find in these data. Thus, the brute qualia of heat, which burns me whether I will or no, causes pain I would prefer not to have, and is regularly followed by certain other experiences which are also refractory to my will—these form the basis for a reasonable belief that there is something not myself, that is, not under my control, which nevertheless acts upon me in hidden ways whose effects I "see."

In other words, reasonable analysis of my situations-experienced calls for a distinction between that in my experience which is created by me and that in my experience which I do not cause but am forced to accept. I define as reality other than myself all that does not depend upon me for its existence or which I depend upon for my experience. Now, since I do not

make my own basic nature, nor the structure and order of the qualia in many situations-experienced, I come to the general conclusion that such situations-experienced are products of what reality in me and beyond me is.

It should be clear, also, that this first indication of reality beyond or other than me (namely, refractoriness of certain aspects of experience) is obviously not evidence which conclusively proves that there is something not myself. I have reasoned about the difference between refractory and non-refractory experiences and have concluded that the refractory are probably due to interaction with something not myself (which I have called x).

Similar reasoning leads me to distinguish my imaginary world, in which I consciously create the order and structure, and my dream world, which at the time of dreaming seems as refractory to my will as any other part of my "real" world. The dream world, on final analysis, does not stand in coherent relationship with that vast store of dependable relationships which I call my everyday experience of "reality." Thus, the refractoriness of qualia and their order serve as a reasonable basis for belief in a world not myself. As I come to find reason to believe in other minds (whose likeness to mine, incidentally, I conclude from the realization that they report certain experiences similar to mine), their independent testimony stands always as confirmation and critique of vast areas of my own specific beliefs. But throughout, my belief in a world beyond me is an hypothesis grounded in the data of my "first person" experience; my belief in an independent world is an hypothesis which is not infallible but which helps me to understand the structure of all of my situations-experienced as no other alternative hypothesis does.

VI. The relation of the known to the metaphysical world. How do we know that what is given in perceptual experience is true of what is non-self? First, if true means identical with, then what is in sensation is not true. We are not even claiming that what is in sensation is similar qualitatively, for everything we know suggests that the heat I experience as a mind cannot be the same process or quality in a poker! What, then, does the

heat I experience tell me about the metaphysical object? Reasonable inference from my situations-experienced tells me that there are certain things about x which, in relation to me, under certain conditions, produce certain kinds of conscious experience.

Let us be cautious here. I am not saying that I know nothing about x, as Kant seems sometimes to have said. It is true that I cannot assert a one-to-one qualitative correspondence between my epistemological object and the metaphysical x. But I can assert that the metaphysical x interacts with my cognitive structure and needs in such ways that the effects of its actions upon me, and upon other minds, and our organization of these effects, are such that we do not misconstrue reality completely either in our thought about these effects or in our actions as guided by reasoning from these effects. In other words, while we cannot affirm one-to-one correspondence between the contents of our minds and the structures and relations of the metaphysical objects, we can say that our cognitive responses are relevant to a structure of things.

No exact analogy, obviously, can be given for what the knowledge-situation seems to be, but, to borrow F. R. Tennant's suggestion, we may say that our knowledge is related to reality as a road map is to the physical roads. There is no one-to-one correspondence between any map and any road, but it would be false to say that the map tells us nothing about the road.

Or, to use another figure, we may say that our knowledge is to reality as a key is to a lock. The key is not identical with the lock, but its structure is not irrelevant to the structure of the lock, but key and lock, when the key fits, operate in such a way as to satisfy the person's demands.

To summarize: our sense-data cannot be organized in any way we please and still be relevant as a guide to further thought and action. We are controlled sufficiently by the structure of the metaphysical object to know that, with reasoned observation, we can proceed to establish dependable relations between our various human ventures, practical and theoretical, and the metaphysical structure. Other kinds of creatures, angels or gremlins, might, in interaction with that structure, avail themselves of more (or less) than what we with our human natures can.

Let us, at this point, try to imagine the situation from the other end, that is, from the point of view of the metaphysical object, x. For reasons not important here, a personalist would say that (in relation to what we describe as the inorganic world) the metaphysical object is best conceived as the energizing or activity of the will of a reasonable, orderly, cosmic Mind. Thus, the mountain and field, the ocean and cloud, the stone and metal, are the effect upon our total personal consciousness of the objective and independent structure of activities which constitute this phase of the cosmic Person's nature. As we improve our insight, as we extend our range of experience and knowledge, we are discovering what that reality can be for us at our level of experience and insight.

Again, while there probably is no one-to-one correspondence between our phenomenal world and this metaphysical activity, the metaphysical activity is such that, it can support a limited number of interpretations and uses. Just as a teacher's words may support a limited number of interpretations and uses; not every interpretation and use will be as true (or as good) as the one he intended. Thus, the structure of the cosmic Person's activities at different levels of being will be relevant to and support a limited number of conceptions and adjustments. The present conceptions of the physical world are conceptions which those activities support. The history of science is the history of the fact that more than one phenomenal description is possible, but not all are equally rich in theoretical and practical value.

VII. Must knowledge mean noetic identity? What, finally, is at stake here? It is the definition of knowledge, which, in turn, controls our definition of skepticism. Knowledge could mean what some idealists and some realists claim that it means, some sort of relation of identity between thought and thing, knower and known. This definition cannot be thrown out of court arbitrarily. But neither can it be used as the standard by which analysis of the knowing process is to be judged, or by which other conceptions of knowledge are condemned. The problem is to establish any particular definition of knowledge in the light of evidence provided in the epistemological situation.

And fundamental is the fact that once the epistemological identity of sense-data and metaphysical objects or thought and metaphysical object are asserted, there is no explanation as to how error can be possible. At best, what such realistic and idealistic theories do is to explain what happens when error does take place. But what needs explaining is how error is possible if identity is the initial and primary condition in the knowledge-situation. A dualistic view of the knowledge-situation, proceeding from interactive rapport at the metaphysical level between knower and known, does allow us to explain how different degrees of error and of truth are possible.

Such a dualistic view of the knowledge-situation problem, however, is constantly attacked on the assumption that unless knowledge is conceived of as cognitive identity, nothing but agnosticism and skepticism can result. Professor Parker contended, in his paper before the Metaphysical Society, that the above argument led to a reductio ad absurdum. Such a fatal charge must be given at least brief attention here. We state it in Professor Parker's own words:

If it is assumed that everything cognized depends for the whole or a part of its essence or character upon the act of cognizing it, then antecedent independent existents are altered by being cognized so as to gain some new character or property (minimally the property of "being known") for which they are dependent upon the cognitions of them. But this implies that the act of cognizing x transforms x into x'. And this is to assert that the awareness of x is not an awareness of x itself, identically, but rather of non-x (x'), . . . which contradicts itself ("I am aware of it and yet not aware of it"). Hence its contradictory—that some cognized entities are independent in essence of their cognition—is true."

In the first place, we must repeat that this attack is formidable only if knowledge must mean identity. It is true that, on the view presented above, the interaction between metaphysical x and the knower transforms whatever x is into x'. But x' (the epistemological object) is the effect of x, which still retains its own metaphysical nature. If x, after interaction with the knower, passed out of existence (as a man expires, though leaving

<sup>&#</sup>x27; Quoted from Professor Parker's "Summary" of his paper.

his last words behind him), then the dualist would indeed have to give up his own ghost. But if he finds, as he does, that his epistemological object is relevant for further coherent thought and action, he is not in the sad plight depicted by Professor Parker.

The dualist is indeed saving that "the awareness of x is not an awareness of x itself, identically." But he would remind his critic that on the dualistic view it makes no sense to talk of being aware of x itself since all the dualist ever knows about x is by inference from x' (the epistemological object). Professor Parker talks as if the dualist held that one first is aware of x and then in "knowing it" transforms it into x'. A personalistic dualist, at any rate, simply holds that the knowing agent is in metaphysical interaction with the metaphysical x, and knows it as x' (epistemological object). He thus does not contradict himself by saving that "I am aware of it and vet not aware of it" because he never said that he was aware of it, the metaphysical x, as it is, to start with. It is his contention, rather, that the epistemological object of which he is aware is the basis for his inference (cognition involving judgment). His whole thesis is (a) that the awareness of objective reference, prima facie, is not necessarily cognition of the independent object; (b) that on reflection (especially on the problem of error) we find it reasonable to hold that knowledge never is direct cognition of the independent object.

In any case, to say that if one is not aware of x itself, identically, one is therefore aware of non-x, is fatal only if non-x here means the very contradictory of x, which is not what a personalistic dualist (at any rate) would assert. The class of non-x could contain not only x' but x in many many variations and still be non-x. The harm is done, even here, only if knowledge is defined to mean absolute identity, barring the slightest degree of difference.

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## RUSSIAN METAPHYSICS: SOME REACTIONS TO ZENKOVSKY'S HISTORY

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ALTHOUGH Russian novelists and Russian musical composers have been well and widely known, Russian philosophers have received less attention. Yet from the novelists themselves it is apparent that Russian culture has been, in some respects at least, favorable to philosophy rather than otherwise, and that we should expect Russian devotees of the subject to be both profound and original. Furthermore, the mere fact that the religious background, always highly influential upon philosophy, was in this case a distinct branch of the Christian Church is enough to justify the expectation that Russian thinkers would present interesting and illuminating contrasts to those of Western Europe and the United States. With the publication of the English version, in two large volumes, of Zenkovsky's History of Russian Philosophy, we are now in a position to confirm this expectation.

Professor Zenkovsky's work is a history in the grand manner—and a grand history it is. We are much indebted to Dr. George Kline for his lucid, readable translation. (One who knows his methods of work will not doubt that it is also accurate.) Our historian takes the basic theme of Russian thought to have been the relations of Christianity and secularism. This does not mean that there has been a dearth of studies in logic, philosophy of science, and so on; or that Zenkovsky neglects these or treats them unfairly or unintelligently. But his belief is that "the genuinely vital creative problems of philosophic reflection derive from the Christian gospel and hence cannot be resolved apart from it." In the West, however, it has, he thinks, been difficult to see this

<sup>2</sup> Op. cit., p. 924.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> V. V. Zenkovsky, A History of Russian Philosophy (Authorized translation from the Russian by George L. Kline [New York, Columbia University Press, 1953; London, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1953]).

because freedom of investigation has there become identified with opposition to the Church, while in Russia it has been possible to defend such freedom "from the religious point of view, taking the ecclesiastical tradition as point of departure, and giving oneself up fully to the 'free spontaneous force of theological investigation,' in Karsavin's familiar expression." The Russian view of the Church, as set forth by Khomyakov and Kirevevski, a hundred years ago, is not that of an "authority" wielded by officials or even councils, but of a community of members forming a spiritual organism in which they reach a level of life involving integral experience of the nature of reality. Ecclesiastical coercion, as in the West, is viewed as a heresy. Faith calls us to a life of freedom, rather than of "obedience." Zenkovsky regards as "romantic" the notion of a generally diffused spiritual insight which would make all important truths perfectly evident, but he seems to agree with the rejection of coercion.

Shestov, much later than Khomyakov, goes so far as to declare that it is only secular "reason," with its claims to "universal and necessary" truths, that tries (all too often successfully) to render us docile: and not wholly without justification-recalling Hegel, for example. The fashion has recently changed once more. We are not now so often intimidated by claims to prove this or that, but more subtly, by insinuations that beliefs going beyond the commonplace arise from linguistic confusions. The insinuations are subtle enough so that one cannot easily refute themfor just what is to be refuted?—but so insistent that it is difficult to resist. The result tends to be the substitution of the banalities of Philistine existence, elegantly restated in metalinguistic terms, for inquiry into the deeper, more comprehensive, and subtler questions which lie beneath the surface even of everyday life and language themselves, and which the older philosophers dared to discuss. I do not mean that no good can come of this new Analysis: I do mean that no great good can come of it until its exclusive claims are broken and it has taken its place as another incomplete and—as now practiced misleading—approach to the philosophic task.

Although I think that Zenkovsky's characterization of the West is less true of England and the United States than of Continental Europe, his account does seem to me to exhibit certain special values in the Russian tradition.

The Russian thinkers, it seems, seldom lost sight of the basic aim of philosophy-integral wisdom, a reflective sense for the whole man in the whole society in the whole reality. They always took philosophy to be dealing, as Dewey has said it should, with the problems of men, not just with the problems of philosophers. The line between philosophy and literature was therefore less sharp. The excellent account of Dostovevsky is a fine example of this in the present work. But also the line between ecclesiastics and creative explorers of concepts is less sharp, or at times seems scarcely to exist, not only because the explorers were so often sympathetic to ecclesiastical ideas but also because the ecclesiastics had so much speculative daring and honesty. (Professor Zenkovsky himself embodies this tradition.) It was apparently seldom forgotten in Russia that modern science and philosophy must either provide new valuations going as deep as ecclesiastically enshrined ones, or endow the old valuations with renewed effectiveness, if mankind is not to go into a catastrophic decline as science gives us more and more power, for evil as well as for good. This is still the question we all face, and it is certainly not obvious that we know what to do with it.

An astonishing feature of some Russian thinkers is their extreme exaltation of man. Not only for us is man the important reality, but for the cosmos. The world is made for us, the whole universe is out of joint because of the Fall, and it is for man to set it right. Is this idea of Solovyov and others a case of hubris? One hesitates, indeed, to set limits to the eventual power of man in the cosmos. Yet I dare say that Fyodorov, that weird dreamer of superman, was on the wrong track when he said that our basic obligation is to put an end to death itself, and even to bring our deceased ancestors back to life (that some of them would be a great nuisance he seemed not unaware), and to make this achievement (God forbid) a substitute for the having of children! (As it is, people want more children than there seems room for on earth!) This is far from being the only startling idea set forth in this book. The author, a most sober person, tends to share in the astonishment.

Another still more characteristic notion of Russian philosophy is that of ontological unity, solidarity, "consubstantiality." This applies on several levels. There is the unity of the human race, perhaps in the Church as the Body of Christ. Even those Russian thinkers who follow Leibniz most closely-Kozlow, Askoldov, Lopatin, Lossky—all abandon the radical pluralism of that philosopher, all admit "windows" in the monads; and while this has been a common trait of most neo-Leibnizians, some of the Russians carry it exceptionally far. The consubstantiality of persons in the Trinity is taken by Florenski to imply consubstantiality in general. (This idea has also been suggested by Whitehead.<sup>3</sup>) Another source of similar ideas is in Plato's notion of the World Soul. This is joined in various combinations with some Patristic conceptions, like that of the "Created Sophia." The creation is not just a set of creatures, it is somehow one creature, and its unity is, in some fashion, ideal or spiritual. (Ironically, or tragically, in a country now officially "materialistic," the notion of mere matter has had exceptionally little vogue, in so far as speculation has been spontaneous or sincere.)

Russian thinkers have not been content to speak only of a unity of that which God creates. Zenkovsky indeed, as well as our only other historian of Russian philosophy who is available in English, Lossky,\* wish to leave it at that, and they criticize those who go further. Here I cannot refrain from applauding Solovyov, Karsavin, Bulgakof, and Frank, among others, for their courage and (in my view) penetration in seeing that one cannot simply say, as Lossky does, that reality consists of the created universe "together with" (a phrase occurring twice in one paragraph) the creator. This togetherness must be something, a real property of the creation, or of God, or a third something on its own. The togetherness of A and B includes both, yet it must be one entity, for if more than one, there must be a further togetherness of these, and so on. Hence I hold that the thinkers mentioned are somehow right, against their historians. In some sense, "pan-

<sup>3</sup> Adventures of Ideas (New York, 1933), pp. 216 f., 241.

<sup>\*</sup> N. O. Lossky, History of Russian Philosophy (New York, 1951), pp. 286, 312.

unity" or "total-unity" is an inevitable doctrine. (The point is not that only one entity is "real," but that one entity must really include all the others. A relation being only as real as its terms, a really all-inclusive entity must have real entities to include.)

But now the question is, how do we conceive the entity which is inclusive of God and his creation? There are but three possibilities: God has the world as a constituent of his own total reality; the world has God, in His total reality, as its constituent; or a third nameless entity has both. Accordingly, God in His total reality must either be a constituent, or have constituents. If the former, then it seems there is a greater than God; if the latter, then God in his total reality is the most complex of beings, not the most "simple," as tradition has it.

The various expositors of "total-unity" tried various modes of speech here. All are rather baffling, not only to me but to their historian (also to Lossky), whose explanation is that "totalunity," if taken as including God, is in principle unintelligible, a blunder. There is another explanation. The historian, and nearly all his subjects, tend uniformly and monotonously to assume that "The Absolute" (or "The Unconditioned") are terms interchangeable with "God." In a few cases qualification is suggested, e.g., by Lossky, but it is not made really effective. The possibility that this identification is idolatrous, a philosophical version of the failure to see the vast difference between the supreme or eminent Thou and a mere It, seems to occur to no one (except Berdyaev and Shestov). Doubtless the influence of German Idealism is in part responsible for this. But the main weight of the European tradition is on this side. Whatever is relative, conditioned, contingent, and in process of becoming, was regarded as inferior. Becoming was being, diluted, as it were, with non-being. Thus the eminent Being must be free from such dilution. God then is simply The Absolute. This is no mere verbal convention that in a philosophical context certain expressions are to be used interchangeably with "God." For consider what happens, taking one example out of many. Zenkovsky expounds the view of Solovyov concerning a "Second Absolute which becomes," or is the upshot of the creative process, and then he trimphantly asks, "If it becomes, how is it absolute?" ' How indeed! But the answer might well be, it is not The Absolute that becomes, but rather God. Is the equating of "non-relative" with "divine" an infallible revelation (if there be such a thing), or an incontrovertible philosophical result? For unless it is at least one of these, to adopt it is to prejudge the religious question by a most tendentious definition. "God" in normal use, refers to the One who is worshipped; but does anyone worship The Absolute or The Unconditioned? Some appear to think they do; I am not persuaded. And I hold that the sound philosophical motives for speaking of a supreme, eminent, or divine reality neither entail, nor even permit, the simple identification of these adjectives with the "absolute," "necessary" or "eternal." As for the word "perfect," which seems less common in the Russian literature, either it is a synonym for "absolute" and open to the same objections, or it is capable of being so construed that it involves relativity as well as absoluteness; and only in this construction, as I have argued many times, does the attitude of worship connote or even permit the ascription of perfection to the object of worship.

Since "God is love," is standard religious doctrine, and since love is interpersonal relationship, it seems on the face of it reasonable to identify "divine" with some eminent meaning of "relative." rather than with any meaning of "absolute." Time after time the total-unitarians and their historians walk all around this issue, but always with their faces turned away from it. Berdvaev is perhaps an exception. He does protest the identification of God with the Absolute, and insists that it is not enough to admit relationships between the Persons of the Trinity; there must be relationships to the creatures by which God is genuinely qualified.\* But he is so impressed by the philosophical tradition that he thinks this religious truth is essentially transrational or mystical. Yet in a philosophy like Fechner's or Whitehead's it is almost truistic! For, in these philosophies, relativity and process are the inclusive conceptions, and any pure "being," independent of all contingent relations, can only be an abstract aspect of the more concrete

<sup>5</sup> Zenkovsky, op. cit., p. 496.

<sup>\*</sup> Nicolas Berdyaev, The Destiny of Man (New York, 1937), pp. 33-40

reality. So far from resting on any transcendental insight, this doctrine seems merely a taking to heart of a logical truism. The togetherness of Being and Process can itself only be a process; for if anything becomes, the total reality becomes, inasmuch as a single new constituent always gives a new totality. Similarly, what includes the absolute and relative, or the necessary and the contingent, can only be contingent and relative. (If X in XY depends on some condition, then so does XY; and if X could fail to be, then so could XY.)

It follows that the togetherness of creator and creature is itself the inclusive creature, and is also the inclusive reality; hence either it is God or super-God. Surely not the latter, hence the former. God, in creating the world, creates a new total reality which is Himself as "enriched" by the world (Berdvaev's term). As one of the total-unitarians says, the whole is self-created. But he leaves this as a mere paradox, because he has never clearly distinguished "non-relative" from "divine." Part of the trouble is due to a confusion between "absolute," as meaning simply nonrelative, and "absolutely all-inclusive." These are not only not identical, they are opposed meanings; for what has all things and their relations is made what it is by relations, and in this sense is relative, if anything is, and more than anything else can be. It is the most completely or absolutely relative entity. This is no more contradictory than is "constantly changing." There is a difference of logical type to consider.

Solovyov tells us of the absolute which needs its own other, and therefore "divides itself" and thus realizes itself. But the absolute, by definition, necessarily and eternally is what it is without having to be realized, and regardless of what else there is. If Solovyov had said that the eminent or uniquely excellent reality needed its own other there would have been no contradiction; for it is a bad theory of value which defines value in terms of independence. That things contribute to my value does not detract one iota from the value which I thus do have. And the unique excellence of God, in one aspect, may very well consist in this, that to Him, and uniquely to Him, do all things contribute, without fail, all the value which they have. It follows that he is bound to have all the value of whatever else exists and incom-

parably more besides, since there is also the value of his own unity or synthesis of the other values. Thus He cannot be rivalled or surpassed, and hence is worthy of worship by all.

We hear also of the "suffering of the Father," but this "patripassionism" (found in Bulgakof, Karsavin, Frank) is certainly no possible qualification of the absolute. It may for all that be a qualification of God. If indeed one means by the Father (nearly the opposite of what the term says) the creator merely in potentia. just as He would be were no actual creatures created, then this is indeed to conceive the divine simply as absolute. But is this Father the One who is worshipped? A worshipped God certainly has created; He is not merely one able to be father but one who is father, really qualified by this relationship. A father qualified by no children is not our God or anyone's God. Lossky, indeed. says that God is "beyond" or "more than" the Absolute, since He must not be made correlative to the relative.7 Also, both he and Zenkovsky say that God is beyond being.\* But are there really more than two possibilities here? Either everything that God is. He is without possibility of alternative, or else, in some respect at least, with possibility of alternative. We can put the matter in simple terms from the theory of signs. Either "token-reflexive" expressions, such as "present process" or "reality up to now," are ultimate, or they are in principle dispensable; either there is a final total reality, "world and God," for which this phrase is a label that could always refer to the same totality every time one used it, or there is a new totality every moment. Philosophies of process say the latter; they are right or not right. These are the two positions, and if the one is a philosophy of process or becoming, the other can properly be termed one of being. It is not a question of "beyond" being, for terms referring to the inclusive truth are either token-reflexive or not. According to philosophies of process, since "the total reality" is never simply the same twice over, and since God must be the inclusive reality, then every time we refer to Him we refer to a new divine totality,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Lossky, op. cit., pp. 128, 230

<sup>\*</sup> Zenkovsky, op. cit., p. 859.

even though one embodying the same divine individuality or essence.

It is remarkable how close Frank comes to this position. without being able to state it consistently. He says that "the trans-definite essence of the unfathomable 'never is the same or self-identical, at every moment and in every one of its concrete manifestations it is something absolutely new, unique and unrepeatable." But this does not make God, merely on this account, an "alogical" or "antinomic" idea. For a man is a new total reality each moment too. Frank, to be sure, admits this and holds that all becoming is antinomic. But this is because it has not occurred to him to think of a unit-becoming as the final concrete entity, each unit summing up the achieved reality of its predecessors. Concretely inclusive unity is thus retrospective: and the only unity which is not restrospective is abstract. So when Frank says that the "deepest level as primary unity," in the pan-unity of unity and plurality, "must be something absolutely simple, inwardly one," 10 he is confusing by a vague value term ("deepest") the logical points: (1) process can express the same abstract character in each new concrete actuality, (2) it can also express the concrete fullness of previous actualities by adequate retrospection or memory, but (3) only the former or abstract unity can be "simple."

Lacking an explicit doctrine of an eminent relativity, able to contain both The Absolute and all ordinary relative things, our valiant and brilliant Russians have tried every other way to make sense out of the relations of creator and creature. They think of the absolute, or being, as mixing itself with non-being, incarnating itself, and so on. They wish to have a total-unity which is somehow both the original power creating all things and the final achievement of the creative process. Even Schelling said (against Baader) that God qua Alpha and God qua Omega cannot be simply identical. And it is the second which can include the first, not vice versa. Any other view is indeed "antinomic." It is actuality that includes the potential, not the other way; it is

10 See Lossky, op. cit., p. 270.

Quoted from Lossky, op. cit., p. 272.

God as having-created, and as possessing, the actual results that includes God considered simply as able to create, as independent absolute.

Of course the charge of "pantheism" keeps cropping up against the pan-unity school, and they themselves keep trying to distinguish their doctrines from pantheistic ones. Thus, for instance, they are at pains to avoid determinism. Some of them, Karsavin e.g., talk of the "self-creation" or "self-origination" of the creatures (cf. Whitehead's "self-created creature," or Sartre's "causa sui"). Zenkovsky can make nothing of this, objecting that it implies the creature as preceding its own coming to be. But does the Schellingian "freedom on the threshold of being" to which he refers really mean this? Only if to "create" here means to be an antecedent cause of. Rather, what is meant seems to be this: the antecedent factors do not wholly determine the becoming or process, yet when it occurs it is determinate. As Whitehead puts it, it is "internally determined and externally free." What else indeed can be meant by a free act, or indeed by a unit event or unit process? If the antecedents were to fully prescribe the process, then the latter must be there before it happens, all except some wholly indeterminate and empty "actuality" to be added to the already established determinations. Decisions would settle nothing not already settled without them. Time would not even so much as "reedit eternity."

Only Solovyov seems to see, with Lequier, Bergson, and Whitehead, that the total concrete reality in a personal existence is new each moment. Lossky, following Lopatin, scolds him for this and declares that the timeless substantiality of the self is proved by experience, by our ability to know the past and the future. As if either Bergson or Whitehead—or Solovyov—had ever forgotten this ability, or had any special difficulty in describing it in their terms! Or even the Buddhists long ago, for that matter. (But Whitehead does more justice to the internal relationships between successive events in a single "society" or sequential system.)

Zenkovsky suggests that total-unity must lead to the denial of divine "creation" of the world, even though its expositors try to save at least the term. He also says that philosophy needs the idea of creation even more than does religion, and in this I suspect he is right. However, the distinction between abstract identity. or the absolute, and concrete actuality, which is eminently relative, opens up new possibilities for conceiving creation. The common factor presupposed by all possible world states is the divine essence (not God, but his essence), the Cause of all things and effect of none. The Absolute. But the total concrete cause of this world is not merely this absolute divine essence; rather, it is God as having actually created and now possessing all previous worlds. On this assumption it makes sense to say that God creates us "out of nothing" (an expression which worries some of the pan-unitarians). For since the present world state involves memories of past states, to say that the present state is created out of nothing is to say that our memories are memories of nothing. A memory can only be created by a cause which includes that which is to be remembered. Now God as supremely relative is "the valuation of the world" (Whitehead), wholly containing it as datum of his valuative act. Thus the other-than-ourselves-now which creates us, as of now, is God and in addition to God, nothing. Our past, which, as just pointed out, is required material for our present self-creation, is already included in God's receptive valuation, just as our new present is about to be, or is in process of being, included. God then is the whole creative source; but not God as First Cause, or as "absolute" source; rather, God as the ever-new ideal summation of the already created, in which summation the uncreated Essence is also included as abstract factor.

Does the element of "self-creation" in us limit the power of God? The expositors of pan-unity tend, more or less clearly, toward the view that the highest kind of power is precisely supreme power to elicit self-creation in others. Berdyaev (somewhat unperceptively treated by Zenkovsky, granting his point that there is a lot of wilfulness and hatred of reality in this writer which mars his work) comes perhaps the closest to doing justice to this question. According to him, "God does not create freedom." For the divine creative action presupposes divine freedom, and it affects others only by influencing, but not determining (a contradiction), their freedom. Berdyaev adds that nevertheless freedom is not ultimately an other to God, since He

is all-inclusive. Our freedom is indeed other to God qua creator, God taken merely as acting upon us; but God is more than His action. He is also receptive of the lives of the creatures, which contribute to and thus "enrich the divine life itself." 11 Yet how this can be must baffle rational philosophy, Berdyaev thinks. I wonder. Is it not precisely the rational idea of consciousness that it has data which it does not determine for itself, but accepts as given? Not logic but absolutistic prejudice has compelled philosophers and theologians to try to construe the divine (selfcontradictorily) as non-receptive consciousness, or as a supreme good superior to all consciousness. The logical way to conceive an eminent being is to conceive an eminent receptivity, as Fechner and Whitehead have done. How, then, does this give God power over us which vet leaves us free? Power over others consists in this, that one's own reality is rich in value which fits the needs of others and is therefore attractive to them as datum for their awareness. To furnish suitable and valuable content to an awareness is to exert the only kind of influence upon it to which it is subject. Now the divine valuation includes all antecedently actualized value, although it is no mere sum of values but an integrated value incomparably surpassing them all. Thus God is the whole of the content offered to our experience, and hence the whole cause in relation to it. But a new awareness is always something besides its data, for it is a new awareness of them, and herein lies its self-creation. Thus one can give a strict meaning both to creation out of nothing, and to creaturely self-creation. This is what the Russians tried to do. I submit that they deserve our gratitude for having furnished a new demonstration that it cannot be done without breaking cleanly with absolutism, or the philosophy of being which treats becoming as an inferior derivative.

Zenkovsky does admirable justice to many thinkers and topics rather aside from his main theological preoccupation. He treats positivists, materialists, every sort of serious doctrine, with intellectual interest. It is fascinating to follow the fortunes of

<sup>11</sup> The Russian Idea (New York, 1949), p. 243.

the philosophies of Leibniz, Pascal, Kant, Hegel, Schelling, Comte, Marx, Husserl, even William James, as interpreted, often in strikingly original ways, in Russia. Unlike Lossky, Zenkovsky has a balanced distribution of attention between various types of philosophy, and the various branches or aspects of philosophical inquiry, during the three centuries which his account covers. I cannot pretend to judge the accuracy of either work, but my impressions agree with those of persons more qualified to form an opinion that Zenkovsky has given us not only a much longer but a more adequate and scholarly account.

Our author presents a clear and illuminating treatment of Soviet philosophy. I cannot admit that this treatment is unfair because it is (in sober fashion) severe. The man who cherishes intellectual freedom, and this man clearly does, cannot speak in mild or semi-flattering tones of such things, unless indeed he be densely ignorant of their nature and history (as some of our intellectuals have been).

In Zenkovsky's view, S. L. Frank is the greatest of Russian philosophers, his view being carefully worked out in nearly every basic aspect, in theory of knowledge, ethics, philosophy of religion. He has an ingenious view of the Unfathomable as beyond the reach of logical laws, thus paving the way for the presentation of his metaphysical position as "antinomic monodualism." But is the unfathomability of God really best viewed as the paradox of the absolute relativizing itself? It may rather lie in our inability to form any but an exceedingly vague notion of the eminently relative actual synthesis of all things in the divine receptivity. We cannot even contradict ourselves here because we cannot so much as formulate an hypothesis. How, concretely, does God evaluate Dulles and Molotov, in relation to all other men, living and dead, and to all other things, present and past? No combination of human sentences could sensibly pretend to answer this question. Here there is silence, surmise, heart-searching, and prayer, not theories, right or wrong. There is not even paradox. There is bottomless ignorance. Concreteness, not essence, or concepts like the absolute as such, or the relative as such, is the mystery; it is the abstract, essential, and necessary which we can grasp, and our theoretical intelligence is thus most at home in pure mathematics, dealing with essences and necessities. Theologians seem slow to learn the lesson of this.

On one question Frank and several of his predecessors are very impressive, namely, on the epistemological question, how do we know the reality of God? We know, they say, by immediate experience, intuition, but the genuineness of this intuition is vouched for by the impossibility of denying it without betraying misunderstanding. "Religious experience is the experience of a reality which we apprehend as the condition of all experience and of all thought," and which it is meaningless or contradictory to deny. Nicolas of Cusa is referred to as showing that "in denying the existence of some particular object we presuppose existence as such from which the object in question is excluded through our negation; hence negation is inapplicable to existence as such." But God is "the essential potentiality or power of all that exists or does not exist and therefore it is self-contradictory to think of Him as nonexistence." 12 This is offered as a version of the Ontological Argument. I have frequently argued (and my fellow philosophers have not troubled to refute me) that the standard criticisms of this argument are irrelevant, for the last thing the argument does is to suppose that "existence," in the ordinary sense in which dollars or islands exist, is a "predicate" necessarily included in perfection as a predicate. Quite the contrary, both the ordinary mode of existing and the ordinary mode of failing to exist are alike excluded by the predicate "perfect." What is left is the unique predicate of existing-necessarily, which, as Anselm explains with some care (but all the references to him in this connection omit the point), is the only mode of existence that is possible for a being without beginning or ending in time, or, in various other respects, free from those imperfections which attend the contingent mode of existence. The behavior of the writers of sceptical or positivistic textbooks (they keep coming out every few weeks) in dealing with this argument furnishes an apt illustration of Frank's thesis that the opponents of religious ideas are really talking about something else! Religion does mean

Us (New Haven, 1946), pp. 42, 69-70. See also S. L. Frank, God With

by God One who could neither exist, nor fail to exist, by accident, and this status of being "such that his non-existence cannot even be conceived" is so essential to all that is meant by the perfection of God that nothing is left if it be denied. One positivistic writer, at least, has actually come to understand this! 13 But then he tries to turn the point into a "negative ontological argument" disproving God. For, says he, modern logic has shown that necessary existence is meaningless or self-contradictory, and so, since the "perfect" must be conceived as existing necessarily, this term too is meaningless or self-contradictory. But I have yet to see the proof in modern logic that necessary-existence is an impossible concept. Existential contingency, as a modality, by definition allows of the two possibilities: existent, non-existent; but, by the same token, existential necessity, as a'modality, allows of but the one status: existent without possible alternative. In both cases, as Anselm in effect pointed out, the modality is indeed a predicate inhering in the predicates "imperfect" and "perfect" respectively; but while the existential predicate "not-necessary" is noncommittal with respect to the alternative, existent or nonexistent, the predicate "necessary" simply means "existent without alternative possibility." And if God is conceived as the necessary measure of reality and truth, and just so has religion conceived him, then to deny his reality is, as Cusa says, to deny the presupposition common both to the assertion and the denial of the existence of ordinary things. Any question concerning contingent existence is, in religious terms, a question of what world results from God's creative action, or of what creative decisions God makes, or of what worlds are contents of God's knowledge; he is thus, by the meaning of his "perfection," thinkable only as the common presupposition of all possible worlds, or possible absence of worlds. Many critics of the argument in effect insist upon taking God as one of the possible worlds! This contradicts any appropriate definition of the religious object. What must rather

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> See J. N. Findlay, "Can God's Existence be Disproved?" *Mind*, LVII (1948), pp. 176-83. Professor Findlay does not distinguish between existence and actuality, and neither did Anselm; that no actuality can be necessary may be granted.

be done by non-theists is to deny the meaningfulness of the definitions. Pure positivism is the relevant sceptical reply to Anselm and Descartes. But then it is no longer a question of formal fallacy in the ontological argument, but only of whether some people do or do not know what they mean by certain terms, and also of whether the religious meanings in question are or are not implicit in all our meanings and experiences, so that it is only by self-misunderstanding that some persons seem wholly without them.

But now I comment again on Frank's failure to see that it is one thing to hold that our experience, in its "relativity" and dependence, involves an "absolute" or "ground," and in its "fragmentariness" involves something "all-embracing" (he shows with much skill that this is so), and it is quite another thing to say that these two, ground and all-inclusive summation, are "obviously one and the same." 14 Is there not rather an "obvious" possibility of confusion here? Absolute condition and all-embracing synthesis can, no doubt, only be conceived as together in the One Eminent reality. They constitute the object of worship, either in its total reality, or in an aspect of itself. But the neglect of this disjunction is scarcely derived from experience! Alas, on the previous page the author had wisely pointed out that we "must beware of confusing the immediate content of our experience with derivative religious 'theories,' " i.e., with thoughts and concepts by means of which we attempt-always imperfectly and therefore more or less questionably—to express it." I cannot but see just such a questionable theory in the contrast the author draws between God and the "particular, the derivative, and the relative," as such—as though we were inferior to God simply because we are particular, that is, more determinate than a mere universal or essence, or again, because we are derivative, that is, possessing values that have been derived from data furnished by the free acts of others. Does not Frank himself want us to contribute, by our free acts, to the all-embracing divine consummation? then sabotage this profoundly religious thought by defining God,

<sup>14</sup> Frank, op. cit., p. 41.

in defiance of logic, as the sheer oneness of absolute and relative, being and becoming?

There is another source of confusion. It is a violation of good linguistic use to identify existence and actuality. For we say that things and persons exist, but not that events, experiences, or states exist. Rather, we say these are actual. Existence is the embodiment of an essence or character in *some* suitable actual sequence of events or states, but it can be *any* suitable actual sequence. Thus the insight that all actuality is contingent, which I suspect underlies resistance to the ontological argument, does not entail that all existence must be contingent. An individuality such that its embodiment in some suitable contingent actuality or other is without possible alternative exists necessarily.

A curious writer is Shestov, a sort of Russian Pascal or Kierkegaard, who does not lose perhaps in these comparisons, apart from Pascal's science or Kierkegaard's poetic powers. Shestov almost rails at philosophers, but in a remarkably informed and intellectual way nonetheless-for he knows what philosophers have been up to-because of their worship of "Reason." The hall-mark of reason, or the cultured alternative to Biblical Faith, is the attempt to see everything in terms of eternity and necessity. Aristotle, Spinoza, Hegel, even Kant, are largely at one here. For Faith, and to God, on the contrary, "all things are possible" (even alteration of the past, it seems!). Faith is freedom, not necessity; and as for eternity, Shestov repeatedly comments on a strange passage in Kierkegaard in which that author imagines God beholding Jesus on the Cross and suffering torture from his inability to come to his Son's rescue because of his own immutability! 15 This, suggests Shestov, is not a Biblical dilemma. Immutability is not Biblical but an imputation of Reason. (Of course texts could be quoted to the contrary, but I think he is right.)

What, however, would Shestov say about the new trend in secular metaphysics toward the radical renunciation of necessity and immutability, in Bergson and Dewey, for example? That

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> See Leon Chestov, *Kierkegaard et la philosophie existentielle*, Trad. du russe par T. Rageot et B. de Schloezer (Paris), pp. 229 ff.

Aristotle, Spinoza, Hegel and others tried to reduce all truth, or all important truth, to necessity or to the eternal, is no proof that secular reason must always do this. There are perfectly secular and rational arguments against doing it. A certain wisdom in Biblical faith may in this way receive confirmation, but it remains at least possible that secular reason will catch up with this wisdom, and on other points it may be ahead of it. Shestov argues to a case, like a lawyer, and does not really investigate the matter. But he is a splendid writer and deserving of attention. Some of his works are available in English, French, and German.

The very full and rich accounts of Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy, and other "literary," but profound authors are a valuable feature of Zenkovsky's History. The story of European thought has now at last been rounded out. The Russian part of the story is by no means a mere duplication or weakened echo of the other parts.

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## LOGIC, PHILOSOPHY, AND HISTORY MANLEY THOMPSON

W/HILE there have been tremendous technical advances made in the name of logic since the latter part of the last century, the nature of logical subject matter and the relations of logic to other disciplines, especially to philosophy, are still not free from dispute. This situation has given rise to two fairly distinct ways of viewing the history of logic. The historian of logic on the one hand may be interested primarily, if not exclusively, in assessing the technical achievements of past logicians. This type of study has already demonstrated the need for radical revision of assessments that were made scarcely a century ago. What was once summarily dismissed as mere adolescent logic-chopping has been found on closer examination to contain technical subtleties, sometimes surprisingly relevant to problems arising from recent investigations. But, on the other hand, one may turn to the history of logic in order to clarify disputes about logical subject matter and its relations to philosophy.

Both ways of looking at the history of logic as well as some of the issues that plague contemporary disputes over the nature of logic are illustrated in three recent books. Henry Veatch's Intentional Logic turns to a medieval Aristotelian philosophy as providing the framework for an adequate account of logical subject matter. Ernest Moody's Truth and Consequence in Mediaeval Logic borrows from the technical apparatus of present-day logicians in an endeavor to reassess what was once dismissed as fourteenth century logic-chopping. Benson Mates' Stoic Logic is a similar study in the logic of an earlier period.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Henry B. Veatch, *Intentional Logic* (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1952). Ernest A. Moody, *Truth and Consequence in Mediaeval Logic* (North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1953). Benson Mates, *Stoic Logic* (University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1953).

Veatch's book is definitely not an essay in historical scholarship. Its aim is to present the proper account of logical subject matter and to distinguish logic from other sciences, particularly from mathematics. If Veatch occasionally implies that much of what is taken today as Aristotelian logic is a gross perversion of the original, he is not concerned with a textual defense of his interpretation. However much he may borrow from medieval logicians, he intends what he offers to be judged primarily as a philosophic account of logic, and only incidentally as a contribution toward understanding the work of past logicians.

Veatch's book, I believe, is an important one even though it fails to establish its central thesis. In an effort to do justice to the book I want first to present under (A) below as sympathetic an exposition as I can of its main arguments. I shall confine my critical comments and discussion of the book's importance to my remarks under (B).

A. "Intentional logic" for Veatch is the only kind of logic, properly speaking. While logical subject matter consists of non-linguistic, abstract entities ("beings of reason"), this does not make logic mathematics because only the entities studied by logic are intentional. "Mathematical logic" thus characterizes an erroneous conception of logic which confuses mathematical and logical entities, and a major part of the book is devoted to an exposé of this "confusion."

An intentional entity is a "formal" as opposed to an "instrumental" sign. An instrumental sign is characterized by the fact that one must first apprehend the sign itself before he can apprehend what it means. In other words, there is always some physical thing, a series of marks on paper, a sequence of sounds, a cloud of smoke, which must be perceived as something itself before it can become a sign of anything else. A formal sign, on the other hand, is not something to be apprehended before one can apprehend what it means. Concepts, for example, are sometimes referred to as signs of what they are the concepts of, but if this reference is to make sense it can hardly mean that the

concept is something comparable to a series of marks on paper which must be perceived as something itself before it can become a sign. The justification for calling concepts signs lies in the fact that a concept is somehow in someone's head, and yet is of, about, or refers to something outside his head. But a person does not perceive the concept in his head when he grasps what it refers to, as he perceives the series of marks on paper when he apprehends its meaning. In the case of concepts there is simply the mental act of referring or intending. The sign is the act of intending and nothing else. Such a sign is a "formal" sign in the medieval sense that its form-what it is- is to be a sign, to function as a sign. There is nothing apart from its signfunctioning by which it can be identified; it is not one thing in itself and then instrumentally a sign. We cannot say that in its sign-functioning it has a physical identity in the nervous system, since this physical identity is not something apprehended as an instrumental sign.

From this account it should be apparent that an intentional entity or formal sign is a difficult thing to isolate and talk about. If Veatch has succeeded in showing that what he means by "formal sign" is a nonlinguistic entity, it would seem that there is nothing left for him to mean but a psychological entity. He endeavors to escape from this conclusion by adopting the principle that one may draw a distinction of reason where there is no separation in reality. Although acts of intending cannot be separated in reality ("in rerum natura" is Veatch's favorite phrase) from either psychological or physiological processes, we may distinguish them from such processes in reason and talk about them as entia rationis. From the standpoint of their mode of being logical and mathematical entities are thus on a par, and the radical distinction which Veatch wishes to draw between them is based on their peculiarities as beings of reason.

Logical or intentional entities are analyzed as various relations of intentional identity. Veatch's meaning here may perhaps be brought out by the following considerations. When a thing functions instrumentally as a sign it does so by becoming in a sense something which it is not. Though physically all that one sees may be replicas of words on a printed page, we may say that

in seeing the page he also "sees" something entirely different—he sees what the words stand for, what is intended by them. In this sense the words become what is intended, they become identical with it. This intentional identity seems to be precisely what constitutes the sign-functioning for which the words are instrumental. In the case of a formal sign, since there is no physical instrument to be called a sign, the intentional identity itself is to be taken as constituting the sign. Such identities are then the abstract entities studied by logic.

Different kinds of intentional entities are distinguished on the basis of a theory of cognition which forms an integral part of the "realistic philosophy" Veatch claims to follow throughout his book. Cognition, according to this philosophy, consists in the establishment of a cognitive identity between knower and known. This identity may be elucidated by the same considerations as those just offered with regard to intentional identity. But there is the essential difference that cognitive identity is real and not intentional. If we are to know things as they really are, unqualified by the fact that they stand in relation to a knower (and this condition expresses the basic tenet of Veatch's realism). it is not enough to say that what we know is what we intend. The sign-functioning constitutive of cognition must be a real identity; otherwise we could not say that what we know is what is really the case. But this real identity can only be effected through the instrumentality of intentional identities, and the latter are differentiated by their different instrumental functions. Veatch's terminology on this point is likely to cause confusion. Formal signs are contrasted with instrumental signs as indicated previously, and yet formal signs as logical or intentional identities are themselves "cognitive instruments."

The three basic kinds of logical entities are concepts, propositions, and arguments. Concepts intend the "whats" or essences of things, and the passage from concepts to propositions is from essence to existence, since propositions intend existence through an intentional relation of identity. Having distinguished conceptually between a thing and its essence, we re-identify them in a proposition. We see a brown thing, for example, and distinguish conceptually between being brown and being this

thing. Then, through the proposition "This is brown" we intend the essence as being in this individual thing. Nothing could be this thing as we now intend it and not be brown. With this view of the proposition, concepts perform a function in the proposition which they cannot perform by themselves. Though concepts by themselves are intentions (of essences), as elements of a proposition they "designate" rather than intend. The intentional identity which constitutes the proposition as a whole is the identity between what is designated by the subject and what is designated by the predicate. Thus, in "This is brown" we intend an identity between the thing designated by "this" and the thing designated by "brown": but we certainly do not intend an identity between the essence—brownness as such—and this individual thing. Veatch's use of "designation" is easily recognized as one version of medieval "supposition," and his account of the proposition as an intentional identity is of course an adaptation of the medieval identity theory of the copula.

Arguments are necessary as a third sort of cognitive instrument because the truth of propositions is seldom immediately evident. Through an argument one intends to present evidence for the truth of the proposition which appears as conclusion. In its strongest form an argument exhibits the cause of what is stated in its conclusion, but this is not always possible and the argument may exhibit only a sign of the cause or may even reverse the order and exhibit an effect of what is stated in the conclusion. The logical or intentional structure of an argument is analyzed as "a relation of triple identity," a phrase which Veatch borrows from Maritain. All argument is thus syllogistic; the extremes being identical with the middle are identical with each other. The intentional identity in each of the three propositions is that already accounted for in the analysis of propositions. Apparent asyllogistic arguments which seem to depend on a transitive relation other than triple identity become syllogisms when they are properly expanded as arguments. Thus, the apparent argument "a is north of b and b is north of c, therefore a is north of c" is valid only on the assumption that north-of is a transitive relation. In its complete form the argument consists of a major premise affirming a transitive connection for any three entities serially related by north-of and a minor premise affirming that the given entities a, b, and c are so related. The crucial point here is that north-of is a real relation holding between things as opposed to an intentional identity between concepts. It belongs to the reality about which we reason as opposed to the cognitive instruments through which we reason. With this distinction between real and intentional relations there is no infinite regress of syllogisms in which the transitivity of intentional identity is reaffirmed for each syllogism by the major premise of a prior syllogism. Such a regress is possible only by confusing the cognitive instruments through which we reason with the reality about which we reason.

Other cases of apparent asyllogistic arguments are disposed of as either enthymemes or immediate inferences. In the latter, a conclusion is drawn "about the intention or proposition itself (ens rationis)" rather than "about the real things (entia) intended by a proposition," as is the case in genuine or syllogistic inference. Thus, though we may speak of inferring "No B is A" from "No A is B," we are not in this case using the latter proposition as a cognitive instrument through which we intend something about reality. Instead, we are considering the proposition itself and observing that whatever we might intend by it we would also intend by its converse. There is no genuine inference or argument here because propositions are not being used to intend reality but only considered as intentions. There is merely the verbal appearance of argument, since we may say "No A is B, therefore, No B is A." The same situation holds for most of what appear to be inferences drawn in accordance with the formulas of the propositional calculus. When we claim to infer A from the conjunction of A and B, we are considering intentions rather than using them to intend reality. From this point of view, it is "improper" to include formulas for syllogistic inferences among the formulas of the propositional calculus. It is improper simply because it treats genuine arguments in which intentions are used to intend reality as on a par with apparent arguments in which intentions are only considered. This point ties in directly with one of the main theses of Veatch's book, that contemporary mathematical logic confuses real and intentional relations.

I want to conclude this exposition of Veatch with some remarks on this thesis.

It must be emphasized first of all that Veatch's distinction between the real and the intentional is not the same as the distinction between the use and mention of symbols, or between object language and metalanguage. There is an obvious difference between the latter distinctions and the distinction Veatch is talking about. The object language-metalanguage distinction results in an infinite hierarchy of languages. When we mention rather than use the symbols of the metalanguage, we are talking in a meta-metalanguage, and so on up the hierarchy. On the other hand, when we distinguish with Veatch between relations which intend and relations which are real we do not start a hierarchy in which our distinction is continually repeated. Though of course there are relations which intend intentions and not realities, this distinction is not a repetition at higher level of our initial one between real and intentional relations. The fact that intentional relations are themselves intended does not make them real.

Thus, if we analyze a syllogism as only one of an indefinite class of arguments depending on transitive relations (north-of and greater-than as well as "triple identity" being instances of such relations), we are from Veatch's standpoint confusing real and intentional relations even though we scrupulously adhere to the distinction between object language and metalanguage. While it is essential to distinguish a symbol designating a transitive relation from the name of this symbol in the metalanguage, such distinction has no bearing on the intentionality or reality of the relation. Again, no confusion between the use and mention of a symbol need result from the fact that syllogisms and immediate inferences are treated as on a par in the propositional calculus. But if our aim is to keep a sharp distinction between propositions used as intentions of reality and propositions simply considered as intentions, the propositional calculus in its current form does not achieve this end.

So much for the moment regarding Veatch's charge that contemporary logicians confuse real and intentional relations. I shall return to this point in my critical comments below.

B. It is easy to find in Veatch what appear to be simply technical errors in logic, and, at times, what seems to be downright ignorance of what has been done in contemporary logic. Yet the force of such criticism is mitigated by the fact that Veatch is endeavoring to present a conception of logic which is radically different from the current one, and one which has its own technical standards and its own criteria of what is relevant to logic. This of course does not mean that Veatch in discussing contemporary logic should have the license to be technically sloppy and to criticize without taking account of all that contemporary logic has accomplished, though unfortunately at times (e.g., when he is discussing tautologies, analyticity, manyplace predicates, the logical paradoxes) he does take such license. However, I do not find that these shortcomings affect Veatch's central thesis that there is a study, traditionally called "logic," of the cognitive instruments through which we intend reality, and that such a study is radically different from anything currently done under the name "logic." It must be emphasized that Veatch does not want to dismiss the work of contemporary logicians as Prantl dismissed the Stoic logicians. Nor does Veatch's position force him to make this dismissal. His case against contemporary logic is simply that, however valuable it may be in its own right as a kind of mathematics, it cannot and should not be expected to constitute the sort of study Veatch calls "intentional logic."

If we are to reject Veatch's thesis that modern logic confuses the real with the intentional, it seems to me we must do so on the ground that the confusion lies, not in modern logic, but in the way Veatch himself has attempted to draw the distinction. We cannot accept the distinction as Veatch wants to draw it, and then argue that he has misunderstood modern logic, which does in fact do justice to the distinction so drawn.

The contrast between the real and the intentional cannot be found, according to Veatch, in concepts alone, since "the mere concept of an essence gives no indication of the existence or non-existence of that essence. The intention of mere essences through concepts has given rise to a certain Platonizing tendency throughout the history of Western thought" (p. 84). On the next page, Veatch calls this tendency "essentialism" and says "it consists in

treating essences as if they had a sort of status in their own right and did not have to be considered as radically ordered to an actual existence outside themselves, so to speak." Concepts are seen as ordered to existence when we realize that in themselves they are incomplete, they are mere possibilities for propositions. They are the one-place propositional functions of the first-order functional calculus. The contrast between the real and the intentional is thus to be found in actual propositions.

A proposition. Veatch claims, is the intentional re-identification of an essence with an individual from which it was held conceptually distinct. In reality there are essences only in individuals, and through the proposition as opposed to the concept essences are intended as they really are. That is, essences are intended as in or of existing individuals. But what precisely is the difference between intending an essence simply and intending it as in or of an existing individual? In one of his many discussions of this point Veatch offers among his examples the two propositions "This is brown" and "Men are mortal" (p. 159). Now we might argue that while conceptually we have distinguished being a man from being mortal, in fact the two are not entirely separable and it is this inseparability which we intend by the proposition "Men are mortal." Mortality is in or of individual men in the sense that there are no men who are not This makes sense because we can specify what we are re-identifying with what: mortality with men. But this does not satisfy Veatch. He wants to extend the procedure so as to include "This is brown." Yet in this case, what is being re-identified with what? We do not have a concept of this existing individual as we have of brownness, humanity, and mortality. When we substitute "this" for the variable in "x is brown" the concept takes on the function of designation (supposition) and becomes a proposition. Yet from the fact that through the proposition we achieve the designation of an individual, it does not follow that the proposition itself is an intention of individual existence that the proposition constitutes an intentional identity between a predicate and an individual designator.<sup>2</sup> The identity is one of designation and not of intention. The proposition differs from the concept in being an intention which includes designation, but not in being an intention which intends something not intended by the concept. A mere gesture of pointing by itself never suffices for designation. The gesture must be accompanied by an intention—a meaning conceptually grasped—as when we point and utter the word "brown." It is this designation achieved through the pointing and the word together that constitutes the proposition. But the intentional factor remains entirely in the concept.

Now if Veatch fails to make his analysis of the proposition as an intentional identity rather than a designation stick with respect to singular propositions, he also fails with respect to nonsingular propositions. "Men are mortal" achieves a re-identification of mortality with men only in the sense that something designated by "man" is designated by "mortal." It is this designation and not the intentional relation between the concepts being a man and being mortal that constitutes a proposition about existence. The proposition "Being a man includes being mortal" is an intentional identity precisely in the sense that it is not a proposition about existence but one about essences. In this sense it is a proposition of second intention, the cognitive instrument through which we grasp relations among intentions. A proposition of first intention achieves contact with existence through designation, and when the latter is not by means of an individual designator, as in a singular proposition, it is by means of symbols of quantification. "There are mortal men" and "There are no immortal men" both employ concepts in a designation of existence. According to the first, there is an existence designated by "man" and also by "mortal"; according to the second, there is no existence designated by "man" which is not designated by "mortal." But in neither case is there an intention

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Veatch regards "this" as logically on a par with proper names and not as an egocentric particular. In the examples on p. 159 he includes "Socrates was a great teacher" along with "This is brown."

as well as a designation of existence. Only the concepts intend—the propositions enable us to effect the designation.

In so far as the foregoing remarks are correct, Veatch's case against modern logic collapses. Relations are intelligible, conceptual, and belong to the realm of essences. To speak of a real relation distinct from an intentional one can only mean a relation whose terms are existing individuals and not intentions. modern logic certainly distinguishes between real and intentional relations in this respect, and also considers those cases (which Veatch does not) where one term is existent and the other nonexistent, as may occur in instances of wishing, believing, desiring, etc. Neither of these ways of distinguishing intentional relations enables us to single out the syllogism as the proper form of all argument. The triple identity in the syllogism (which is seen to be class inclusion when the designative function in the premises and conclusion is taken into account) is neither more nor less a proper cognitive instrument than any other transitive relation. Mathematics and logic as studies of the properties which belong to relations regardless of their terms do not differ essentially. In so far as propositions achieve only a designation and not an intention of reality, Veatch has no basis, either for excluding syllogistic formulas from the propositional calculus or for proclaiming the necessity of construing all propositions as subject-predicate in form. In short, the case for an intentional logic as Veatch conceives such logic cannot be sustained.

His case stands only if the real can be distinguished from the intentional as the intended is distinguished from the instrument through which it is intended. With the distinction drawn in this way, one may claim that the proposition is an intentional identity of subject and predicate which effects an intention of the "what" or essence of an existing thing. All knowledge of the real then arises through such instrumentality and logic becomes the study of subject-predicate propositions and syllogistic arguments as the only proper cognitive instruments. Such is the position Veatch wants to maintain, but in his efforts to defend it he ends by distinguishing the real from the intentional as the designated is distinguished from the instrument through which it is designated. This way of drawing the distinction is in accord with the view of

logic Veatch wants to oppose and leads to the overthrow rather than the retention of Aristotelian forms as the only ones proper to logic.

I remarked at the beginning of this discussion that I think Veatch's book is an important one, even though it fails to establish its central thesis. Its importance lies in calling attention to a philosophic conception of logic which is all but lost today. There is much that has been said in the past about logic as the study of the cognitive instruments through which we intend as well as designate reality, but with the technical achievements of present-day mathematical logic this philosophic view of logic has almost passed out of sight as well as out of fashion. The question of whether these technical achievements might belong to a kind of mathematics rather than to what is properly logic still forces its way occasionally into contemporary discussion (in Dewey's Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, for example), and whenever this question arises the conception of logic Veatch is talking about becomes relevant.

Unfortunately, Veatch does not consider the possibility of concepts which, as formal signs apart from propositions, intend the essences of existing things. Yet the uncombined expressions which Aristotle treats in his Categories seem much closer to such concepts than to the one-place propositional functions of contemporary logic, which Veatch takes as the equivalent of the concepts in his logic. The role of concepts apart from propositions as intentions of real things was debated by medieval logicians under the heading of "signification," a consideration which was viewed as prior to that of supposition. Veatch apparently feels that any attempt to take concepts by themselves as intentions of existing things must result in some sort of Platonism or essentialism rather than the realism he wants. Yet, on the contrary, it may be argued that the road to Platonism lies in the failure to unite essence and existence in concepts, since the union of the two achieved in propositions is a unity of designation merely. With this unity alone we may know (have a cognitive identity with) essences but can only point to reality. If the contrast between the real and the intentional can be located in concepts rather than propositions, it becomes possible to maintain that real things are intended as well as designated and the case for an intentional as distinct from a mathematical logic must be debated again. Though when the case does not rest on the nature of propositions, the universality of subject-predicate and syllogistic forms may be considerably qualified. The case in any event needs a further hearing, for the benefit of our understanding of logic and philosophy as well as of history, and Veatch has done us a service in re-exploring one avenue of defense.

## II

Moody's book is an essay in the project of translating medieval logic into the language of the twentieth century. The study is confined to a few texts of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, principally Albert of Saxony's Summa logicae and Jean Buridan's Sophismata and Consequentiae. William of Ockham's Summa logicae "is used in supplementary manner, and some use is made of the works of Abelard, William Shyreswood, and Peter of Spain in connection with the origin and evolution of certain distinctive and fundamental concepts" (p. 12). Moody characterizes this selection of materials as one "restricted to a few of the more accessible and complete logical treatises" of the period. But another principle of selection is also in operation. The ease with which the materials can be translated into the technical language of present-day logic determines to a large extent the treatises and portions of treatises chosen for study. The project of translation is not confined to a use of modern logical notation, but includes a use of modern technical distinctions, such as that between syntax and semantics, which occur in talk about logic.

After the introduction Moody begins with a second chapter entitled "Logic and Language." He notes that a doctrine of signification preceded a theory of supposition in the texts he is examining and that the former usually involved a consideration of "mental terms," "intentions of the mind," or "concepts" as constituting natural as opposed to conventional signs. But he dismisses such consideration as outside the province of strictly formal logic.

Once the natural or "mental" sign is mentioned and acknowledged as prerequisite for the conventional institution of sounds or marks as language signs, the logical analysis of language proceeds as a formulation of the usage of conventional signs in some definite language. To employ the terminology of C. W. Morris, formal logic abstracts from the particular relations of "sign-vehicles" to their "interpretants" and to their "designata," and deals only with the relations of the conventional language signs (or "sign-vehicles") to each other (p. 19).

With this dismissal of signification. Moody turns to supposition as the doctrine essentially relevant to the establishment of formal logic. "Supposition" is the name given in medieval logic to the property of "being interpretable for something." This property "was understood as the capacity of a term to be interpreted for one or more objects in a proposition." It is by means of this property that "the linguistic 'sign-sign' relation is distinguished from the physical 'sound-sound' relation" (p. 20. Moody's italics). Supposition, Moody declares, is thus a syntactical relation of term to term rather than a semantical relation of term to an extra-linguistic object. This becomes clear when we consider that the metalinguistic formulation of a semantical relation requires expressions in the metalanguage for both the term and its designatum, e.g., "man" designates man. But we can specify the supposition relation without using expressions for the designata of the terms in question, e.g., "In the sentence 'Some man is an animal' the term 'man' stands for something for which the term 'animal' stands" (p. 23). If one objects that the phrase "stands for something" expresses a semantical concept, Moody says we may reply that "the word 'something' does indeed refer to whatever the terms designate, but it does not, like those terms themselves, possess independent meaning. Its function is a syntactical one of quantification, of determining a connection in extension for the two terms, just as relative pronouns determine an extensional relation of the subject of the dependent clause to an antecedent subject" (p. 23).

But Moody does not consider a more telling objection to this syntactical interpretation of supposition. The linguistic sign-sign relation may be viewed as differing from the physical sound-sound relation simply in the fact that it depends solely on linguistic rules. These rules specify how tokens of various sign-designs

may be spoken or written in combination so as to constitute tokens of other sign-designs, how words, for example, may be combined to form sentences. The determining factors are thus the signdesigns and the rules, both of which are arbitrarily chosen at the start. This is the way syntactical relations are viewed by Carnap. Morris, and other contemporary writers whom Moody professes to follow on this point. Yet there is nothing in this way of viewing such relations which corresponds to "the capacity of a term to be interpreted for one or more objects in a proposition." The closest we can come is to say that according to the rules only certain sign-designs have the capacity to become subjects or predicates of sentences. But the rules remain the one determining factor of the capacity, and if we may speak of a capacity in this case we may do so just as well with respect to other sign-designs, e.g., the capacity of "and" to stand between sentences or of "( )" to inclose sentences. The medieval theory of supposition hardly refers to capacity in this sense. In addition to the capacity to stand in a certain relation to other sign-designs, supposition is the capacity of a term to stand for something when standing in a certain relation to other terms. This capacity to stand for when standing in cannot be bestowed on certain symbols rather than others by purely syntactical rules. As far as syntax is concerned, "(" has just as much capacity to stand for as "man" has. Any difference in such capacity is to be determined by our choice of semantical rules.3 These considerations give what I take to be a decisive argument against Moody's conclusion that supposition is a syntactical relation.

It does not follow from this argument, however, that Moody is wrong in denying that supposition is properly a semantical relation. Semantical rules relate signs to designata. They establish the actual relation between sign and designatum and not simply a capacity on the part of the sign to take on this relation when it stands in a syntactical relation to other signs. This suggests that supposition, strictly speaking, is neither syntactical nor semantical; speaking loosely, it seems to be a combination of both. Moody is certainly right in not even mentioning prag-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> See R. Carnap, Meaning and Necessity (Chicago, 1947), p. 7.

matics as a possibility, but then there is no reason a priori why supposition must be located entirely in one of the remaining two dimensions of Morris' semiotic. Moody is perhaps too anxious here to find a nice use of present-day theories in his interpretation.

This twofold, syntactical-semantical character of supposition would seem to be an essential factor in the prominence of the subject-predicate form in medieval logic. Syntactical rules alone, as we have already noted, can never bestow a capacity to "stand for" on the terms which stand in a certain syntactical relation as distinct from the terms which stand in other syntactical relations. Likewise there is nothing about semantical rules themselves which would compel us to single out the subject-predicate relation as fundamental. Such singling out would have to come from the peculiar ontological assumptions we made in the process of formulating the rules. In Carnap's terms, it would depend on our choice of a "framework." 4 The twofold character of supposition, then, suggests that medieval logicians took the syntactical relation of subject-predicate as having ontological significance, and hence as providing the basic structure of a semantical framework. If this is the case, it would make sense to have a single word "supposition" to refer to a semantical property which belongs to terms only in so far as they stand in the privileged syntactical relation of subject-predicate. An investigation of supposition along these lines should unearth characteristics of the intentional logic Veatch is defending. Signification as well as supposition would have to be considered and the issue of whether there can be an intention of reality as well as of essence would become central. It is unfortunate that Moody turns away at precisely the point where he could say much that is relevant to Veatch's work. If supposition is simply the syntactical relation that Moody interprets it as being, there could hardly be anything in medieval logic like Veatch's conception of an intentional logic. Yet Moody's earlier book on Ockham's logic makes a strong case for the view that the possibility of an

<sup>\*</sup> See R. Carnap, "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology," Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 4 (11), (1950), pp. 20-40.

intention of reality is essential to Ockham's conception of logic.<sup>5</sup>

In his third chapter, "The Theory of Truth Conditions," Moody makes some interesting observations regarding the medieval interpretation of the square of opposition. It is almost the universal practice today to make the question of existential import pertain to universal as opposed to particular statements. The modern interpretation allows such import only for particulars while the Aristotelian-medieval interpretation erroneously allows it for universals as well. Moody suggests, on the contrary, that the medieval interpretation allows existential import only for affirmative as opposed to negative statements. He has good textual grounds for this view and it has the advantage of making valid all the traditional Aristotelian relations claimed for the square. He offers the following formulas as exhibiting the relations in the square (p. 52).

$$(Ex) \cdot Fx : (x) \cdot Fx \supset Gx \qquad (Ex) \cdot Fx \cdot Gx \qquad 0$$

$$(Ex) \cdot Fx \cdot Gx \qquad (Ex) \cdot Fx : V : (Ex) \cdot Fx \cdot \sim Gx$$

There are difficulties with this interpretation which need to be ironed out, though Moody takes no notice of them. The interpretation as it stands is inconsistent with the traditional doctrine of immediate inferences. According to what usually passes today as traditional Aristotelian logic, we may obtain an equivalent statement by changing the quality of a statement and the quality of one of its terms. Thus, "No asses are men" is equivalent to "All asses are non-men." With Moody's interpretation of the square we must either deny this equivalence or try to construe the second statement as negative. In a footnote on p. 38 Moody remarks that for medieval logicians sentences containing "infinite nouns," such as "not-man," were "considered to be exponible, or reducible to compounds of sentences in which the word 'not' occurs only in its use as a sentential operator." But by exponentation "All asses are non-men" becomes "An ass is

<sup>\*</sup> The Logic of William of Ockham (New York, 1935). See the discussion of "absolute terms," pp. 54-57.

something and no ass is a man," which is not the sort of negative statement that will fit Moody's interpretation. The only way of saving the interpretation seems to be that of denying the traditional equivalence in question. But there is a further difficulty. Moody speaks (p. 52) as though the formulas given above constitute actual symbolic translations of A. E. I. and O statements. Now there is nothing about these formulas themselves which prevents our substituting an infinite noun "~ H" for either of the predicates "F" or "G." Then, " $(Ex) \cdot Fx : (x) \cdot Fx \supset \sim Hx$ " should be a formula translating an A statement. But actually, it translates an exponible statement rather than a categorical A. Putting "Fx" for "X is an ass" and "Hx" for "X is a man," the formula translates the statement "An ass is something and no ass is a man." In short, Moody's formulas do not distinguish between what the medievals took as genuinely simple or categorical statements and what they regarded as statements only quasi simplex. which were exponible and equivalent to compound or hypothetical statements.\* Once again, Moody seems to have been too anxious to use the language of the twentieth century. His translations obscure the dominant role played by the subject-predicate form in medieval logic.

In his fourth chapter, "The Theory of Consequence," Moody concludes after a general discussion of the meaning of "consequence" in medieval logic, that "the medieval rules of 'simple' consequence determine a set of theorems formally similar to those of the system of strict implication" (p. 78). A simple consequence is one which holds without temporal restriction, as opposed to a consequence which holds "as of now." Each definition, law, or theorem in the system Moody presents is substantiated by Latin quotation from medieval sources, often from several authors. The symbolism is derived from *Principia Mathematica* and *Symbolic Logic* (Lewis and Langford), and

<sup>\*</sup> Cf. Moody's book on Ockham, p. 201. For a discussion of the difficulties I have mentioned in Moody's interpretation of the square of opposition, as these points arise when a similar interpretation is applied to Aristotle's account, cf. my "On Aristotle's Square of Opposition," The Philosophical Review, LXII (1953), pp. 251-65.

reference numbers of theorems in the latter work accompany the corresponding theorems in Moody's system. The result is impressive and certainly succeeds in showing that what was once dismissed as logic chopping can be made to appear quite respectable to modern logicians. In the final chapter, "Truth and Consequence," Moody sketches various medieval solutions for the liar paradox. Here he is more cautious in his use of distinctions made by present-day logicians. He remarks in the final paragraph that whether Buridan's solution of the liar "involves the distinctions made by contemporary exponents of 'the semantical conception of truth.' between syntactical and semantical systems, hierarchies of metalanguages, and corresponding ambiguities in the word 'true,' may be left to the reader to decide" (p. 109). He goes on to point out that "it was assumed, in medieval logic, that adequate laws governing the use of language could, without contradiction or paradox, be developed within language" (p. 110).

Whatever its shortcomings, Moody's book is a valuable contribution to the careful reassessment of medieval accomplishments in logic which has been started by logician-scholars like Lukasiewicz, Bochenski, and Boehner.

## Ш

Mates' book on Stoic Logic "repeats most of Lukasiewicz's published conclusions on the subject and offers additional evidence for them" (p. 1). It also argues four points original with the author. (1) In the semantical theory of the Stoics there is a distinction very similar to the sense-denotation and intension-extension distinctions of Frege and Carnap. (2) "Diodorean implication" is not, as has been supposed, an ancient version of present-day strict implication. (3) The Stoics clearly anticipated what is referred to today by Quine and others as the "principle of conditionalization." (4) The Stoics claimed their propositional logic was complete in the sense that every valid argument could be reduced to a series of arguments of five basic types. Two appendices are included in the book. The first offers new

translations of nearly all of the more important fragments pertaining to Stoic logic, with the aim of correcting inadequacies in existing translations. The second appendix comprises a glossary of technical terms from Stoic logic.

Mates is very cautious in arguing his four points, each of which is carefully qualified in view of the evidence for it. The reader is acquainted at the outset with the difficulties in trying to find anything like a complete Stoic logic in the scattered fragments now available, and Mates is careful to call attention to specific difficulties in the course of his argument.

It is possible to reconstruct only "the bare essentials" of Stoic semantical theory, and we have no examples of the application of their principles to specific problems. There is no evidence that they had a "principle of interchangeability" or that they considered "oblique" or "not purely designative" occurrences of linguistic expressions (cf. p. 21). Their fundamental distinction is that between το σημαΐνου, το λεκτόυ, and το τυγλάνου. This distinction bears many resemblances to the Zeichen-Sinn-Bedeutung and designator-intension-extension distinctions of Frege and Carnap. Mates feels that "the concepts of το σημαΐνον, Zeichen, and designator coincide," but in the case of to hexton, Sinn, and intention "the agreement is not complete" (p. 22). For example, the Stoics regarded the intension of an individual name as a characteristic peculiar to an individual. This is not the same as the "individual concept" of Carnap, which also seems to represent the position of Frege. Again, it is doubtful whether there is complete agreement between the Stoic use of "property" (ποιότης) as the lekton of a class name (προσηγορία) and Carnaps' use of "property" as the intention of a class name. The only examples of class names Mates can find in the relevant fragments are "man," "horse," "goddess," and "wrath." Since each of these seems to be the name of a species, the Stoic ποιότης may have been restricted to properties taken as defining a genus or species. Since the Stoics did not regard every collection of things as constituting a genus or species, their meaning of "property" would then be more limited than Carnap's. Wih respect to extension, the third member of the fundamental triad, the Stoics seem to have had only the metaphysical thesis that whatever is denoted by an

expression is a body. There is no trace in the fragments of anything like the Frege-Carnap notion that the extension of a sentence is its truth-value.

As far as comparing Stoic semantics with the theories of Frege and Carnap is concerned, Mates has done an excellent job. He does not overstep the limits imposed by his remark at the start of the comparison: "The goal here, as elsewhere in this study, is to give a true picture of the Stoic contributions and not to try to show that there is nothing new under the sun" (p. 19). But it can hardly be said that Mates has done as much as can be done toward making the Stoic doctrine of the lekta and related notions intelligible. It is certainly safe to assume that the Stoics were not trying to make "contributions" to the technical and highly specialized work of constructing the semantics of an artificial language. On the contrary, we can gather from the fragments more about what they were trying to do than we can about how they tried to do it. We know, for instance, that in their "semantics" they were particularly concerned with epistemological problems about the certainty and reliability of knowledge. They tried to find a criterion of knowledge in what they called an apprehending or grasping presentation (φαντασία καταληπτική), a presentation which was supposed to grasp the real object presented. This is far from the aims of Frege and Carnap, and it would not be surprising if Stoic semantics seems more incomplete than it might otherwise be when it is considered only with respect to these aims. A comparison of Stoic views with medieval attempts to account for an intention of reality would add further historical perspective to the conception of logic Veatch is trying to defend and would reveal at least another side of Stoic semantics.

Mates' point about Diodorean implication is based on the assumption that the tenses of the verbs in Diodorus' definition are to be taken seriously. According to a crucial passage in Sextus, Diodorus defines a "true conditional" "as one which neither is nor ever was capable of having a true antecedent and a false consequent" (p. 47). That verbal tenses are essential is indicated by the fact that they also appear in Diodorus' definition of the possible as "that which either is or will be" (p. 37). In

accord with the latter definition. Diodorus defined the impossible. the necessary, and the nonnecessary with corresponding verbal tenses. With these tenses taken seriously. Mates can relate Diodorean to Philonian implication as follows. "A conditional holds in the Diodorean sense if and only if it holds at all times in the Philonian sense" (p. 45). The antecedent and consequent of a Diodorean conditional are thus always propositional functions, since they "tacitly contain a free time-variable." Hence "Diodorean implication may be regarded as a special type of what Russell calls 'formal implication'" (p. 46). While a modern logician, then, would not recognise Diodorus' implication as the "strict implication" of C. I. Lewis, it is probable that Diodorus himself would have maintained they were the same, since for him "whatever is true for all time is necessarily true" and hence "any conditional which would satisfy his requirements for truth would also satisfy his requirements for necessary truth" (p. 47). Modern commentators who side with Diodorus on this point attach no importance to the different verbal tenses in his definitions.

Mates has, I think, made a good case for the view that Diodorean implication is not the same as strict implication. But his contention that the antecedent and consequent of such an implication are propositional functions each containing a free time-variable seems to be reading quite a bit into the fragments. The proper analogue of a propositional function in the Stoics would seem to be a deficient (ἐλλιπές) lekton. According to Diogenes Laertius (VII, 63), "writes" is a deficient lekton because we ask "who?" while "Socrates writes" is a complete (ἀυτοτελές) lekton (cf. Mates, pp. 16-17). Propositions (ἀξιώματα), according to the same passage, fall under complete lekta. If Diodorus had intended his antecedents and consequents to be propositional functions, we would expect to find him quoted as specifying that they were deficient lekta. "If-day, then-light," for example, instead of "If it is day, then it is light," which is actually a result of substituting for what may be taken as time-variables in the former. A more cautious account would be that Diodorus was probably preoccupied with the Stoic ideal of propositions which the wise man could assert without fear of being trapped into saying something false. Among the safest in this respect would be conditionals whose antecedent and consequent were so related that the conditional as a whole would never be false. The emphasis on time is due to the concern of the wise man to find a proposition which could be safely asserted at any time. The resulting conception of implication somewhat resembles Lewis' strict implication, but is not quite the same because of the temporal considerations. Diodorus, after all, was not concerned with developing a conception of implication that would be suitable for a modern logical calculus.

By a "principle of conditionalization" Mates says he means "something like the following: If a conclusion  $\beta$  is validly derivable from the premises  $\alpha_1, \alpha_2, ..., \alpha_n$ , then the conditional proposition  $[(\alpha_1 \cdot \alpha_2 \cdot ... \cdot \alpha_n) \supset \beta]$  is logically true" (p. 74). If four "important reservations" are made, certain passages in the Stoic fragments "are virtually statements of a principle of conditionalization." Mates' reservations are: "(1) Stoics always state the principle as an equivalence instead of as a conditional; (2) the contexts in which the principle occurs are always contexts in which Sextus interprets the Stoics as trying to give a criterion for the validity of arguments; (3) 'logically true' is replaced, usually, by 'Diodorean true'; and (4) there is no extant example of the Stoics' using the principle as a rule of inference."

The passages in Sextus which Mates refers to certainly appear to state something like a principle of conditionalization. An argument is said to be valid if, and only if, its conclusion follows logically from the conjunction of its premises as a consequent follows from an antecedent, and the examples which accompany this statement make it clear that there is to be a logically true conditional corresponding to every valid argument. Mates has performed a valuable service for Stoic scholarship by pointing out the confusions in translation which have resulted from failure to distinguish in these passages between references to a logically true conditional and to a valid argument. Yet the facts indicated by Mates' reservations seem to me to suggest a more plausible account of the passages than the one to be gained from the assumption that the Stoics made a lisping statement of a principle of conditionalization.

The fact that the passages occur only in Sextus, and only in contexts in which he is interpreting the Stoics as trying to give a criterion for the validity of arguments, suggests that we should look to what Sextus was trying to do as well as to what the Stoics intended. Diogenes Laertius, as Mates remarks (p. 76), says that for the Stoics an argument is valid if and only if the negation of the conclusion is incompatible with the conjunction of the premises, and a conditional is true if and only if the negation of the consequent is incompatible with the antecedent. These two statements occur in different contexts, the first in an account of arguments and the second in an account of propositions.7 Now it is clear that Sextus' concern was not simply to give an accurate report of what the Stoics took to be the criterion of a valid argument, but also to show that their criterion failed. If we combine Diogenes' two statements, we can give an argument which appears to show that the Stoics argued in a circle when they attempted to state the criterion of validity. What Diogenes says about arguments seems to make the criterion of their validity the truth of a conditional, while what he says about conditionals seems to make the criterion of their truth the validity of an argument. Sextus explicitly makes this charge of circularity at least once (Hyp. Pyrrh., II, 114), though Mates does not comment on the point. Otherwise, Sextus seems content to take the first half of the argument and to proclaim that in so far as the Stoics could not agree among themselves on the definition of a true conditional they failed to produce a criterion for valid arguments. This criticism Mates considers "germane" (p. 77), though clearly it depends for its force on the peculiar twist which Sextus as opposed to Diogenes seems to have given the Stoic doctrine.

What appears to be a principle of conditionalization may thus be simply the result of Sextus' restatement, for polemical purposes, of what the Stoics had said about arguments and conditionals. There is no need to assume, as far as our evidence goes, that either Sextus or the Stoics had conceived of anything approaching a principle of conditionalization. With regard to Mates' other reser-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Mates gives the references as VII, 73, 76, but the statement about arguments occurs in 77 rather than 76.

vations, there would have to be an equivalence rather than a conditional if the issue is the criterion of a valid argument, and the conditional which supplies the criterion would have to be, if not "Diodorean true," at least true in some stronger sense than "Philonian true." The absence of examples referred to in the fourth reservation is of course implied by the interpretation here suggested. Yet none of this diminishes the importance of Mates' contribution in calling attention to the fact that logically true conditionals and valid arguments are distinct though essentially related in Sextus' account. Mates' careful statement of the reservations to his interpretation is an excellent example of the high standard of scholarship preserved throughout his book.

The Stoics seem to have believed their propositional logic was "complete" in the sense that "every valid argument (except arguments containing metalinguistic terms) could be proved on the basis of arguments of the five undemonstrated types only" (p. 82). From the fragments we know what the five undemonstrated types of argument were and that the Stoics had at least four rules by which other arguments were to be proved on the basis of the undemonstrated ones. Since the second and fourth rules are not stated in any of the fragments, we do not have means to judge the Stoic claim that their propositional logic was complete. Mates' brief comments on this point are interesting and provocative.

Mates, like Moody, writes as part of a growing contemporary movement which is dedicated to writing the history of a "formal logic" that is philosophically neutral and akin to mathematics in the precision and rigor with which its basic concepts can be formulated and their consequences developed. The technical work of present-day logicians provides the historian with a ready-made model against which the work of the past may be compared. While this sort of history, as the books by Moody and Mates show, can be of considerable value in our understanding of the past, it is certainly not a history which can tell all that is worth knowing about the work of past logicians. However philosophically neutral formal logic may be, there are philosophic questions which have been and are still being asked about it. Its functions as an instrument of cognition, as a tool of philosophic analysis, its

relations to pure mathematics and to ordinary language raise issues which are difficult to separate from the problems of logic itself. The stand taken on these philosophic issues (as Veatch's book clearly illustrates) is bound to have its effect on what is done or not done under the name of "formal logic," even though there is a core which remains neutral. Ancient and medieval logicians debated at length the philosophic issues at the same time that they developed a formal logic, and it is not always possible to keep the two undertakings entirely separate. History of the sort attempted by Moody and Mates, as I believe the present consideration of their books has shown, may run afoul in two directions. A failure to remark the philosophic issues which prompted the technical work of past logicians may lead to a technically incorrect formulation of their achievements. On the other hand, preoccupation with what seems to be purely formal logic may distort the history by obscuring and misrepresenting the philosophic issues debated.

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## THE PLATONIC HERITAGE OF THOMISM

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The appearance of this trim but densely packed little book which because of lack of advertising has been slow to become known here) has caused considerable interest among students of Thomistic philosophy. But it has also left many in somewhat of a quandary how to evaluate it. In the opinion of the reviewer this is due to the fact that, although it presents a thesis that is fundamentally sound and reveals keen metaphysical and historical insight, the arguments used by the author to develop it are by no means all as solid as what they are supposed to defend and hence might tend to cast undeserved suspicion on the thesis itself. There is also a considerable amount of intricate and technical discussion which puts a heavy strain on those not already very familiar with Thomistic as well as Greek thought.

When what is known as the Thomistic Revival began in the latter part of the nineteenth century, it was first the Aristotelian content and attitudes of St. Thomas's philosophy, so explicit and obvious all through his texts, that received the dominant stress. The commentaries on Aristotle were drawn on heavily as a source of Thomistic doctrine and the continuity between the two thinkers was emphasized in every way.

Then, as historical scholarship began to probe more deeply both into the text of St. Thomas and into his sources, two other somewhat neglected aspects began to emerge into the limelight as of central importance. The first was the modestly concealed but nonetheless profound originality of St. Thomas in shifting the center of equilibrium of his whole philosophy away from form and essence toward the act of existence as the root of all ontological perfection as well as of intelligibility. This was a radical

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Arthur Little, S. J., The Platonic Heritage of Thomism (Golden Eagle Books, Dublin, 1949).

transcending not only of Plato but of Aristotle, for whom form still represented the supreme perfection and infinity was a function of indetermination and imperfection. It was also a decisive advance on the Augustinian tradition itself and enabled St. Thomas to go further than any other Christian thinker in giving full metaphysical meaning to the Hebraeo-Christian revelation of the proper name of God as Being ("I am Who am," "He Who is": Exodus, 3:14). This existential interpretation of Thomistic metaphysics, due principally to the influence of Maritain, Gilson, De Finance and others, has by now won pretty general acceptance among those who profess to belong to the so-called "authentic" Thomistic school (a wide and flexible category with extremely blurred edges!).

The second aspect that has emerged into the forefront of investigation is the less obvious but no less indispensable role of certain Platonic—or more accurately Neoplatonic—elements in the philosophical synthesis of St. Thomas. Most important among these (and virtually incorporating all the others) is the central doctrine of the Platonic tradition, formally rejected by Aristotle, namely, the theory of participation.

The decade from 1939 to 1949 witnessed a remarkable flowering of studies along this line. Their authors, though differing in points of detail, were generally agreed on this, that although St. Thomas was strangely reticent in admitting his indebtedness to the Platonic tradition as such, and not infrequently

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> See J. Maritain, Preface to Metaphysics (New York, 1939); also his Existence and the Existent (New York, 1948); E. Gilson, L'être et l'essence (Paris, 1948), and its shorter English adaptation, Being and Some Philosophers (Toronto, 1949, 2nd ed. 1952); also the new chapter on existence in his Le Thomisme (5° éd., Paris, 1947); J. de Finance, S. J., Etre et agir dans la philosophie de S. Thomas (Paris, 1945); and in this country the Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, XXII (1946) on Thomistic Existentialism.

To mention some of the best known: C. Fabro, La nozione metafisica di partecipazione secondo S. Tommaso d'Aquino (Milano, 1939; ed. 2a, Torino, 1950); L.-B. Geiger, O. P., La participation dans la philosophie de S. Thomas d'Aquin (Paris, 1942); L. De Raeymaeker, La philosophie de l'être (2º éd., Louvain, 1947); A. Hayen, S. J., L'intentionnel dans la philosophie de S. Thomas (Bruxelles, 1942).

attempted to cover some of his borrowings with a dubious Aristotelian paternity, what he actually did was to take over the theory of participation, purged of its Platonic ultra-realism of absolute forms, and use it as central structural principle around which to organize his whole doctrine of the relation of creatures to God (participation of essence in the common perfection of existence by imitation of the divine exemplary ideas, etc.). It is quite true that the theory in its original Platonic and Neoplatonic form was profoundly corrected and transformed by being transposed into a realistic Aristotelian framework of abstraction in epistemology and act and potency in ontology, and especially by the substitution of analogous participation in a unique subsistent absolute, the plenitude of Existence or Esse, for univocal participation in a multitude of ontologically absolute specific and generic forms. Nevertheless the fundamental principle itself remains, both in content and inspiration, clearly Platonic and non-Aristotelian, and was easily accessible to St. Thomas in the numerous Neoplatonic sources at his disposal.4

This interpretation of Thomism as essentially an original synthesis of both Platonism and Aristotelianism, with stress laid on the central role of participation, has already won a strong following in Thomistic circles in Europe, and more and more in this country during the last few years. There remain, however, not a few important Thomistic groups who are either reluctant to admit any major role of participation in a non-Aristotelian sense or at least are unwilling to allow that the term "Platonic" can legitimately be applied to this or other so-called Platonic doctrines in the profoundly modified form in which they appear in St. Thomas. As they see it, the essence of Platonism consists in its error, namely, its ultra-realism of separately subsisting ideas, so that when this has been eliminated whatever remains can no longer be called authentically Platonic. Accordingly they distinguish

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The reviewer himself has traced a typical case of this fusion of Aristotelianism and Platonism in his article, "The Limitation of Act by Potency: Aristotelianism or Neoplatonism?", New Scholasticism, XXVI (1952), 167-94; also in "The Meaning of Participation in St. Thomas," Proceedings of Amer. Cath. Phil. Assoc., XXVIII (1952), 147-57.

between the conclusions of Plato (positio Platonica), with which St. Thomas frequently enough agrees, and the methods or principles by which he arrives at them (via Platonica), which, they claim, St. Thomas systematically repudiates. In this country two of the most vital and influential centers of Thomistic thought, the Mediaeval Institute of Toronto and St. Louis University, seem to favor more or less strongly this position.<sup>5</sup>

To this the participation school, with which the sympathies of the present reviewer lie, answers that, although there is much truth in these objections, they do not represent an adequate view of the total picture. In the first place, it seems hardly fair to identify the essence of so rich and fruitful a system as Platonism with its errors. Although the applications of the participation principle by the Platonists were obviously too literal and uncritically ultra-realistic, still this does not rob the fundamental insight of its basic relevance to the real order, nor of its fruit-

<sup>5</sup> After the above lines were written a review of Fr. Little's book appeared in the Modern Schoolman, XXI (1954), 225-27. In it, Leonard J. Eslick of St. Louis University expressed the position we have outlined above in words almost the same as our own and with all the explicitness that could be desired: "It has far too often been supposed that such a term as 'participation' has the same meaning and function in the Thomistic doctrinal context as it has in Platonic thought. Nothing could be further from the truth. Platonic participation presupposes the Platonic chorismos, which makes it quite impossible for the subject which participates to possess in any intrinsic way the perfection in which it participates. It therefore necessarily follows that Platonic participation is radically incompatible with any properly analogical doctrine of being. As an ineluctable consequence (though one which seems often to have escaped the attention of even such a competent scholar as Geiger) the term 'participation' is wholly equivocal in Plato and St. Thomas, and has no community of meaning which can be transferred from one doctrinal context to the other. It follows also that exemplarity will have an utterly different meaning and function in the two philosophies. Whatever Aristotle's defects in this regard may be, Plato is the least likely source in the history of philosophy for these Thomistic positions." These conclusions seem to me to be entirely too intransigent and not sufficiently faithful to the de facto historical evolution of the doctrine. They fail to take into account the fact that a philosopher can introduce into the stream of thought an insight or structure of thought whose validity and usefulness far transcend his own inadequate or even erroneous use of it and which therefore can serve as a precious, even indispensable inspiration for another philosopher's more successful application of the same basic insight.

fulness if properly applied. In the second place, it can be shown, we believe, that not only does St. Thomas frequently use the participation principle to arrive at his conclusion but at least in a few texts commits himself explicitly to an endorsement of the *via Platonica* in its fundamental application to the relation of creatures to their ultimate source.

Father Little aligns himself squarely with those who attribute a role of major importance to the theory of participation in St. Thomas and consider it to be definitely platonic in content and inspiration. In fact, in summarizing the position of this school above we have already summarized the central message of the present book. The author arrived at his conclusions independently of the continental scholars who were working along the same line, though he was able to make use of the works of most of them in his own final draft (except the important study of Fabro, which he summarizes at second hand in a somewhat garbled version). In his main thesis he agrees with their conclusion, though he goes considerably further than the others—too far, in our opinion—in the extent to which he tries to assimilate into Thomism certain Platonic and Augustinian methods of proof for the existence of God.

In an excellent Preface, which presents a bird's-eye view of

<sup>\*</sup> For example, cf. De Potentia, q. 3, a. 5 (Quaestiones Disputatae, ed. Spiazzi, Roma, 1949), where St. Thomas adapts to his own use three arguments to prove the origin of all things from one creative source. He tells us himself that one of these is borrowed from Plato, one from Aristotle, and one from Avicenna. The one from Plato he formulates thus: "The first argument (ratio) is this. If some one property is found shared in many, it is necessary that it be caused in them by one cause; for it cannot be that such a common property belong to each one in virtue of its own self, since each one, according to what constitutes it properly itself, is distinguished from the other; and a diversity of causes produces a diversity of effects. Since, therefore, being (esse: the act or perfection of existence) is found shared by all things, which, according to what they are, are distinguished from each other, it is necessary that being be bestowed on them from one cause. And this seems to be the argument of Plato (haec videtur esse ratio Platonis), who maintained that prior to every multitude there was some unity, not only in numbers but also in the natures of real things" (my translation). See also De Pot., q. 6, a. 6; Sum, Theol., I, q. 6, a. 4.

the whole book, the author defines his objectives with clarity and restraint:

What we shall mean by Platonic elements in Thomism are those doctrines of St. Thomas that are derivable from the parts of Plato's own philosophy that were rejected or neglected by Aristotle. St. Thomas may not have recognised that they were Platonic and opposed to Aristotle. He could have discovered them for himself, for he could have read them in some Platonic source that he had forgotten and had them recalled by some suggestion of Aristotle's . . . But our essential task is only to prove certain doctrines of St. Thomas Platonic, not to trace the source from which they were derived or to prove that he himself knew them to be Platonic (p. xii).

The doctrines referred to are all applications of the theory of participation: participation in the divine ideas as the necessary completion of the Aristotelian doctrine of universal concepts; participation as the way par excellence of rising from finite beings to God as their source and of explaining both the distinction and similarity between the finite and the Infinite; and participation as the necessary grounding for the spirituality of the soul, the power of free will, and certain other ethical and social corollaries such as the absolute moral law, etc.

The author's reasons for undertaking such a work he expresses as follows:

Throughout my chief interest has been in the Thomistic doctrine itself rather than in its historical parentage. But I have underlined its debt to Plato because Thomists have admitted this debt somewhat reluctantly (as did St. Thomas himself); and I am convinced that unwillingness to acknowledge any source for Thomism but Aristotle will endanger the understanding of its central religious doctrine of participation. Thomism owes to Aristotle its firm foundation in reality, but to Plato its skiey grain (p. xiv).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> On p. xi the author states that St. Thomas was well acquainted with two influential Neoplatonic works then believed to be of Aristotle, the *Liber de Causis* and the *Theology of Aristotle*. This is true only of the first work. The second was indeed known to the Arabs and hence can be said to have indirectly influenced the thirteenth-century Scholastics, but it was not translated into Latin and directly known to the West till the Renaissance (cf. F. Van Steenberghen, *Siger de Brabant d'après ses œuvres inédites*, II [Louvain, 1942], p. 445, n. 1; M. De Wulf, *Histoire de la philosophie médiévale* [6\* éd., Louvain, 1934], I, 69, n. 41: Eng. trans. [London, 1935], I, 62, n. 3).

The two chapters in the Historical Introduction have as their aim to shed some light on St. Thomas's rather disconcerting practice of trying to invest with Aristotelian authority almost every doctrine that he held, his leaning over backward to interpret in an orthodox way certain crucial and ambiguous Aristotelian texts. and his curious reluctance to acknowledge his Platonic affiliations. The explanation is shown to reside to a large extent in the intellectual and spiritual crisis precipitated by the sudden massive intrusion of Aristotelian texts, accompanied by their Arab commentaries, into thirteenth-century Christian thought, and the battle that Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas had to wage in order to get the riches of Aristotle admitted to a place of honor in Christian philosophy without at the same time allowing the dangerous parts of his doctrine to poison the Christian mind. That this danger was not imaginary had already been made all too evident by the extreme Aristotelian group surrounding Siger of Brabant. is no wonder that in view of the suspicion and threats of ecclesiastical condemnation hanging over the new doctrine St. Thomas should have tried in every way plausible to show the value and fundamental harmony with Christian wisdom of a purified Aristotle, and consequently to have played down his own heavy borrowing of corrective elements from the current Neoplatonic Augustinianism.

The first chapter tells the story of this crisis well. It is unfortunate, however, that the author seem to rely for his sources almost exclusively on the fifty-year old classic of Mandonnet on Siger of Brabant, with no mention of the basic new monograph covering the same ground by Prof. Van Steenberghen of Louvain. The latter has forced historians to revise their accounts of Siger and the struggle over Aristotle on not a few important points, and in particular to tone down the supposed intransigent opposition of St. Bonaventure to Aristotle in his early years of teaching at the University of Paris.\*

The second chapter undertakes to establish the foundation stone on which the whole ensuing thesis of the author must rest.

<sup>\*</sup> Cited above in note 7.

This is the identification of Aristotle's fundamental error as the denial of any supreme efficient and exemplary cause of the being of the material universe, either as regards its matter or its forms. It is this denial, inseparably linked with the rejection of participation, which closes the door definitively to any explanation in terms of pure Aristotelianism of the ultimate origins of contingent things, as well as of their intrinsic analogous similarity in being to God as their source. The author establishes this point well, and it is pretty generally accepted by the best commentators now anyway.

The difficulty now remains to explain how St. Thomas could, in all apparent sincerity, maintain that Aristotle's Prime Mover was the efficient cause of the universe beneath him, at least in its forms if not in its entire being, and thus could open the door to his own adaptation of the Stagirite's principles to deduce the doctrine of strict creation. The author finds what is perhaps the most plausible answer in St. Thomas's commentary on one crucial text of Aristotle's Metaphysics (Book II, 993 b 23-31). This passage is so terse and vague that the Angelic Doctor could, without patent violation of the text, interpret it in the sense that there is an efficient cause of the very being of the heavenly bodies and then use this text as a norm for interpreting other more troublesome passages. Aristotle here invokes the principle that whatever is the cause of a generic-univocal (synônumon) property in the other members of a genus must itself contain that property in the highest degree. Thus fire is the hottest of all hot things because it is the cause of heat in all the others. Hence the principles (archai) of eternal things must be the most true because they are the cause of both the truth and being of other things. St. Thomas in his commentary enlarges the principle to include analogous causes (without any Aristotelian authority) and then interprets the vague Greek "principles of eternal things" as the efficient causes of the heavenly bodies, which, he says, "have a cause not only for their motion, as some have thought, but also for their being, as the Philosopher here expressly states." Since the Greek term "principles" can mean any kind of ontological "reasons," either intrinsic or extrinsic to a being, St. Thomas is here clearly forcing the text far beyond its Aristotelian intention

or even implications, though without strictly exceeding the abstractly possible literal sense of the words.

Such a method of textual commentary would indeed be considered sharp practice today, but it is not clear that St. Thomas did not sincerely believe he was here bringing out the implicit thought of Aristotle. It is this crucial interpretation that permits St. Thomas from then on to gloss over or explain away Aristotle's radical severing of the link in being between God and the universe. and even to cover with vague Aristotelian authority his own use

of the Neoplatonic participation principle.

The author establishes all this with admirable acumen and sufficient solidity, though with occasional lapses of accuracy in detail. He could have made his case even stronger had he called attention to the remarkable bit of metaphysical sleight-of-hand by which not only St. Thomas but other medieval philosophers generally (perhaps following the Arabs) neatly reversed the abovementioned Aristotelian principle that the cause of a generic property must be the highest in that genus, thus making it the equivalent of the quite different Neoplatonic principle, "The highest in any order is the cause of all the lower members of the same order." The Aristotelian principle deduces a maximum in perfection from the fact of causality; the Neoplatonic, rooted in the theory of emanation and participation, deduces causality from the rank of maximum. Even though the Aristotelian text is taken from Book a of the Metaphysics, acknowledged to be so much more Platonic in tone than the rest of the work that many have questioned its authenticity, there is still quite a gap between the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic formulations of the principle. But as Fabro points out, St. Thomas seems to have fastened on to this principle with evident satisfaction as a point of confluence of Aristotelianism and Platonism in virtue of which he could without further scruple cover many of his Platonic reasonings with the aegis of Aristotle."

<sup>\*</sup> Fabro gives a list of thirty-five texts where St. Thomas appeals to this principle (La nozione metafisica di partecipazione . . ., 2a ed., p. 65). But he does not seem to recognize the reversal of the original Aristotelian formula. The only one I am aware of who has noted this point-and he

In these first two chapters the author has laid his foundation well. In fact, because of the obvious implications in what he has brought out, he has already won half of the approaches to his goal and predisposed the reader to accept his main thesis of the central role of Platonic participation in St. Thomas. It is regrettable that what the author builds on this foundation from now on is not always as solid as the foundation itself.

Part Two, entitled "The Ascent from the Many to the One: Participation," now takes up the main uses of the participation principle in St. Thomas. It aims to prove, as the author says, that these applications are (1) Thomistic, (2) Platonic, (3) non-Aristotelian, and (4) true. The first chapter in this section makes an excellent start. It begins with one of the best brief analyses of the general meaning of the participation principle in St. Thomas that this reviewer has seen, although the backing up by texts is unnecessarily meagre. 'Participation is had when several different subjects (the multiplicity must be at least potential) possess each in its own restricted or imperfect way a similar perfection derived from a single common source which possesses the same perfection by essence and therefore in plenitude.

It should be noted that participation implies more than mere similarity: it postulates similarity derived causally from one source. It also implies more than mere efficient causality and not always that: the primary affirmation is of similarity in many as derived in some causal way from one source. If the participation is merely of an idea in an idea, or of a reality in an idea, the causality will be only formal or exemplary. If the participation is of a reality in a reality, as in the one case of finite beings in Infinite Subsistent Being, the causality will be not only exemplary but efficient and, as a corollary, final also. And in the case of this ultimate perfection of being, since it cannot be differentiated by anything outside it, the participated similarities will have to be analogous to each other, not univocal.

It should be noted also that one of the great advantages of the principle involved here, that objective similarity in many

merely remarks à propos of it that it seems to have become a school tradition in its latter form—is Geiger (La participation, p. 189, n. 1).

demands an objective transcendent unity as its cause, is that it permits the direct passage from mere static similarity in being to a single infinite cause in the order of being, without any need to pass through motion to a first mover. The line of motion, on the other hand, is the only one open to Aristotle by which to arrive at a supreme cause. St. Thomas not only applies this principle directly in his so-called henological argument for the existence of God from a many to a One in the order of being (esse), but attributes the method of proof explicitly to Plato in one of his rare admissions of direct Platonic affiliation.<sup>10</sup>

Next Father Little studies the first application of this general participation principle, namely, to the problem of the ultimate ontological foundation of the unity of universal concepts. The result is a hands-down victory for Plato over Aristotle. Since the multiplicity and diversity of individuals in a species cannot as such explain the objective formal similarity of their specific essence, disengaged by our universal concepts, St. Thomas is forced to abandon Aristotle and take Platonic-Augustinian wings to trace back this similarity to its source in the unique exemplary idea of this species in the mind of God. Aristotle, by rejecting the link of participation between earth and heaven, is forced to abandon any attempt at ultimate explanation of the fact which he sees to be true.

This chapter on the whole is definitely a success and already establishes to a large extent the author's main thesis. This is despite a number of disconcerting inaccuracies or dubiously founded statements. Fabro's thesis (which the author was unable to read himself) is not reported accurately as regards his supposed stressing of participation in Aristotle himself (pp. 42-43 and 22). The refusal to admit any intrinsic analogy in Plato does not seem quite fair. To affirm baldly that "St. Augustine held that universal ideas were innate and denied universals post rem" (pp. 50-51; 128) is surely exceeding the evidence. Too much credence is put in Geiger's thesis, justly criticized by many for distinguishing too sharply, especially in

<sup>10</sup> Cf. De Pot., q. 3, a. 5, quoted above in note 6.

St. Thomas, participation by limitation and participation by composition.

The following chapter (Chapter III), on the nature and foundation of truth in the judgment according to Plato, Aristotle and St. Thomas, is much less solidly based than what has preceded. Aristotle is, without evidence, accused of reducing the judgment to a mere agreement between "concepts". It is also unjust to Aristotle to accuse him of being hesitant and "uncomfortable in affirming any truth whose evidence was not sensible experience (pp. 60; 58)."

We come now to the central and—to my mind—weakest part of the book. It deals with the so-called Platonic proofs for the existence of God as found in St. Thomas, then as reworked by the author in what he considers a more adequate formulation. Unfortunately, in this reworking, he injects elements irreconcilable with St. Thomas's own central metaphysical intuition.

The basic insight of a genuine Thomistic metaphysics and epistemology is, I think, that all perfection, truth and possibility—and our knowledge of them as well—must be uncompromisingly rooted in existential being. Viewed in this light, the author's own series of proofs and interpretations are not only not legitimately founded in St. Thomas's texts but on several crucial points are in serious conflict with the latter's basic principle of the priority of being over truth and possibility. In a word, I believe much of them to be not only dubious Thomism but dubious metaphysics tout court.

It is in Chapter VIII that the trouble starts. This contains the author's own fully elaborated version of what he considers the best way of developing the notoriously terse and enigmatic text of St. Thomas. The proof consists in arguing immediately from the pure formal concept of real limitation in perfection to the necessary existence of an absolutely infinite being as exemplar of all the limited degrees. It runs thus. Real limit in perfection implies the necessity of real infinity (actual or possible) beyond it. For the totality of perfection to be finite would imply contradiction in terms, since limit postulates a further degree at least possible. (It might be noted in passing here that the author fails to bring out sufficiently one of the essential points in any

adequate analysis of limited perfection, namely, the careful verification and identification of some objective common perfection participated by all [the analogous perfection of existence itself for Otherwise the argument from "perfection" in St. Thomasl. general remains a mere vague conceptual one.) question in the proof now arises: can this infinite be a mere aggregate or sum of members all of which are individually finite. or must there be among them one absolutely and intensively infinite being as the source of all the others? The author attempts to prove the latter alternative as follows. If all the members were finite the totality would not be absolutely infinite; for it would be really possible that some member could have a higher degree of perfection, which would mean that the present totality is still only Thus the totality would always be limited unless it contained one absolute infinite, which can then be shown to be the standard and exemplar of all the rest.

This last part of the proof seems to me to involve only another variation of the ontological argument from the conceivability of the most perfect, and to labor under its fundamental defect. First, we have no right to affirm that a higher perfection of any individual member (i.e., a truly higher grade of being, not a mere further assimilation of the existing perfection of the totality, which would not raise the qualitative level of the whole any higher) is really possible, unless we already know there is some existing higher cause capable of so elevating it. Nor do we have any way of being sure that a single absolutely infinite being is positively, and not merely negatively non-contradictory. In a word, the purely conceptual deduction, if there is a finite being there must be an absolutely infinite one, is just too simple to be valid.

It is possible in sound Thomism to rise from the finite to the infinite by the principle of composition, namely, that all finitude requires a composition of limiting potency and participated perfection or act, and that every composite must be caused; or by the principle that all participated similarity in the fundamental perfection of existence (esse) must derive by both exemplary and efficient causality from a unique source that is by that very fact an absolute plenitude or infinity; and perhaps by some other ways also. But the direct argument that the finite by its very concept implies an absolute infinite is to my mind undoubtedly Anselmian,

perhaps also authentically Augustinian, but neither genuinely Thomistic nor perhaps even properly Platonic, since it is not strictly a passage from a many to a One.

The author's next proof, a variation of the classic Augustinian one from necessary and eternal truths, seems to me to labor under a basically similar defect. The former left the possibility of an absolute infinite hanging in the air, founded only on conceivability. This one leaves the eternity and "reality" of necessary truths about contingent beings hanging in the air for one disastrous moment, between the moment when they are recognized as independent of and prior to contingent existent beings and contingent minds and the moment when they are proved to be actually being thought by a non-contingent eternal mind. The argument runs that since analytic propositions such as first principles are intrinsically and absolutely necessary, we can immediately conclude to their positive "real" eternity independent of the contingent subjects to which they are applied. But since real eternal truths demand some existing eternal foundation, they must exist in an eternal existing non-contingent exemplar.11

The difficulty is clear. For St. Thomas—and for any sound metaphysics—truths as such, no matter how necessary to be thought this way when a mind actually thinks them, can never be quasi entities-in-themselves which for one moment can be conceded to be real in any way (let alone eternal) unless it is known either that they are founded in some existing being which

This "reality" of the law or principle independent of the contingent objects which it governs is a key point in the author's argumentation and he does not hesitate to affirm it in the plainest terms. Thus: "And thus to see that the law is itself a reality independent of the mind is to recognise it as true" (p. 138). "But the law considered as necessarily real on the evidence of itself alone, even if we prescind from any mind that may know it, is the law as ontologically true or knowable... [The mind] affirms the law as existing or real in some way as the standard rule which all things must observe in order to be able to exist at all" (p. 139; italics are the author's own). Though the author makes several attempts to qualify the "reality" thus affirmed as "only notional being" (p. 139), he does not seem to realize that this qualification hardly squares with the strength of his other statements and if taken at full value would immediately dissolve the very foundation of his proof: the independent reality of necessary laws before the existence of an eternal mind thinking them has been established.

is "the true" (ontological truth) or that they are actually being thought by some existing mind (logical truth). Hence it is impossible to use the "eternity" of necessary truths as a datum certain in itself from which to conclude to an eternal mind or exemplar, since it is impossible to know their eternity until we first know that there is some eternal mind which is eternally thinking them. We can indeed know such truths to be necessary, in the sense that if any mind thinks the same existing being or its validly abstracted essence or a derived note again, then under pain of contradicting itself it must think this same content the same way. But before proving the existence of God as source of true contingent things we cannot validly affirm that the truths about them are eternal. We might also add that the author seriously confuses the traditional meaning of ontological truth when he calls ontological truths propositions, such as the principles of contradiction, or 7 plus 3=10. Ontological truth is nothing but a being itself as conformed to or capable of manifesting itself to a mind.

It is true that the author does appear to make a good case for this particular proof from one text of St. Thomas (Contra Gent., II, 84). This text seems to admit that from truths which are eternal as regards their object we can conclude to an eternal being in which they are founded. However, St. Thomas is very cautious here and does not commit himself on just what such truths are. In fact, he is far more cautious than the author's own quotation of him would suggest. By an unfortunate oversight the text of St. Thomas, which reads, "If the truth understood be eternal . . .," has been rendered with the conditional omitted, "The (eternal) truth understood (by the human soul) is eternal . . . " (p. 124). This makes quite a difference. But at any rate, later on in the Summa Theologica St. Thomas is much more clear-cut and uncompromising. It cannot be affirmed, he says, that any truth is eternal unless either the being known is eternal or it is sure that there is an eternal mind thinking it.12

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Cf. the masterful article, Sum. Theol., I, q. 16, a. 7, in its entirety, esp.: "The truth of enunciations is nothing other than the truth of the intellect. For an enunciation resides in the intellect, and in speech. Now according as it is in the intellect, it has truth of itself... Hence, if no

In Part III. The Descent from the One to the Many: Passive Potency, we return to much more solid ground. This whole section, revealing much metaphysical penetration, deals first historically, then speculatively, with the fundamental challenge to metaphysics laid down by Parmenides and the attempts to solve it on the part of Plato, Aristotle, and St. Thomas. The Parmenidean challenge was this: if only being is, and non-being is not. how is it possible that there be any real differences or multiplicity within being? Father Little shows how Plato met this challenge head-on by admitting that we must affirm in some way the reality of non-being as a distinguishing principle within being. Obviously the term "non-being" cannot be pressed too literally. It signifies not absolute but relative non-being. Thus every distinct entity or idea for Plato must be a mixture of being (exactly what it is) and non-being (the negation of the indefinite multitude or "infinity" of what it is not). Unfortunately, because of his identification of perfection with form and limit and of imperfection, indetermination, and matter with the unlimited, Plato could not work out a clear-cut theory of non-being as limiting principle, such as St. Thomas later evolved in his doctrine of potency as limit, with the help of the Neoplatonists. Plato's fatal penchant for hypostatizing even this negative correlative principle of non-being into an absolute form on its own compounded the confusion much worse. But at least he laid down the general principle that in

Others repeat the argument in so vague and ambiguous a manner that it is hard to tell what they understand by it or whether they are interested in anything more than salvaging the authority of St. Augustine or not abandoning a certain line of Thomistic tradition now venerable with age.

intellect were eternal, no truth would be eternal. Now because only the divine intellect is eternal, in it alone truth has eternity. Nor does it follow from this that anything else but God is eternal, since the truth of the divine intellect is God himself" (corp.). "In this manner, all universals are said to be everywhere and always, in so far as universals abstract from place and time. It does not, however, follow from this that they are eternal, except in an intellect, if one exists that is eternal" (ad 2m). Cf. also I, q. 10, a. 3 ad 3m; q. 16, a. 8; De Veritate, q. 1, aa. 5-6. It is true that the author cites a number of Thomists who defend a proof from eternal truths (p. 130). But most add some kind of codicil which shifts the argumentation back to the line of being before mounting up to the supreme Truth as Exemplar.

relative non-being resides the general possibility of differentiation and limitation.

Aristotle, on the other hand, dodged the main challenge of Parmenides and left the basic problem of the static similarity and diversity of essences in the order of being unsolved, as a pure state of fact. His principle of real passive potency, of which he is so proud, is not a principle of basic limitation or even differentiation between beings. That role belongs to form. Potency is not the principle of not-being-any-other-being, but only of not-yet-being-fully-this-being or some other being. It solves the problem of Parmenides within the limited area of change only.<sup>13</sup>

St. Thomas's theory of potency combined in a genial synthesis the points of view of both Plato and Aristotle. He radically enlarged Aristotelian potency so that it now fulfills, first, the basic role of static limiting and differentiating principle within the various orders of being, thus rendering possible the participation of the many in the One; second, it fulfills the dynamic role of principle of incompletion rendering possible change and evolution. This is a conclusion of capital importance, indispensable in the eyes of this reviewer if we wish to understand correctly St. Thomas's position in the history of metaphysics.<sup>14</sup> The author sums it up well thus:

The centre of Thomas's system is the concept of potency as the principle of limitation, which when further analysed signifies limitation as an intrinsic principle of being . . . The centre of Aristotle's system is the concept of potency as a principle of change or of motion implying in material things a process of evolution or gradual assimilation towards the Pure Act (which for Aristotle means the Perfect Action). Thomas admitted Aristotle's doctrine but as a secondary function of potency. The difference of Thomas from Aristotle is towards Plato (p. 203).

The chapter is in its main lines one of the most valuable and illuminating in the whole book, and we have seen little like it elsewhere in English. Some rather serious inaccuracies of details,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> His inability to solve the fundamental problem comes out clearly between the lines of a very revealing passage: *Met.* N (XIV), 2, 1088b 35-1089b 31.

<sup>14</sup> See note 4.

however, should be picked up. It is not correct to say (p. 183) that Plato simply identifies non-being univocally with space or matter. It is found analogically also as the indefinite dyad of the greater and the less on the level of mathematical entities and again as the illimitation of pure "intelligible" otherness on the higher level of the pure ideas. Nor can it be said that Plato held anything positively resembling the real distinction of essence and existence in St. Thomas (p. 202). Since being for Plato was identified with form and essence, there was no room in his system for a common analogical perfection of existence participated in by essence as a The author also seems to have a peculiar blind limiting principle. spot towards Plotinus (and non-Christian Neoplatonism in general), dismissing him summarily and superficially as an "idealist" (pp. 191, 244) who denied the reality of the One as well as the role of non-being as a principle of differentiation. No note is taken of the major role of the Neoplatonists (Plotinus and Proclus) in elaborating the theory of participation and especially of form as limit compared with the super-formal infinity of the One, which directly prepared the way for the Thomistic notion of limiting potency. The contention that for Aristotle matter was a kind of solid entity possessing its own being, thus making his doctrine of matter and form resemble more that of Suarez than of St. Thomas's notion of intrinsically correlative incomplete principles of being (p. 188), is a challenging statement, perhaps with a good deal of truth in it, but none the less dubious and difficult to prove in view of Aristotle's explicit affirmation that matter is a relative principle (pros ti; Phys. II, 2, 194 b 8).

From the point of view of contemporary existential Thomism, with its clear-cut centering on being as simultaneously essence and act of actual existence (id quod est), it seems to me both dubious Thomism and nebulous metaphysics to write as follows: "Being [positive perfection] is the intrinsic principle by which a thing is real or existing. It is existence (not necessarily actual but at least possible) considered with reference to the existing thing, not to the mind considering it. Because it means possible existence, a necessary truth, being is a metaphysical principle" (p. 209). It is not clear to the reviewer just where the author stands as regards the central insight now so widely and effectively used as

touchstone by so many contemporary Thomists, namely, the act of existence considered as the core of all positive perfection of all essences, which are merely delimitations interior to it.

Part IV outlines some further corollaries or applications of the participation doctrine in St. Thomas's psychological and ethical theories. The author shows how it is impossible to give a sound metaphysical proof of free will unless it is shown that the will is of its nature ordered to infinite goodness as its final end, in which all finite goods participate as intermediary ends but which none can equal. Thus only the final end is willed necessarily. No finite good can force the will's adherence to it unless it be clearly seen as an absolutely necessary means to our ultimate happiness. Without the theory of participation one can only discover by consciousness his liberty as a pure fact, but not ground it metaphysically.

In conclusion, The Platonic Heritage of Thomism is not, and we do not think the author intended it to be, a work of sustained, high-level scholarship like some of the continental studies of participation. Nor, because of its occasional somewhat disconcerting lapses in accuracy and admixture of dubious interpretations and reasonings is it a book to be used as a sure and self-sufficient guide for beginners to the authentic thought of St. Thomas. Nonetheless, it is a genuinely valuable and illuminating contribution to a deeper penetration into the hidden springs of the Thomistic synthesis. The middle part of the book, where the author ventures out on his own elaboration of the proofs of the existence of God, is the weakest and most dubious part of the whole. But the central thesis on the role of participation in St. Thomas is to our mind thoroughly sound, well grounded by the author, and well worth bringing out, especially in English, where there is so little on this subject as vet. Several of the applications are also well handled, as is the analysis of passive potency and limitation. If one wishes, therefore, to get the best out of the book without wasting time and becoming confused or alienated by the long, intricate, and dubiously valid discussions on the proofs for the existence of God, I would suggest reading up to Chapter V inclusive and from Chapter XI to the end. This is the real contribution of the book and one for which we can be sincerely grateful to Father Little.

We can best conclude by quoting Fr. Little's own conclusion, to which we subscribe heartily:

Whether wittingly or unwittingly he [St. Thomas] taught a Platonic doctrine rejected by Aristotle when he taught participation. That doctrine is only one stone in his building but it is a stone of the arch without which Thomism would collapse. It is not merely fundamental in the sense that its denial would render important doctrines untenable. It is itself of the first importance, central to the system, for it is the doctrine of the relation of man to God. And God cannot be known and creatures cannot begin to be understood unless participation is presupposed; for the first thing true of them is that they are creatures, related to God, Being Itself, vet distinct from him by non-being. Therefore the doctrine of participation must be conclusion or premiss to every truth in a true philosophy. Since Aristotle, in rejecting Plato's heavenly assembly of universals, had rejected all doctrines of participation St. Thomas was constrained to find his doctrine of participation in an emended Platonism. He must therefore be regarded as a Platonist in great measure, even though he was in greater measure an Aristotelean (p. 286).

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## WITTGENSTEIN'S INVESTIGATIONS

IRWIN C. LIEB

Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations is an important book that deals mainly with the ideas of meaning, understanding, and sensing. Wittgenstein's first book, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, also deals with these ideas. But in the way they deal with them, and in their final understanding of them, two books could hardly be more different. The Tractatus, for example, deals with these ideas through very sharply defined, tightly interconnected propositions. The Investigations, on the other hand, treats them in paragraphs that are conversational, often loosely connected, and frequently disjoined by isolated observations. Some of these observations are perceptions of genius; others, unfortunately, are rather obvious.

The differences in the styles of these books are only tokens of more important differences in their methods and results. To see this it might be useful to look at the theses about representation which are central to the *Tractatus*, but which Wittgenstein leaves altogether aside in his *Investigations*.

Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* view of representation may be considered an extended answer to two questions: I. What must be the case if one is to represent at all (cf. 2.0211, 2.0212)? And II. In what does the essential connection between a sign and its object consist (cf. 4.03, 2.16, 2.161)?

To answer the first question Wittgenstein asserted in the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Philosophical Investigations (Macmillan Company, New York, 1953). Wittgenstein takes as the motto for his book Nestroy's observation: "Überhaupt hat der Fortschritt das an sich, dass er viel grösser ausschaut, als er wirklich ist."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Kegan Paul, London, 1922).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> To refer to parts of the *Tractatus*, I use the number Wittgenstein gives to the statements referred to. To refer to parts of the *Investigations*, I use a paragraph sign followed by the number Wittgenstein gives to the paragraph.

Tractatus that "what is the case . . . is the existence of [logically independent] atomic facts" (2)—combinations of the simple things or objects that must constitute such facts (2.011). If objects were not the uncompounded substances of the world (2.021), Wittgenstein believed that nothing whatever could be thought. He therefore supposed that all thoughts or propositions must finally present possible atomic facts. They might, of course, initially present what seem to be complex facts. But then, Wittgenstein thought, they can (theoretically) be uniquely analyzed into sets of elementary propositions to which atomic facts could correspond (3.25).

In answer to the second question, Wittgenstein argued that because propositions present states of affairs, they must be essentially connected with them (4.03). He said that the connection derives from propositions being pictures (4.01, 4.03). from having something in common with the states of affairs they present (2.16). What every picture has in common with its object, he suggested, is its form of representation: the possibility that respective (simple) elements are arranged in the same way (2.033, 2.15, 2.151). If propositions are true, they, their signs, and their correlates were said to have their structure in common: their respective (simple) elements are actually arranged in the same way. Wittgenstein called the simple elements of propositions "names" (3.202). He said that the connection between a name and its object is that the name means the object (3.203). And he concluded that "one name stands for one thing, and another for another thing, and they are connected together ['like members of a chain'] s... so the whole, like a living picture, presents the atomic fact" (4.0311).

<sup>4</sup> The simple elements of the world are logically simple objects. The simple elements of sentences are name tokens. The simple elements of propositions are names, but might be called the meaning of name tokens, or the elements of thought.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> According to the *Tractatus*, names may be connected like members of a chain (i.e. without intermediaries, or intermediaries of a different kind) because of the internal properties of the simple objects they mean. "It is essential to a thing that it can be a constituent part of an atomic fact" (2.011). "If I know an object, then I also know all the possibilities of its occurrence in atomic facts. (Every such possibility must lie in the nature

In the first part of his *Investigations*, Wittgenstein deals with these two questions again. But his new answers to them differ radically from those of the *Tractatus*. For the *Investigations*' answers are not different answers of the same kind. Instead, in the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein purports not to understand the two questions, and so he discusses their sense instead of answering them; or, he in effect repudiates the questions and deals with others which look like them; or what is perhaps still the same thing, he treats and examines the questions in a different way, and gives answers to them different in kind from the answers of the *Tractatus*.

I

This is certainly true of Wittgenstein's discussion of the topics raised by the first question. Instead of finding that simple objects and names are essential in representation. Wittgenstein now finds that questions about such simples are without sense. Toward bringing out their lack of sense, he builds upon several connected remarks. He begins by saving that questions about logically simple objects and names presuppose a special thesis that is itself without sense. The thesis is that a word has no meaning if nothing corresponds to it (§ 40). Wittgenstein believes the thesis is without sense because it "confound(s) the meaning of a name with the bearer of the name" (§ 40). Behind it, seemingly lending it sense, he finds the idea that there must be things that exist in their own right, from which all other things are compounded. (See § 46, where Wittgenstein quotes from Socrates' dream in the Theatetus.) And this idea, too, he holds to be senseless. If it is, the special thesis about meanings and the questions about simple names and objects will

of the object)" (2.0123). "Only in the context of a proposition has a name a meaning" (3.3).

<sup>\*</sup> They would have been answers of the same kind had Wittgenstein written, for example, that "subjects, not substances, are the elements of the world" or that "naming, not picturing, provides the essential connection between propositions and states of affairs."

indeed be without sense. So will the theory of representation of the *Tractatus*. And Wittgenstein will have been right to set that theory aside and not replace it by another that makes the same senseless suppositions.

To show that the idea of logically simple objects has no sense, Wittgenstein does not argue the issue. To do that would acknowledge the idea to have sense. Instead, he asks directly what meanings there are for "simple" and "composite," and he answers that all sorts of things could be meant by the terms. He concludes that the question whether a thing is complex makes sense only "if it is already established what kind of complexity—that is, what particular use of the word—is in question" (§ 47). According to Wittgenstein, when a philosopher asks if complexes are not ultimately compounded of simple objects, the kind of complexity that is in issue has not been settled: the question has not been given a sense. He therefore supposes that the correct answer to the question is "that depends on what you understand by 'composite.' (And that is of course not an answer but a rejection of the question)" (§ 47).

This answer will seem ineffective to many philosophers. For they will suppose that what needs to be done to overcome Wittgenstein's rejection can be done very easily. One has merely to explain what is meant by "simple and composite elements of the world." Yet Wittgenstein believes that this has not and cannot be done so that the clarified questions about elements are philosophical ones.

The evidences for this crucial belief of Wittgenstein's are his views about the clearness of conceptions and his view of philosophy. Both of these views, however, seem to me open to serious objections. Together, they lead to the impasse that Wittgenstein is not able to describe the conditions for conceptual clarity without substantially changing his view of philosophy.

I.A. Wittgenstein's View of Conceptual Clarity: Some philosophers have treated concepts as if they were special sorts of objects, known in appropriate special ways. They have considered them clear (to us) if we know the elements that constitute them, or if our vision of them is unobscured. To oppose such theories, Wittgenstein emphasizes what seems

frequently forgotten: the variety of activities by which we learn and teach the meanings of words, and the spectrum of differing uses of words to describe, designate, explain, joke, etc. describing these activities or games, Wittgenstein reminds us of the variety of (apparent) criteria we have for settling whether meanings are understood. He reminds us too that philosophical (hidden) criteria seem often irrelevant to many familiar cases of knowing meanings. One reason for their strangeness is that a person's knowledge of the meaning of a word is usually said to depend upon his knowing how to use the word appropriately. and not (necessarily) on his acquaintance with an esoteric object. A person may come to know the meaning of a word as the result of contemplating an image, or after perceiving or thinking about certain things. But privileged activities and special objects do not actually occur in all cases of knowing meanings. To insist that they must occur (though perhaps in a covert way), Wittgenstein would say, is to erect an inappropriate paradigm. It is to be too insensitive to the variety of conditions that actually prove whether we know and are clear about meanings.' A single formula that will say what all meanings are and which will not obscure or distort their differences would no doubt be ideal. But being general, any single formula has to slight differences. To appreciate the variety, Wittgenstein would prefer that we chronicle differences instead of thinking of overall similarities. Should we nevertheless wish a single criterion, instead of finding it either in special ways of knowing or in special things known, Wittgenstein

Wittgenstein discusses the reasons which impel some philosophers to make the model for meaning in one area the paradigm for meaning everywhere. See below.

Philosophers who regard concepts as objects tend generally to think that the use of a predicate can be rightly fixed only if one is acquainted with the object which that predicate names. They of course allow that someone might have used a word correctly without knowing the object named. But then, they would say, the correct use will have been accidental, and may be unsure and unguided in fresh contexts. They would say that using a term correctly is an apparent but an inconclusive test of whether one knows its meaning. Knowing for sure what its meaning is and what its use can be is knowing the object which the word names. For Wittgenstein, the requirement that we must always know the object would be a hidden criterion. For him, the apparent criterion is generally sufficient.

supposes that we shall be closer to the *life* of words, and be less misled if we say that "the meaning of a word is its use in the language" (§ 43), and that the meaning of a word is clear when its use is well prescribed. We thus have a new formula of great generality, which allows for varieties of meaning by allowing for variety in the uses words may have in a language."

Now let us see whether this formula, though reluctantly given, furnishes good grounds for declaring the conceptions central to the *Tractatus* to be without sense.

According to Wittgenstein a concept or meaning is the use of a word in the language. It is clear when the word is used clearly. And a word is used clearly when it is used in cases for which its use is well prescribed.

To understand this view we will first have to understand what "well prescribed" means. Wittgenstein introduces the idea

<sup>&</sup>quot;The meaning of a word is its use in the language" is a formula of the same kind as the formulas Wittgenstein rejects. Wittgenstein would no doubt prefer not to assimilate the variety of uses of "meaning" to any single formula, even if it did not admit of exceptions, as he allows that his own formula does (§ 43). The principal reason for his preference is that a single formula tends to make us assimilate differences, to classify without proper regard to what may be important differences (e.g. to assimilate in classification words that are concepts and those that are not, or are not always used as concepts).

As a formula of the kind it opposes, Wittgenstein's formula is open to the sorts of difficulties that attend the others. For example, on the view that a concept is an *object*, it is difficult if not finally impossible to explain either the generality of conceptions or their relevance to particulars. Likewise, for Wittgenstein's formula, it is difficult to know how to understand the differences and relations between using a word on a particular occasion and the (general) use of that word, how to understand "the use of a word," "different uses," or even, how to understand "word."

Wittgenstein discusses some of these difficulties. Invited by his formula, and in his judgment rightly set aside when we understand it, these difficulties would not have arisen had Wittgenstein been even bolder, had he refused to provide a formula of the kind he repudiates. Charles Peirce's practice is, I think, instructive by contrast. Instead of giving a single formula, Peirce wrote about different kinds of meanings, and provided his pragmatic maxim to teach us how to isolate only the rational purport of a conception. (See The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, V.)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1e</sup> This should be refined. I think Wittgenstein would not say that a concept is the use of a certain type of word in the language. Instead, I think he would say that a word is a concept if it is used in a certain way.

of "normal cases" to help explain its meaning. He writes that "it is only in normal cases that the use of a word is clearly prescribed; we know, are in no doubt, what to say in this or that case" (§ 142). We have then to see just what a normal case is. Plainly, it need not be a widely known, frequent, or familiar sort of case. But shall we settle that a word is used in a normal case because of features of the case itself, or because the speakers of the word in that case are specially characterized? Shall we say that a word is used in a normal case if its use in that case is rule guided? Or shall we say that a word is used in a normal case if its users know or feel confident about what could be said in that case?

Neither of these options is strong enough.

On the first option, if the use of a word is rule guided, particular uses in accord with the rules are uses in normal cases. normal cases may, however, occur in philosophy as anywhere else. They may occur even when a philosopher talks about elements. The elements of which Socrates dreamt in the Theatetus, for example, were said to have certain marks: to be perceptible, nameable, and to be such as not to derive their character from anything else. Having these marks, certain rules are at once relevant to fix the use of "element": meanings for "element" are at once fixed by affiliation with uses for "perceptible." "name," etc. Though not fully fixed or rendered familiar by these meanings, the sense of "element" is well enough settled to enable Plato (in the discussions about unity and knowledge) to conclude that simple elements cannot be used to provide the distinction between the things for which an account can be given and those for which it cannot be given." It would therefore seem that if Plato's use of "element" is abnormal, and therefore unclear or even senseless, something much stronger than prescription by rule should mark normal cases.

It may of course be that the prescriptions which guide Plato's use of "element" are not full enough: that the use of "element" is not *clearly* or well enough prescribed. But then we should

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> The discussions in *Theatetus*, 201-208, are indispensible in the study of either of Wittgenstein's books.

ask: clearly or well enough prescribed for what? Perhaps the answer is "clearly or well enough prescribed to eliminate or prevent doubt about what could be said in this or that case." This is the answer the second option provides. To accept it is to hold that a conception will be used in normal cases if we are in no doubt whether or not the word is applicable in those cases (§§ 84, 85). Yet if doubt (or the absence of doubt) about a use of a word is the criterion which settles that conception's clarity, we risk being idiosyncratic. For individual confidences in manners of speaking have repeatedly to be fractured to reveal unclarities; and personal doubts do not (usually) dirty the clearness conceptions otherwise have. If doubt is relevant to clarity, as Wittgenstein's own descriptions show, it is not (usually) private, but is more general or social in character.

Specifying suitable doubters, however, could easily lead to arbitrariness. A word is not used in normal cases as it is generally used among persons in arbitrarily specified groups.12 The doubts that children may have about whether "neutrino" is to be used in this or that case, for example, does not show that that concept is unclear or not prescribed for those cases. But if physicists were generally unsettled about its use, the conception would properly be judged unclear. One thing that qualifies physicists as judges and disqualifies children is that physicists know something which children don't: they know the point of introducing the conception; they know what jobs "neutrino" is to do and what words it is to do them with. (See §§ 11, 80, 81.) Knowing the point and the jobs, whether and how well "neutrino" can be used to achieve them is not arbitrarily judged by physicists. Much the same can be said for all sorts of words: they have their functions—as diverse as the functions of different and different kinds of tools, and those who know their function may judge whether cases of their use are clear or normal.13

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Some people have thought that Wittgenstein and other philosophers wish to make the ordinary man (or what Cambridge and Oxford philosophers believe to be the ordinary man) the *measure* of conceptual clarity.

<sup>13</sup> I don't want to suggest that Wittgenstein would oppose the point that the doubt relevant to determining clarity has to be founded on knowl-

In the case of "neutrino" and other words, then, the occurrence or absence of doubt about the applicability of a word is, by itself, of only secondary interest. What is primary is knowledge about what functions the word is to perform, or the rules which guide its use. So we seem again thrown back upon rules to distinguish normal or clear from abnormal or unclear uses. Different psychic states may well attend different ruleguided uses for words, and may even vary with them in interesting ways. But the variations are so considerable that it is impossible effectively to use doubt to mark objective possibilities and to distinguish normal from abnormal cases. It certainly does not allow us to declare that, say, Plato's use of "simple element" is abnormal, unclear, or senseless. There are rules which guide Plato's use of the term, and such uses, for an appropriate audience, prompt no damaging doubt. I am therefore unable to see that, so far, Wittgenstein's criterion for clarity can be used to bar philosophical uses of "simple element."

For Plato's use of the term "simple," what kind of complexity is in issue is settled. That is enough to settle the sense of questions about simple and composite. To be sure, the way in which Plato uses the term is sometimes different from the way in which "element" is used by others. But as his use is rule-guided, it certainly seems that there is no ground for repudiating his philosophical questions about elements."

edge of certain sorts. It is rather that he does not seem always to use it sufficiently.

Words have their functions and so do tools. (See § 11.) There may be a difference, however, between the way a tool is normally used and the way it is best used. Wittgenstein would not say that words resemble tools in this respect. He would not want to say that a conception has certain (important) properties which make it more effective or better suited to do one job rather than another. The concept, for him, does not have properties in virtue of which it is used. The concept is the use.

<sup>14</sup> I am not positive that Wittgenstein would repudiate Plato's questions. He says that one can reject the philosophical question (§ 47), and that question is perhaps the one in which we speak absolutely of simple elements (§ 47). But just what such a question would be, and who (besides himself) has raised such a question, Wittgenstein does not say. Because he doesn't, how precisely he would regard Plato's uses is difficult to know. It does seem plain, though, that Wittgenstein regards his own

There may still be a way to strengthen Wittgenstein's formula. Perhaps the rules which guide, say, Plato's use of "simple element" do not prescribe those uses clearly or well enough to enable one to accomplish certain purposes. Filling in the formula in this way does not distort what Wittgenstein has to say about the normal use and clear meaning of a term being its use for particular sorts of purposes (§§ 10, 11, 69, 132). It may be, then, that what is finally wrong with the uses philosophers have given to "simple" and "complex" is that, though fixed by rule, the uses are without suitable, helpful, or revealing purposes. To answer this requires consideration of Wittgenstein's view of philosophy.

I.B. Wittgenstein's View of Philosophy: If Plato's philosophical use of "simple element" does not fulfill its purpose, the failure, Wittgenstein might say, is not due to the frailty of guiding rules, but to the inappropriateness of the purpose itself. What the purpose is, and how consuming it can be, Wittgenstein knows—perhaps better than any of those who have learned most from him. About its essential function, he writes that logical investigation

seeks to see to the bottom of things and is not meant to concern itself whether what actually happens is this or that.—It takes its rise, not from an interest in the facts of nature, nor from a need to grasp causal connexions: but from an urge to understand the basis, or essence, of everything empirical. Not, however, as to this end we had to hunt out new facts; it is, rather, of the essence of our investigation that we do not seek to learn anything new by it. We want to understand something that is already in plain view. For this is what we seem in some sense not to understand (§ 89).

About what some do, and think they have to do, to understand, about why all such programs and thoughts must founder, Wittgenstein writes most plainly. He says that when we try to understand what is in plain view, "we feel as if we had to penetrate

Tractatus uses of "simple" and "composite" as inadmissible. But Plato's Theatetus uses are sensible because they enjoy at least the sense derivative from the sense of the terms with which they are introduced, and because the possibility of their predication does not depend on empirical evidences of doubt or assurance. Upon these grounds, Wittgenstein's Tractatus uses of "simple" and "composite" are sensible too.

phenomena" (§ 90). To do so, he says, we direct our investigation not towards phenomena, but "as one might say, towards the 'possibilities' of phenomena... Our investigation is therefore a grammatical one" (§ 90). We try "to grasp the incomparable essence of language. That is, the order existing between the concepts of proposition, word, proof, truth, experience, and so on. This order is a super-order between—so to speak—super-concepts" (§ 97). "When we believe that we must find that order, must find the ideal, in our actual language, we become dissatisfied with what are ordinarily called 'propositions,' 'words,' 'signs'" (§ 105).

To search for the ideal often becomes the purpose of philosophers, as it was for Plato. But according to Wittgenstein, the search for the ideal can only lead us astray. Impelled by dissatisfaction with ordinary language and ordinary understanding, "it is difficult as it were to keep our heads up,—to see that we must stick to the subjects of our every-day thinking, and not go astray and imagine that we have to describe extreme subtleties . . . " (§ 106). We must stick to everyday subjects, Wittgenstein seems to say, because in the end we cannot sensibly get away from them. This view arises from the idea that a concept is the use of a word and that a concept is clear in the case of its normal use. When we speak about language (or the world), Wittgenstein says that we must speak "the language of everyday" (§ 120). This language cannot be too coarse and material for what we want to say, and any other language would have to be constructed from it (§ 120). It might be thought that another language could be constructed by trying "to refine or complete the system of rules for the use of our words in unheard-of ways" (§ 133). But Wittgenstein says that this will not solve our problems. For when our conceptions are used in their normal cases, they are clear; they do their jobs, and do not conflict with one another. The trouble arises when we follow out the rules for the use of words. "Things do not turn out as we had assumed. That we are therefore as it were entangled in our own rules. This entanglement in our rules is what we want to understand" (§ 125). One reason we often get confused or entangled, Wittgenstein says, is that we "compare the use of words with games and calculi which have fixed rules . . ." (§ 81), rules that prescribe every case." One way out of the entanglement, then, is to see the ways in which words are actually and normally used: to see that they are not everywhere prescribed: to rid ourselves of the idea that they are everywhere prescribed, and that they conflict so intolerably that philosophy has to realign all concepts. What we can sensibly want is

to establish an order in our knowledge of the use of language: an order with a particular end in view; one out of many possible orders; not the order. To this end we shall constantly be giving prominence to distinctions which our ordinary forms of language easily make us overlook. This may make it look as if we saw it as our task to reform language. Such a reform for particular practical purposes, an improvement in our terminology designed to prevent misunderstandings in practice, is perfectly possible. But these are not the cases we have to do with [in philosophy]. The confusions which occupy us [in philosophy] arise when language is like an engine idling, not when it is doing work (§ 132, the italics of the last sentence are added). Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it. For it cannot give it any foundation either. It leaves everything as it is (§ 124).

A close examination of the ways in which language is actually used, like a fresh therapy (§ 133), often provides a way out of entanglements. It generally will, if Wittgenstein's analysis is adequate or true. His analysis, in summary, begins and ends in an almost Cartesian commitment to a primary fact: the way language is actually used to do work. Every conceptual inquiry is said to build out from and through it; none can leave it behind, and none can furnish grounds for criticizing its essentials. The way in which language is actually used to do its work can, in some areas, no doubt be improved. But these improvements are for practical (working) purposes, and are not philosophical. Philosophical improvements would aim at correcting or replacing ordinary language. Yet, built out from it, philosophy cannot justify, undercut, or overthrow it.

The primary fact of this view, however, is not isolated, and the claims made about that fact are unestablished. As it seems

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> "A philosophical problem has the form: 'I don't know my way about'" (§ 123). Cf. Plato's view on the genesis of philosophical problems in the *Republic*, 523.

to me, no actual, everyday use of language is, by itself, in principle above criticism. In particular, I think that Wittgenstein cannot help us to know which are the uncriticizable uses of language actually doing work, or that were he able to, he would have to complete his philosophy in such a way that it would *interfere* with the actual use of language.

The first of these alternatives becomes binding if we see that the philosophical problems occasioned through the uses of words are not solely problems that arise when language is like an idling engine. They may arise over the way that engine seems to do work. They may arise, for example, when we notice that the use of "white" in everyday uses of "this is white" does not so well comport with the uses we have for "know" and "appear"; when we find that the familiar uses of "predict" and "possible" are not entirely consonant with familiar uses of "I know that it will rain tomorrow"; when we discover that informing someone by "I dreamt of Juliet" prompts puzzlement about uses of "real" and "unreal," etc. These are observations and questions which arise about language at work. To say that they do not rightly arise, or that they do not arise over cases in which words are really doing their jobs, seems either to be false, or else to use "the language of everyday" and "language doing work" so that those expressions could apply only to specially selected uses of words in everyday language: those in sentences that are not self-contradictory, or in certain groups of sentences that do not contradict one another. To say that a conception is clear and not vague in the cases in which it can be predicated without contradiction is less surprising than to say that a concept is clearly prescribed only in normal cases; likewise, to say that we best understand the meaning of a word by studying its uses in non-self-contradictory statements is not likely to mislead; while to say that discussion of concepts must be conducted in the language of everyday cannot but invite misinterpretation. Both sorts of formulations, the familiar and the forceful, are no doubt true. But both need substantial elucidation. This is plainly true of Wittgenstein's formulations. For he does not explain when it is that we can consider language to be working. So he leaves "language doing work" along with "normal case" without their

own everyday uses. Not having provided them, were Wittgenstein otherwise right about the root position of ordinary language, neither philosophy nor any other conceptual inquiry could have an impeccable foundation. Instead, all would have to be built upon a base that may, at one or another crucial point, be found unduly weak. We no doubt must build from and through familiar concepts. But no one of these can be simply specified as having an uncriticizable use. If everyday language does not actually specify which uses of everyday language are exempt from criticism, a philosophical view built from fallible foundations must fallibly judge what uses can withstand all criticism. For this reason, at least, instead of being dispensible, a systematic philosophy seems all the more required.

The second alternative becomes binding if we recognise that in having introduced the phrases "language doing work" and "normal case" and having tried to connect their use with uses for "concepts." "clear," etc., Wittgenstein comes perilously close to working in the field which, he says, is confusion in philosophy: trying to describe language when it is like an idling engine. To do this best, to avoid leaving conceptions hanging without connections (as Wittgenstein does), many philosophers have thought that they must elucidate, extend, and systematize the connections between conceptions. Their descriptive, speculative, and logical jobs have sometimes been undertaken simply because conceptions in everyday language are not fully enough prescribed or refined to enable us to understand what is in plain view. Such jobs are not terminological reforms designed for the "particular practical purposes" of preventing misunderstandings. Nor are they, finally, piecemeal admissions of acceptable uses for isolated sets of conceptions. Something more comprehensive has always been required.

To conduct such comprehensive inquiries is indeed Witt-genstein's own aim: "... the clarity we are aiming at is... complete clarity. But this simply means that philosophical problems should completely disappear" (§ 133.) By this I think that Wittgenstein means, in part, that problems about conceptions will no longer torture if we understand the way we actually use language to do work. But even such complete clarity is an ideal.

That we do not (usually) mean to contradict ourselves is something of which no one needs reminding. But that we do not contradict ourselves when language is used in normal cases is a philosophical thesis—one which is no doubt to be understood as necessary, but which is not acceptable on that count alone.16 Whether it should be admitted depends upon complicated considerations; partly, upon how it is to be understood; how its conceptions relate to others. By not having connected his central concepts well enough with others. Wittgenstein's thesis cannot function as an effective reminder for clearing up confusions.17 To render it so, "normal case" and "language doing work" would have, at least, to be connected to a great number of other conceptions. Those connections would then grow to systematic proportions, and could not but help interferring with everyday language. Were it so enlarged, Wittgenstein's thesis would not be enormously different, structurally, from those philosophies which use "simple" and "composite elements" (instead of "word" and "normal use") as key conceptions. Were it so enlarged, the theses of the Investigations would not differ in kind from those of the Tractatus.

It therefore seems that if we attend to the language of everyday, we do not find even its logic unimpeachable. If there are uses of every day language that are above criticism, or relatively so, they have to be isolated and specified upon certain criteria. To provide the criteria is part of the work of philosophy. Discriminating between uses in ordinary language, a philosophical view interferes with it. There seems no midground: take actual everyday language and lose critical effectiveness. Take a philosophical criterion for criticizing uses of ordinary language, and lose the expectation that philosophy must be descriptive. From this dilemma, Wittgenstein seems unable to escape.

<sup>17</sup> "The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a particular purpose" (§ 127).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> "If one tried to advance theses in philosophy, it would never be possible to question them, because everyone would agree to them" (§ 128).

All the *Tractatus* questions about the essential connection between signs and objects were answered, Wittgenstein thought, through his doctrine of logically proper names. Wittgenstein said that names *mean* objects; that propositions represent the states of affairs they do because their constituent names have the possibilities of combination that their correlated objects do; and that, though the propositions of everyday are in order, their representative function will be finally exhibited if they are analyzed into compounds of elementary propositions.

The Investigations leaves these theses aside. The theses do provide an answer to the question "what is common or essential to all representations?" But Wittgenstein believes that the answer is inappropriate because it is based on the misleading thought that something must be common. To avoid being led astray, Wittgenstein now says: "What is common to them all?—Don't say: 'There must be something common . . .'—but look and see whether there is anything common to all . . . To repeat: don't think, but look!" (§ 66).

Wittgenstein follows this injunction scrupulously. He does so in telling us how particular names are used, how "this" is used, how particular concepts are used, and by extension, how different languages might be used. The lesson one feels from all these descriptions is that the multiplicity of uses of language is enormous, and that describing them so as to be able to assimilate them in general forms of language is far more problematic than logicians have usually realized. More than that, Wittgenstein himself believes that such assimilations are worthless (§ 14). He says, for example, that "when we say: 'Every word in language signifies something' we have so far said nothing whatever; unless we have explained exactly what distinction we wish to make"

<sup>18 &</sup>quot;It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of tools in language and of the ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of word and sentence, with what logicians have said about the structure of language. (Including the author of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*)" (§ 23).

(§ 13).19 Without making these distinctions, descriptions of the uses of words are assimilated, and we are likely to be misled into thinking the uses are themselves more alike than they are (§ 10). To answer that philosophers need not be misled is right, of course. But that answer avoids an important point: a point about the ways in which general descriptions are insensitive to (often wide) differences among the objects described.20

A particularly acute illustration of this point arises with the Investigations' discussion of the general form of proposition. In the Tractatus (4.5) Wittgenstein said that there was a general form of proposition. It is "such and such is the case." He now remarks that "—This is the kind of proposition one repeats to oneself countless times" (§ 114): but that "it is employed as a propositional schema, but only because it has the construction of an English sentence. It would be possible to say instead . . . 'this is the situation,' and so on" (§ 134); and finally, that at bottom saying that "such and such is the case" or "this is how things are" is the general form of proposition is the same as giving a definition (§ 136).

One interesting feature of these remarks is that Wittgenstein

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> But then Wittgenstein adds parenthetically, "(It might be, of course, that we wanted to distinguish the words of language... from words 'without meaning' such as occur in Lewis Carroll's poems...)" Just such purposes are usually served by definitions of "sign."

<sup>20</sup> Often Wittgenstein himself treats this question and proposed answers to it too casually. For example, note what he says regarding one view of the relation between genus and species: " . . . if some one wished to say: 'There is something common to all these constructions—namely the disjunction of all their comm n properties'—I should reply: Now you are only playing with words. One might as well say: 'Something runs through the whole thread-namely the continuous overlapping of those fibres'" (§ 67). This response is especially provoking because Wittgenstein does not explain the idea of "common features" which he himself uses. Wittgenstein also seems to suppose that differences between uses are simply apparent, that they can be noted by looking. He ends one paragraph, for example, by saying "... assimilating the descriptions of the uses of words in this way cannot make the uses themselves any more like one another. For, as we see, they are absolutely unalike" (§ 10). This is far too offhand to be an acceptable account of the recognition of differences, of important differences, and the possibilities which uses and different uses define.

does not say that "this is how things are" does not give the general form of proposition, or that there may not finally be some essential connection between a name and its object. He seems to believe instead that attending to such a schema or definition of "proposition" is likely to lead us to overlook the peculiarity of the sorts of propositions there are, their differing kinds of use, and to make us think that in accepting such a form one is "tracing the outline of a thing's nature . . . [while] one is merely tracing round the frame through which we look at it" (§ 114).

Each of these beliefs deserves an extended appraisal; certainly each deserves more discussion than can be given here, and, as I believe, more than Wittgenstein himself provides. Yet, if it is sensible to urge that philosophical views are not without purpose, and that Wittgenstein's own work requires systematic extension, then even something brief about these beliefs will not be without point.

First: the general form of a proposition need not be an English or a German proposition. The general form will be what is common to all propositions, what something must have to be a proposition. That, of course, is not a proposition, though the proposition which is the definition of "proposition" will exhibit or possess that form, as will any other.<sup>21</sup>

Second: it may very well be that attending to the form of proposition can lead us to overlook the differences there are between varieties of propositions. Being well warned of the danger, however, we need not overlook those differences. Fighting one danger should not make us victim to another: that of being so absorbed in noting the differences between propositions that we overlook their similarities; that of being so absorbed in the different particular ways in which propositions are related to facts that we overlook the general way in which all of them are related to fact. General similarities between propositions have their importance; and if our purpose is to describe propositions as well as we can, contempt for the general

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> I do not mean to suggest that Wittgenstein supposes the general form will be a proposition. The remarks quoted above mean to deal with Wittgenstein's reasons for thinking that "this is how things are" was to be employed as the propositional schema.

case is twin to the sin of having contempt for the particular case.

And third: Wittgenstein does not explicitly discuss whether we are entitled to infer the essential nature of facts from the formal features of propositions or of names. His view seems to be that we are not. One remark which expresses his view is that "we want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use of language; an order with a particular end in view; one out of many possible orders; not the order" (§ 132). Yet if philosophy may legitimately concern itself with a comprehensive order of concepts, 22 distrust of the inference must be considerably reduced. Indeed, if there is a general form of proposition, and if that form is not arbitrarily specified, then that form will be incorporated in any proposition about the world. Then, so far as what is known at all of the world can be abstracted from the peculiarity of our way of knowing or expressing it, the inference to the essential nature of what is known will have to be allowed.

About all this, many more things should be said. It is disappointing that Wittgenstein did not himself say more, and that the later parts of his book do not extend and develop the views he remarks upon at the start. The later portions offer themes and asides on understanding, thinking, imagining, memory, mind, etc.

Throughout his book, Wittgenstein exhibits the very tenderest sensitivity for all shades of thought, feeling, and speech. He shows us what we would see if we would but face the details of our concepts. Wittgenstein's comments upon what he shows us, however, depend upon some of the theses that have been discussed. Because they do, I have to believe that, through his Investigations, Wittgenstein's "Progress seems to be far greater than in fact it is."

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Or, philosophy is led to concern itself with a comprehensive order even in trying to establish a particular order.

### BEYOND THE CONCRETE: WAHL'S DIALECTICAL EXISTENTIALISM

#### **NEWTON P. STALLKNECHT**

The contrast between the philosophical climate of Britain and America on the one hand and continental Europe on the other has rarely, if ever, been greater than it is today; and in reading the work of Jean Wahl, whose lectures at the Sorbonne may well be considered characteristic of the more speculative schools of recent continental thought, the American student becomes vividly aware of this difference. Professor Wahl's continued preoccupation with traditional problems presented in their full historical setting, his readiness to accept a suprasensuous intuition as a legitimate organ of observation and reflection, and his willingness to learn from the utterances of poets and novelists, indeed, even from the painting of Cézanne and Van Gogh, all distinguish his work sharply from that of British and American analysts. Again, for Professor Wahl there is no real distinction between a critical history of philosophical ideas and speculative philosophy itself. In this respect, his work is almost Hegelian and one has the feeling that he is always conscious of the relevance of Hegel's thought to his own argument.

For Professor Wahl, the va-et-vient of speculative concepts reveals a restless dialectic whereby the emphasis of the theorist passes periodically from one contrary to another. Thus such notions as subect, object, the one, the many, have each in turn a recurring moment of dominion. But this movement, although

¹ See especially Philosopher's Way (Oxford University Press, N. Y., 1948), and Traité de Métaphysique (Payot, Paris, 1953). Philosopher's Way amounts almost to an abridged English translation of the French treatise, which contains many expanded references to the history of philosophy and to contemporary thought. Also the sequence of topics has been rearranged in the French work, although the underlying argument is the same in both books. I have found a helpful supplement to the above in La Pensée de l'Existence (Flammarion, Paris, 1951). Here Professor Wahl discusses in detail the contributions of Kierkegaard and Jaspers.

it animates the development of ideas, cannot reach a stable equilibrium; and the notion, that may perhaps be attributed to Hegel, of a rational dialectic that has achieved a final resolution, is for Wahl, as for Kierkegaard, a false ideal. This does not mean, however, that we are thereby finally condemned to a relativism or historicism. We can escape the vacillating one-sidedness of a "rational" dialectic. Indeed, the dialectic process seems to invite us to transcend it, or we might say, the very purpose of argument is to transcend itself since vision and not a discursive strategy is the goal of the philosopher.

Hegel's adverse critique of immediacy so prominent in the argument of his *Phenomenology*, is based on an analysis of language. Wahl insists that we must not let language, "taken literally," come between us and the real. He would seem to seek an absolute awareness that, like Bergson's intuition, dispenses with symbols.

... an immediate vision remains the goal of the philosopher. The criticism of Hegel was based on an analysis of language. According to him the now and the here, being always changing, are only abstract ideas. But he did not take account of the fact that the sentence containing the words "now" and "here" points to a reality beyond itself, and, as we have said, that thought is always directed toward things. Hegel's criticism is destructive of the intellectual now and here, but not the now and here as they are felt, which language can describe only imperfectly. From the imperfections of language we cannot infer anything about the so-called imperfections of reality (*Philosopher's Way*, p. 12, see *Traité*, p. 23).

It is true that through dialectical criticism we may sharpen our ideas, supplementing each term by its contrary. But this process is an unending one, and we must learn to look beyond words and definitions if only to distinguish these from reality, if only to insist that our ideas are not reality. Such extra-linguistic vision is a grasp of the immediate. It appears almost as a return to the immediate, which it would seem has all along been present to us, hardly noticed behind the screen of language. For Wahl, the thing-in-itself seems to lurk behind the phenomena of linguistic presentation. We might almost say that the phenomenal order is our way of talking about the real. Since conventions of

verbalization color observation as well as theory, this extralinguistic reality is often ignored.

In his recent books, Professor Wahl describes the origin of this concern for the immediate as a gradual revolution in philosophical method, toward which he himself undertakes to contribute, thus following in the footsteps of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, James, Bergson, and contemporary existentialists. Professor Wahl thinks of this movement as a philosophy of the future, as the philosophy of the future, that will supersede ways of thought for many years recognized as typically modern. The present stage of the new philosophy is described as tentative, anticipating rather than formulating a new orientation. Wahl insists throughout upon the provisional status of his thought.

Here Professor Wahl's interpretation of his own work is difficult to evaluate. After all, Kierkegaard's revolt against Hegelian panlogism is now over a century old. Thus even sympathetic readers may well wonder whether Wahl's philosophy with its almost encyclopedic background of historical learning, may not be Hegel's "owl of Minerva" that takes flight only as the shades of night are falling. Wahl's work may come to be interpreted as a summary statement of a tradition that has now very nearly run its course. One may hope with the present reviewer that this is not the case, and that the tradition extending from Kierkegaard to Jaspers and Heidegger may be, historically speaking, a preface to a more systematic existentialism, that will continue to compete successfully with Thomism, Marxism, and positivism. But the issue is very uncertain, or at least so it appears to an American observer, even to one who is fearful of allowing the wish to father the thought.

Whatever their prophetic accuracy, Wahl's predictions are interesting and worthy of attention: contemporary thought is moving toward an intuitive awareness of becoming or "concrescence." It sees or tries to see things in the making, their "parts" emerging in contemporaneous growth. In other words, recent philosophy follows Bergson, even perhaps overreaches him, in an effort to avoid the "ready made" objects of language and conceptual dialectic.

One of the characteristic features of the philosophy of the future will probably be its insistence on the concrete, conceived as a totality in the sense in which Hegel conceived it, but, in opposition to Hegel, as an empirical totality. Thus, it will be opposed both to the rationalists and the empiricists; for the latter insist rather on the particular, and the former on the universal.

We have said that the word "concrete" is not entirely satisfactory because it presupposes a kind of synthesis supervening upon separate elements. Whitehead has coined the word "concrescence" to connote the contemporaneous growing of the different elements, which, indeed, by virtue of their very intermingling and mutual involvement, cannot even be called elements. This word indicates very well the interfusion of things and their contemporaneous growth...

A theory of the concrete could be constituted in part under the influence of Hegel and his feeling for the whole, and of Bradley and his conception of a felt totality, and in part under the influence of James, Bergson, and Whitehead. This theory would affirm that what is given is not parts outside parts, but felt wholes and feeling wholes (*Philosopher's Way*, pp. 201-02).

"Empirical totality," in "concrescence" and open to our non-discursive awareness—here we have the theme of Wahl's return to the immediate which carries him, if we may echo the title of one of his earlier writings, "beyond the concrete" of both empirical and rationalist traditions. As a rule, empiricists presuppose in advance of experience that observation will come upon an order of things composed of "least parts" or primary units. But togetherness, mutual interdependence and interpenetration, even of things in the making, as well as their juxtaposition and succession, may after all be open to intuitive apprehension. This may follow as a corrective upon a discursive inventory or it may precede analysis altogether as a first orientation. In any case, the unity apparent in this way is not likely to be recorded verbally, and it can hardly be defined, but it can be felt and felt vividly.

As Goethe recognized, we may perhaps learn from Kant—the Kant of the third *Critique*—the possibility of a new approach not only to theory but even to observation in which whole and part, both in the making, are present simultaneously. Here mere becoming surrenders to concrescence, the emergence and self-maintenance of "substances in act" or entelechies. Concrescent wholes are not *concretions* or adjustments of preexistent parts or elements. Such parts as there are should perhaps be called "passages of becoming" that respond to one another in their

emergence. Here, in his own way, Wahl considers Whitehead's self-creative "subject superject." But Whitehead's rationalism invites paradox while Wahl's intuitionism discretely avoids it. We recognize concrescence as manifest in living things, in works of art and in moral autonomy. This last perhaps is most obvious as an instance of Being self-maintained in Becoming, Wahl speaks of "islands of Being in a sea of Becoming."

If we were to think theoretically about the two words "I become," we should soon lose the meaning of each. Who is this I? And if I am I, how can I become? But there is a practical solution, which consists in the construction of ourselves and at the same time the destruction of ourselves, because the one does not take place without the other. We have to become our Being and to be our Becoming, uniting these two elements by our works, by our oath and promise, which, as the philosophers Alain and Sartre have insisted, reveal our will to constitute our stability within our Becoming. By our oath, as Sartre says, we link our future with our present and our past (Philosopher's Way, p. 65; see Traité de Métaphysique, p. 49).

Such autonomy can hardly be described at length although it can be felt as a sense of responsibility. But it must be felt in "silence"—a silence quite unhegelian that recalls rather more of Plotinus than of Wittgenstein. The silence of intuition somehow bridges the lacunae of dialectic. Indeed dialectic—or dialogue is surrounded by silence. There is a silence that properly precedes question and answer, the silence of perception, the non-vocal "given" that presents us with a world to be known. This silent vision can be interrupted and distorted by discursive efforts at describing its content. The philosopher must seek to regain this vision and so to return to the immediacy of perception. Again there is the "silence of ecstasy where the mind achieves a union with its own highest point, which is at the same time the highest point of the world" (Philosopher's Way, p. 317; cf. Traité de Métaphysique, 701 ff.). In perception we recognize our presence in the world; in ecstasy, which includes a sense of creative freedom, we recognize that we transcend this world. Between these silent immediacies lies the proper realm of dialectic or, once more to borrow an Hegelian term, the "unhappy consciousness" of philosophy, whose discursive descriptions can never quite do justice to their intended objects. But this contrast is not solely a matter of rational dialectic. It may be intuited. Between the two immediacies of perception and ecstasy "there is a tension and an intensity by which existence is defined" (Philosopher's Way, p. 317). Perhaps we should say "revealed" rather than "defined." Our presence in a world by which we are nourished and our freedom as creative agents within that world—in other words. our immanence in the world and our transcendence of it, two notions indispensable to one another, together characterize our Wahl speaks briefly of a non-conceptual human existence. dialectic—an existential dialectic— in which perception, ecstasy and awareness of our existence are related to one another. "The synthesis [of this existential dialectic] cannot be formulated in words; even the thesis and the antithesis are ineffable. We are in the realm of immediacy, not in that of mediation" (Philosopher's Way, p. 316). It is with an effort that we maintain our intuition at the level of immediacy.

Let us consider briefly the thesis and the antithesis of this existential triad. Either one can be obscured if its immediacy is lost in a verbal definition. In his survey of theories of perception, Wahl examines many of these definitions with special reference to modern realism, in whose development a dialectical insecurity is apparent. We vacillate between what might be called a direct and a representative realism. This conflict would seem to be intellectually insoluble. It is a perennial source of perplexities that grow and more and more subtle as we continue to supplement ideas by their contraries in order to avoid paradox.

We must not imagine that realism is an easy doctrine. Always divided between a theory of immanence and a theory of transcendence, it has no stable equilibrium; it goes from one aspect of the real to the other. But this is because it wishes to be true to the real and because there is no reason why our relational and intellectual schemes should completely express reality or exhaust its richness. So sometimes realism insists on the intentionality of what is in ourselves, directing itself toward things, and sometimes on the identity between things and what is in ourselves.

Even if science should one day succeed in making us understand completely the mechanism of perception, we may question whether it will ever completely clear up the mystery.

There is a mystery, but is there really a problem? From the moment when we pose the problem it appears as insoluble. But if we take account of the realm that is prior to problems and in which we prim-

arily are—in which we believe in the existence of the external world, in which we have that animal faith that Santayana speaks of, that sense of being rooted in things, which is at the same time a knowledge of things—we see that knowledge as participation in and communion with the world is a reality and that man is characterized by this very participation and communion (Philosopher's Way, p. 211; see Traité de Métaphysique, p. 324).

Professor Wahl finds this sense of participation in a world of things an important moment in the phenomenology of our culture. It reminds us of Wordsworth, of Cézanne, and of the Dingegedicht of Rilke. The reference to Santayana may trouble some students who find animal faith a pragmatic concept. However, Wahl's interpretation or reinterpretation of Santayana parallels a remark of Whitehead's: "If we allow the term "animal faith" to describe a kind of perception which has been neglected by the philosophical tradition, then practically the whole of Santayana's discussion is in accord with the organic philosophy" (Process and Reality, p. 215). So interpreted, animal faith is in accord with Wahl's view of perception.

It is only after we have tried to "explain" perception that we come clearly to recognize and appreciate its universal purport, namely, our presence in a world of things and events. Here we experience space and time in their qualitative immediacy, the becoming and the togetherness of things. Thus the temporal aspect of the world may be felt as our expectations, yearning, fear, regret, and remorse. We are also aware that things do not exist in isolation. There is a density, a compactness, even an interfusion of things-a spatial togetherness. Such is the content of the spontaneous faith by which we are linked to the world and to things. This insight overrides the dialectic of the epistemologists, and yet we may profit by the theories that we repudiate. We come to acknowledge a spontaneous insight which has, we recognize, always inspired our belief, but not our theory. We endorse Santayana's animal faith, but we are not bound by his skepticism that discounts this faith and interprets it as a pragmatic orientation of the psyche. This is owing to our recognition that any analysis undertaking to record the content of this insight will in some measure distort it by putting an undue emphasis upon an isolated term, say, that of the given, of the substantial object,

or of the act of knowing; whereas all of these appear together as our awareness of our presence in a world of things of which we are ourselves constituents. Thus we may say quite sincerely, reporting our perception as we maintain it, "To me, at my present point of view, the round plate lying over there presents an elliptical image." The image is the presence of the plate. This recognition transcends at once the subjectivism and the objectivism of modern theories of knowledge.

As we shall see, we do not have to stop at the subject or the object. Yet, supposing for a moment that we can separate them, we have to ask for their conditions. Notwithstanding the absolute priority Descartes gave (or seemed to give) to the cogito, there are presuppositions of the cogito. Not only its object, as Malebranche implied, but perhaps its material conditions, as they were interpreted, rather coarsely it is true, by Hobbes and Gassendi, have to be taken into account. And as for the object, it too has its presuppositions, whether consciousness and the self, as the idealists say (and this I doubt), or time and space, as Alexander says (and this I doubt also), or rather a general scheme of compresence and prehension, as Alexander, in some passages, and Whitehead have suggested, and of distance. Compresence and distance—these would be the ultimate conditions of Being, or at least its characteristics (Philosopher's Way, p. 35).

The silence of perception, when once we have "returned to it," is an orientation in the world of things and events. But there remains the danger that we will lose ourselves in this world, that our human existence will be confused with nature, or that a concept of "human nature" will arise that obscures the quality of man by confusing human activity with the goings on of a sub-human order. But man cannot be wholly absorbed in his world; he is not one with nature as Wordsworth himself came in time to know. There is, in opposition to our participation in things, a sense of transcendence or freedom. This has given rise in philosophy to a series of dialectical contrasts comparable to that surrounding the theory of perception. Wahl devotes prolonged consideration to the concepts of determinism and indeterminism. He observes that these notions are inseparably connected with the categories of modality, and here he finds that western thought is more than ever unsure of itself. The categories of modality may be defined only by the negation of one another and freedom cannot be defined without reference to modality. As a result there is no wholly positive concept of freedom. The notion of freedom is one of the least well-founded of philosophical ideas.

The intellectual affirmation of freedom is essentially a negation—a negation of necessity. But what is necessity? It is in its turn a negation—the negation of possibility. The necessary is what cannot not be, as Aristotle has said. And what is the possible? The possible, at least the possible as theoretically conceived, is in its turn a negative idea. The concept of possibility implies that in a particular case what has taken place "might not have taken place." But this negation is founded on a hypothesis. For how do we know that what has been might not have been? What has been might not have been if . . . if we cancel one or some of the conditions that have made what has happened happen; or which will make happen what will happen.

... Let us notice also that necessity, at least when it does not apply to first principles, is as hypothetical as possibility; like possibility, it presupposes an "if." If something exists, another thing exists. There would remain only one category of modality: reality. Or we might say more accurately: since there is only one kind of modality,

there is no modality at all.

. . . What are the consequences for the concept of freedom? Freedom is the conceived negation of the conceived negation of a conceived negation. If, therefore, we really eliminate the last negation (possibility), the second (necessity) is thereby canceled, and so is the first. Thus, the last card of this house of cards, freedom, or rather the concept of freedom, vanishes ( Philosopher's Way, pp. 132-33; Traité de Métaphysique, p. 540).

Our freedom, or at least we might insert by way of qualification, the negative aspect of our freedom, the aspect that has to do with categorial modality, could never be "discovered" or deduced by the philosopher. There is, however, a positive sense of freedom including the feeling of possibility that characterizes our living future. It is not so much an intellectual presupposition of action as its intuitive quality, which in reflective retrospect we are all too likely to forget and which can never be reduced to a stable definition. There is no freedom in the abstract since there is no definition of freedom. Freedom is an indefinable act, an act by which we assume the responsibility for our deed and its consequences—our whole personality centers itself around the free act. In this sense we may say that the free act is the act that we cannot not do. And here again we find the insufficiency of the categories, since the free act, which seemed to presuppose possibility, is related to necessity (Philosopher's Way, p. 134; Traité de Métaphysique, p. 545).

We have, however, no longer to do with an intellectual necessity—which would presumably involve predictability—but with a necessity of another sort, a qualitative necessity—"une nécessité vécue, existentielle" (Traité de Métaphysique, p. 548).

When we say that "our personality centers around the free act" we find ourselves committed to an existential philosophy. Here in our awareness of our own existence we find an intuitive reconciliation of our participation in the world of things and events and of our limited but genuine dominion over our own lives. In a sense, we are our past lives, and our freedom requires us to answer for a past while we lay claim to a future as also our own. The decisive present holds past and future in an existential unity. In the moment of commitment our human decision reconciles, or shall we say, realizes possibility and necessity, freedom and determinism. We remain in our world—the world that has begotten us and from which we cannot escape—but it is all the more our world because in action we leave our mark upon it.

... Our admiration for the achievement of Van Gogh and even of Cézanne cannot be separated from our feeling that we are in the presence of their personal effort, as expressed in the kind of brush strokes they employ, and we feel them as men at the same time that we admire them as painters (*Philosopher's Way*, p. 49).

Existence, in this sense, is freedom, but freedom incarnate in a world which it accepts and transforms however briefly and modestly.

The metaphysical pride of the idealist is replaced by a realistic humility, for which man is open to the world and the world to man: so that man and the world contribute to one another's formation—man constituting the possibility of the world, the world constituting the supporting or substantial reality of man. But such realistic humility does not mean renunciation or any lack of courage. For man, to recognize his place in the world, such as it is, is an act of courage (Traité de Métaphysique, p. 562).

We may characterize Wahl's philosophy as a metaphysics of self-realization. Wahl only rarely considers the philosophy of history, but his point of view is clear. He mentions.

Progress, decadence—some would say cycles. But man, the elementary human being, remains the same, with his crudity and his goodness. There is only man, but man always sets something beyond

himself. There can be existence only through the recognition of transcendence. We hear the historians say that it is unfortunate that men have pinned their faith on an absolute. But there would be no history and no historians if man didn't believe in an absolute (*Traité de Métaphysique*, p. 561).

It is the high purpose of Jean Wahl's philosophy to defend and to clarify this belief so that man may have faith in himself.

The foregoing remarks do no more than outline a narrow cross-section of Wahl's recent work, although I hope that I have caught his central intention. The *Traité de Métaphysique* is rich in detail and many of Wahl's comments are worth consideration for their own sake, whatever the importance of the total contribution may be. Toward a final evaluation of this contribution, let me in closing make one or two comments.

Professor Wahl is often too ready, perhaps too eager, to declare the bankruptcy of rational thought. Thus I find myself uneasy about his whirlwind condemnation of the theory of modality. We have seen him eliminate the categories of necessity, possibility, and reality in rapid succession. Upon considering this argument, I hesitate to accept the suggestion that necessity must be defined as the negation of possibility. Nor am I convinced that the "if-then" character of prediction renders necessity essentially hypothetical. At any rate, these considerations would seem hardly sufficient wholly to invalidate the category of necessity. All this should be reconsidered in the light of Professor Wahl's remarks elsewhere to the effect that order and chance are correlative concepts, equally relevant to experience (Traité de Métaphysique, p. 680). Here we have a suggestion that interrelated concepts may support one another and illuminate experience rather than involving one another in collapse, even though unsolved problems must be recognized and even though we must admit that once divorced from an existential experience these notions have Thus Wahl's treatment of the categories of little meaning. modality seems extreme and perhaps not required by his argument.

Again, Wahl may be too ready to find a paradox in the free man's assertion "I can do no other." Has he not confused a natural or physical with a moral necessity?

Finally, we must recognize that the existential dialectic, all three of whose terms are ineffable, affords a difficult theme to embody in philosophical language. We are reminded of a mischievous remark made about Carlyle, who strove to reveal the "empire of silence in forty volumes." Considering however the nature of the task, we may gladly recognize that Professor Wahl has not been unsuccessful. At the very least he may reawaken for many of his readers a naive curiosity. The "silence" that follows, say, his discussion of perception or of freedom may be interrogative. We may then ask ourselves once more what is it that the philosophers are talking about? Certainly they are not always talking about talking. Professor Wahl suggests, at times persuasively, that the many themes of the philosophers revolve about points that they never touch. Thus he tempts us to look beyond symbols and propositions. To be sure, people have tried this in the past and in the arts it has led to some interesting developments. But the attempt is comparatively rare, despite Bergson's works, in metaphysics. In this sense, the work of Jean Wahl may be considered as an invitation. It may be high time that we accepted and came to recognize that metaphysics, or first philosophy, is itself something of an art—the art of "seeing."

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## A THEORY OF MAN

It is not very common to find a man who has been teaching and writing on philosophy for more than thirty years, and has acquired a distinguished position in contemporary philosophy, and yet who has not published a single book during that period. That is the strange case of Francisco Romero who is, today, Latin America's most outstanding philosopher. His first real book is his *Theory of Man* 1 published when he was over sixty; all the others are col-

lections of articles previously published.

To understand Romero's philosophy it is necessary to have a general idea of his "metaphysics of transcendence." This theory was presented for the first time more than ten years ago; he comes back to it in his Theory of Man. Following Max Scheler and other contemporary philosophers, Romero distinguishes four levels in reality; inorganic, living, intentional physique and spirit (p. 207). Each level supports the next one, which grows out of the former. The degree of transcendence that we can find in each level is what gives it its metaphysical status. On the physical or inorganic level, transcendence is almost non-existent, it is clearly present in the living realm, dominant in the intentional physique and absolute on the spiritual level (p. 211).

Transcendence is the fundamental concept in Romero's philosophy. For him, it is the positive element in reality, that which gives reality its dynamic character (p. 206). Every change implies transcendence. It is clear that time, and not space, is the key to understand reality. In fact, transcendence implies the evolution

or development of everything that is real.

Man, as such, appears at the third level, i.e. with the intentional physique. Romero admits the existence of a primitive, non-intentional physique that we share with animals, in which no distinction between subject and object has yet been made. At that stage experiences are simply lived; when we become human beings

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Teoria del hombre (Losada, Buenos Aires, 1952).

we transform those experiences into objects. It is in the intentional act, namely, the activity pointing towards the object, that man constitutes himself.

Man is, therefore, an intentional consciousness, a subject, which opposes an object and tries to apprehend it. If what constitutes man's essence is his intentional act, and this is of a cognitive nature, the intellectual activity of man overshadows the irrational aspects.

Objectification, i.e. the act by which a lived experience is transformed into an object, is accomplished by the statement (juicio). That is why the author holds that "man is a being that states something" (p. 45). The most elementary form of the objectifying statement is the formula "that is something" or "that is present" (p. 45). We can speak of a subject only when it affirms the presence of his own experiences; an animal lives its "experiences" but never states that they are there, never objectifies them. That is why an animal can never be a subject.

If man is essentially a subject, i.e. a being capable of conceiving a realm of objectivities, human society must necessarily be an objectifying society, completely different from an animal society. In the latter, heredity is essentially of a biological nature; in the former it is intentional heredity, i.e. acquired through culture.

Up to now we have referred only to objectification as a perception of an objectified world, but such perception is followed by the capacity to create objectivities, i.e. by what is called "cultural activity."

The intentional level goes beyond animal life. But man is not only intentionality; he is also spirit (espíritu). That is why the first part of the book which deals with intentionality is followed by a second devoted to the spirit.

From what has been said it is clear that Romero does not support Scheler's thesis—largely accepted in Latin-America—that spirit is the essence of man. For Romero a man is already human on the merely intentional realm; he gets his full development in the spiritual world, which is also intentional, since it is directed to objects.

Mere intentionality creates objectivities for a subject. But man soon subordinates these to his immediate needs and wishes. Useful and agreeable things are good examples of such objectivities. Thus, the mere intentional acts, which are the result of the activity of the subject towards the object, have a second stage or "return" (regreso) towards the subject, because it is the subject, and not the object, that is the final aim of the whole intentional act. The spiritual act is characterized by the lack of this "return" towards the subject; it is projected towards the object and remains there.

The transition from mere intentionality to spirituality implies a new ontological specie; in fact, it shows the separation between "the two great realms in which reality is divided, namely, nature and spirit" (p. 165). The gap between nature—within which Romero includes mere intentionality—and spirit does not prevent him from considering the former as the foundation of the latter, and to hold that spirituality is potentially hidden in intentionality.

Let us now turn to the specific qualities of the spirit. If the spiritual act is defined by its total objective projection, the first and fundamental characteristic of the spirit has to be "absolute objectivity." As we have seen, in mere intentionality there is a tendency towards objectivity that is frustrated when the act finally points to the subject instead of the object. In the spiritual act objectivity is absolute, since the act never turns to the subject but keeps right on towards the object. The spiritual act does not aim at anything that is useful or agreeable to the subject; the object is the final goal.

Universality is the second characteristic of the spirit. The author distinguishes between ethical, cognitive and aesthetical universality, maintaining that all of them derive from the total objective projection of the spiritual act. Liberty is also a characteristic of the spirit. It implies the liberation from the forces, biological and intentional, that pull the subject towards his own interests and pleasures. From objectivity the author derives "a certain unity of the spirit" that can be clearly seen in ethical and cognitive acts. In opposition to the plurality of interests that we can see in the intentional realm, we find the unity of the spirit that keeps on pushing towards a goal in spite of the difficulties he

finds on the road. Historicity (historicidad) is the fourth characteristic of the spirit.

Absolute objectivity is, as we have seen, the first and fundamental characteristic of the spirit, but it really coincides with absolute transcendence (p. 202). This does not mean that they are identical. In fact, absolute transcendence comes first, since the spirit is totally objective only because it is absolutely transcendent. Spiritual freedom also has transcendence in its foundations. In short, of all the characteristics of the spirit, transcendence is really the first, and spirit can be defined as absolute transcendence.

The third and last part of the book is entitled "The Man." Here the author discusses man's dual character, namely, nature and spirit (from which he derives man's historical nature), sociability, historicity and meaning. In the present reviewer's opinion this is the weakest part of the book, and the one that will give rise to most objections, as we shall soon see.

There is no doubt that Romero's *Theory of Man* is a work to last. It is the outcome of thirty years of reading and thinking. It shows a familiarity with the classics and with contemporaries, particularly the German philosophers. It is, nevertheless, not always consistent.

If we look to the main thesis we find that what defines man is the presence of "intentionality as a normal activity" (p. 281; see also pp. 11 ff.). The author admits that in some animal species we can find elementary forms of intentionality (p. 11), though in them it is not "a permanent and normal activity" (p. 12). But if animals reach the level of intentionality, though it is not their normal activity, intentionality cannot serve to distinguish man from animal. Someone may insist that in man intentionality is a "permanent and normal activity," while it is not so in any animal. True, but how can we know that it cannot be permanent? There is no essential reason which prevents this. If there were a gap between the second and third level of reality, one could hold that there is a real difference between men and animals. Romero maintains that there is such a difference, and vet at the same time holds that intentionality (by which we define "man") can also be found in some animals.

Judging from the first part of the book, mere intentionality is

enough to make a man. But in the chapter devoted to "duality," in the third part of the book, it is maintained that man has a dual character: namely, nature (in which the author includes intentionality) and spirit. Man, he explicitly affirms, necessarily has spirit (p. 240). Is it spirit, then, which gives man his real character? I do not think Romero forgot in the third part what he wrote in the first. Something more important than forgetting is involved: a dramatic struggle between two opposite theses. Romero holds them both at the same time, and even in the same paragraph. He writes, for instance: "A permanent lack of spirit can be found in the most humble levels of the human species and in primitive cultures, and sporadically even in culture of a media or higher level. But the presence of spirit is, in some measure, indispensible if we are to recognize what we call the human in man" (p. 240). In the first sentence the author holds that there are men without spirit; in the second, he denies this. tradiction seems to be present even in an occasional single sentence. For example, Romero writes: "The man we know, and to whom we attribute the qualities that define the species, is the man with spirit, though we do not exclude the existence of men without spirit." But if spirit is the defining quality of man, how can there be individuals that have not the essential characteristic of the species?

The relation of spirituality to intentionality gives rise to a more important contradiction. On p. 241 Romero maintains that spirituality does not consist of anything foreign to intentionality. The fact that spirituality is also intentional supports this view. Nevertheless, on the same page he writes: "But we do not suppress with this the complete difference that there is between spirit and nature. With spirit, a new realm arises" (p. 241; italics mine. One has to keep in mind that "nature," for the author, includes "intentionality."). In fact, the arising of the spirit seems to imply a new real, judging by what he had written before: "The transition from mere intentionality to spirituality does not only imply a distinction that shows the constitution of a new ontological species, it is also responsible for one of the most important separations we can imagine: the separation of the two orders in which reality can be divided, namely, nature and spirit" (p. 165). It is hard to

know whether the author's real thesis is that spirituality does not consist in anything foreign to intentionality, or that "a complete difference" and "unabridged gap" exists between the two.

The question is of great importance not only because both theses give two different pictures of man, but also because they imply two different conceptions of reality, two incompatible systems of metaphysics. On the one hand, there is the metaphysical doctrine (which Romero seems at first to hold) that maintains the unity of all reality, in which every level is nothing but a stage of a total and single process. On the other hand, there is the doctrine (to which Romero subscribes in the paragraphs quoted from p. 165 and p. 241) that maintains the existence of an "unabridged gap" (p. 165). A metaphysical monism does not preclude distinctions, but it does not allow us to split reality in two.

It would have been helpful if Romero had given us an analysis, a definition, or, at least, a short explanation of the key words and concepts in his philosophy. Thus, it is clear, from what has been said that "transcendence" is Romero's fundamental category. He writes that "the truth of being is transcendence" (p. 213); he uses the notion as the fundamental criterion for his division of reality into four levels, and he also uses it as a key note in his interpretation of spirit. But, what is transcendence? The author does not say. Yet its meaning is surely not self evident. "Intentionality" and "objectification" also are in need of clarification.

In large circles in the United States and in England, philosophy has been reduced to semantics. In Latin America, there is a tendency to go to the other extreme. Usually, authors do not make an effort to make their ideas and language clear and precise, to the point that sometimes it is difficult to decide whether one is reading philosophy or literature. This is not the case with Romero. He has both a brilliant style and clear ideas. But the does take for granted the meaning of many concepts which are in fact ambiguous. And this is particularly regrettable when they represent the categories of his philosophy.

Rome.

1

IF the aesthetician's primary responsibility is to the practical critic and to the artist, and if he should not allow himself to be pushed into centrifugal inquiries, Jordan's Essays in Criticism is not a book on aesthetics.1 For Jordan is not interested in developing a comprehensive theory of the arts or even of poetry. He works away from such problems towards their philosophical foundations, inquiring into the role that poetry plays in culture and into the factors that enable it to fulfill its function. Wherever we pigeonhole the inquiry, however, no one can deny its importance. Since Mathew Arnold's day we have been looking with a feverish urgency for an elucidation of the value that we so deeply feel art has for man. What we need is an "apologetics" of poetry. My own high estimate of Jordan's book is based on the conviction that he has offered us a defense of poetry which is in principle much more serious and liberal in scope than any available to us today, in spite of the fact that in his exposition it often appears to be little more than a Nessus shirt.

Jordan holds that art is constitutive of culture. The doctrine has thus, obviously, its roots in idealistic philosophy. Audacious, perhaps foolhardy as it may seem to some, and absurd and even perverse as it will seem to others, Jordan seeks to demonstrate that poetry "is literally the creator and legislator for the real world" (p. 44. See also pp. 16, 34, 44, 53, 73, 79, 258. Others could be cited).

In order to elucidate his theory Jordan points out that the primary function of language is not to communicate meanings

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> This is a revised version of a paper read at the fifth meeting of The Metaphysical Society of America, on 19-20 March, 1953. Jordan's book has been published by The University of Chicago Press. All numbers between parentheses following references are to this book.

but to constitute objects. The objects so constituted are not about reality but are themselves reality, are a real world of objects that is sufficient unto itself and which makes up the world of culture. "Words are not signs" (p. 34). And some pages later:

The substance, stuff, of art is not merely one of the realities along with that of religion, science, industry, etc., but reality itself. And it is reality in intelligible form, reality made intelligible by the form that art imposes upon it. Art is not about experience, not about life, not about nature, not about God. It is concerned with a reality that gives to experience, life, nature, and God whatever substance they have, and it has its existence upon a higher plane of being than these. Its substance matter is reality itself; its specific or individualizing relation to experience, life, nature, and God is that it is the synthetic identification of all these in a world, a universe to which it gives constitution and form and so substance (p. 79. See also p. 43).

This, the central thesis of the book, is the burden of the first chapter and its full explication is the task of the rest of the book.

Jordan is not satisfied to speak of the constitutive function of language in general terms. In his earlier book, The Aesthetic Object (p. 84), he attempted a deduction of the a priori forms of functions of thought through which the elementary color-tone or feeling content of experience is transformed into objects. These forms are the categories of value. The color-tone content is for Jordan the stuff or feeling which poetry structures into its objects. In the present volume no formalistic "deduction" is attempted and we are not given tables of categories, as in the earlier book, but essentially the same problem is faced: How does poetry come into being and out of what is it made up?

#### II

Jordan's first job is to make clear how poetry creates reality. It is the imagination that achieves the synthesis through its organon, metaphor; and the imagination derives the materials with which to make reality from the medium in which it lives. About it lies a content of unlimited variety, which the imagination gathers free of the principle of contradiction, and which it synthesizes into reality. The stuff it gathers has, prior to its

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synthesis, no apprehensible form; it is feeling or quality, as yet unordered and undesigned. "In the beginning was the Word" (p. 44). But this does not mean that words or language created man who uttered the word which creates the world. At any time in history there is a constituted world of culture, populous with all sorts of objects and rooted in a physical world that makes it possible. But the world, such as it is for us, has in the order of history no less than in that of logic, as its fundamental and pristine principle, the creative activity of language that began it and now keeps it going.

Through the double role it plays, as the stuff of the world and of experience, "feeling," or "quality," mediates between both and gives the mind immediate grasp of reality. The synthesis thus accomplished by language is the basis for the distinction between aesthetic objects and other kinds of objects—moral, religious, and practical. For the aesthetic mode of apprehension

mind and its object are one, in accordance with the principle of analogical identity, and in their oneness they cease to be as mind and object... All the arts thus are activities in which 'mind' comes to completeness and fulfillment and realization and so annulment as mere mind in an appropriate object, or activities in which that which is quantitatively objective and unformed mere matter is informed by the suffusion of it by the mind operating as the principle of creative agency (p. 51).

The objectivity which is the result of the annulment of mind defines the aesthetic experience in which the poem is present to us immediately, self-sufficiently, or, as I phrase it, intransitively. A poem, Jordan tells us, "does not have meaning," and he adds, "it is meaning" (p. 57). A sunset, an aesthetic object, asserts.

The sunset does not address itself to me, nor does it 'express' itself to or for any being whose claim to its recognition lies only in the consciousness of it as a sunset. The sunset has no purposes, no ends; its design, both as determinative of its form and as delimitative of its intention, is its own constitution and the continuity of that constitution with the design of the universe. It asserts its being to itself and to the world that it, together with other such, constitutes, and in that assertion it is. It creates itself an object, and this object is what it means and all it means. This does not mean that it creates an object for itself, an object other than itself which it proposes to 'mean'... (pp. 20-1).

This is so important that it bears reiteration. The meaning of the word "assertion" ought to be clear from this quotation; others employ for the same purpose the word "revelation." Through the term Jordan intends to convey, it would seem, that the aesthetic object, the poem, refers to nothing outside itself, does not "communicate," is reflexive in meaning or, as I put it, that the poem, when beheld intransitively as poem, and not as something else. means what it is and is all that it means. Whatever we choose to call this mode of experience, it is structurally different from the moral, the religious and the cognitive-discursive. What is doubtful is whether anyone has as vet done more than to isolate it; whether anyone has analyzed it successfully. Jordan's explanation adds up to the claim that the poem is reality. In any case, the assertion that the poem does not refer beyond itself, that if beheld intransitively it is its own meaning and means what it is, marks, not only for Jordan but for the largest segment of contemporary aestheticians, the basic distinction between things that are and things that are not aesthetic. If we abandon this distinction we are forced to commit ourselves, in our relations to art, to sheer sentimentality, for art becomes either referential or associative. What this adds up to in practice is that we turn it into an iconic imitation of something that exists prior to the act of creation or that we substitute an unstructured collage of all kinds of sentimentalities and private associations for the carefully structured and organically related autonomy of the object the artist presents us with. But those who assert the autonomy or intransitivity of art often overlook its complexities. Never simplistic, Jordan is careful to qualify by adding that words have "cosmic implications." He tells us that

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The reader ought to be warned that Jordan would reject the language of this last paragraph, since the word "experience," which he did not hesitate to use in *The Aesthetic Object*, has been pressed into use, in his more recent work, to refer to the source of all evil—the subjective, the purely private, the idiotic. As here used it does not refer to the private, the idiotic. "Experience" may refer to the subjective aspect of perception or knowledge, and to its objects, and also to the relational complex which includes the subject and the object; there is no need to degrade it or reduce it in meaning.

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the relevance of words that have meaning is to a system of objects and relations and qualities, and it is only through these objects and relations and qualities, considered as objective and independent of mind, that the meaning of a word is to be determined (16).

It is in the light of this complex notion of the autonomy and intransitivity of poetry that we must interpret many passages that otherwise seem unintelligible in *Essays*, of which the following is a representative sample:

The poem constructs itself, or is through all eternity, and dictates to the poet the form for which it demands assertion, and it chooses the words and phrases and 'conceits' from out of the qualities of its own design (p. 24. See also pp. 30, 36, 46, 80, 110, 120. There are others).

#### Ш

To the unqualified realist who has forgotten certain fundamental insights of the idealists, the notion that the poet "creates" culture must seem absurd. The realist accepts the linguist's conviction that the fundamental function of language is to transfer meaning; and this in turn involves the belief that meanings are already there waiting to be transferred. This conception of language is itself grounded on an epistemology according to which the organization of the world in which men live belongs to it independently of the cognitive and practical activities of the men who constitute it. It can hardly be claimed that men distributively affect any but the smallest part of their social world. But collectively, through their cognitive activity and also, of course, through its practical results, men create their social world and the values and meanings which constitute their culture.

We need not go, however, to idealistic philosophers; psychologists and ethnolinguists offer us grounds on which to question these realistic assumptions.<sup>3</sup> But Jordan, working at

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Let me confine myself to the ethnolinguistic evidence, of which I am less ignorant than the psychological. In the light of the hypothesis that has been suggested by students of language like Sapir, Whorf and Hoijer, we can pose the question whether language does not at least in part help to rear the social world in which man lives—or as Jordan would put it, "the world of culture." Hoijer's formulation of the hypothesis which

the foundations, faces problems that scientists do not even seem to suspect. Thus he tells us that words employed in their primary functions are not about objects, but they are about objects when they refer to scientific or moral objects; for the scientific objects are abstractions while moral objects have to be realized through action, and are thus never as fully real as the objects of poetry (p. 43). If this interpretation is correct, Jordan is a realist in epistemology, not a phenomenalist, and his problem is to harmonize the idealist principle of the constitutive role of knowledge with objectivity, or to qualify his realism by the idealist principle. This, along perhaps with a manner of exposition that shifts the burden of grasping his thought chiefly on the reader, is the reason that, while he tells us that poetry is literally the creator of the world, he also tells us the reality created by the poet obtains from beyond itself the stuff—the feeling or color-tone or texture or quality, as it is in various contexts variously characterized—to which the poem gives form and thus reality. The world of art

is not a figment or fiction of the imagination, although it is created by it; but is a discovery by the reason of what is there in reality... sense is the presupposition of experience, the presupposition of substant matter, that by which, as basic medium and background or *Urgrund*, the world of time and space is transformed into the concrete materials of art (108).

he credits Sapir and Whorf with cannot be dismissed as wholly idealistic speculation. As Hoijer puts it,

peoples speaking different languages may be said to live in different 'worlds of reality,' in the sense that the languages they speak affect to a considerable degree both their sensory perceptions and their habitual modes of thought.

<sup>(</sup>Harry Hoijer, "The Relation of Language to Culture" in Anthropology Today, an Encyclopedic Inventory. Prepared under the chairmanship of A. L. Kroeber, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Ill., 1953, p. 558A. In this article a useful bibliography will be found). There are no doubt important differences between Hoijer's formulation and Jordan's. In any case, it is the essential identity of commitment in respect to the constitutive role of mind or language to which I would call attention. But let me say parenthetically that whether we speak of mind or of language makes no substantial difference for our purpose, for whether we distinguish between the terms and assign to language the transfer of meanings and to mind their creation, or whether we prefer to speak of the two functions of language, the constitutive and the communicative or practical, we have the same problems and in identically the same relations to each other.

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There are many passages that can be cited to show that Jordan is seriously asserting the seeming paradox that mind both creates and discovers reality (pp. 110, 133, 371.) In these passages (and others) Jordan distinguishes the poem from the thing the poem is about—the realities of which it is a replica or which it contemplates, or which, through the medium of language, it asserts or reveals.

I agree with Jordan that an aesthetic that stubbornly sticks by the facts no matter how self-contradictory they may appear, will assert the two propositions Jordan asserts: the poet creates reality, or as he would probably prefer, reality is created in the poem, and the poet or poem discovers reality. Jordan, I believe, wants to obviate this difficulty, but he gives us only tantalizing hints as to how he would go about it. What these hints add up to, so far as I can discover, is that the stuff or texture or quality which is external to the poem comes into the poem by the principle of analogical identity, and thus, it seems, mediates between an existent world and the reality of poetry. But this solution presents, in turn, a number of serious difficulties for the reader, one of which I shall state succinctly: I refer to the fact that this principle of analogical identity is conceived and employed by Jordan in a prodigiously protean fashion, and from its manifold uses and the several attempts at definition of it which we find in the text I did not find it possible to get a clear enough notion of what is intended by it.

Part of the difficulty is terminological. What Jordan seems to mean is that other objects of culture are not as real as the poem because not as fully realized. They are "mere existents." In several places Jordan seems to have in mind some sort of contrast between "reality" and "existence," and at least in one passage, between reality, existence and actuality (pp. 215, 234). If my reading is correct, the "reality" of poetry includes existence (p. 202). But if this is the case, the solution is not adequate, and for two reasons: a) the term "existence" is not explicitly defined, and one is left to infer its meaning from texts that are anything but luminous; and b) we are left wondering about the ontological status of objects that lack "reality" and are mere existents. The problem is further complicated by the fact that not only does art

require matter or stuff that is not created by the poet and as to whose status one is in the dark, but that "form," which structures the matter and endows it with reality, is not given by the words or through the synthesizing act of the imagination but is found in things (p. 248). The stuff of reality is feeling; what lifts feeling to the plane of reality is form. But if form is in things, how can the creative act of the poet give them reality? How can art be literally the creator?

However we manage to dispose of this puzzle, Jordan is emphatic in his insistence that the activity of the imagination is "cognitive" in the sense that its processes are accomplished by reason, and that the object created is known "as distinct in nature and character by virtue of its relational structure, from the object of mere sense" (p. 91). The organon of the imagination is "metaphor," but this word is not employed by Jordan in its ordinary sense, to refer to a figure of speech wherein a word or phrase denoting one object or idea is applied to another in order to suggest a likeness. He uses it to designate the organon through which the imagination creates reality. It is "the formulation in words of the design of an object as that design is implicit in a complex of mutually appropriate qualities" (p. 112); and a few pages later we are told that a metaphor is "the assertion of an individuality; the assertion by which a complex of real quality becomes an individual or asserts itself as real" (p. 117; also pp. 115, 124, 125, 361, among others). It would seem therefore that "poem" and "metaphor" refer to different aspects of the same activity. The word "poem" refers to the language object as synthesized out of circumstantial qualities, by the agent, the free imagination; and the term "metaphor" refers to the means or organon employed by the agent to bring about the synthesis.

#### IV

Jordan maintains the compatibility of two propositions: the imagination operates freely (p. 88), and the imagination has its own logic (pp. 101-02). Perplexity is intensified when we notice that he also maintains that the activity of the imagination is the

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activity of reason in one of its modes, and is therefore "cognitive" in essence. "Cognitive" means, it would seem, that the object is grasped as real, as objective, and that in coming to be it obeys the logic of the imagination, which latter is in turn a function of reason. But if the imagination obeys its own logic, how can we say that in creating the poem, it does so freely? What Jordan seems to mean is that it is free from the laws which govern scientific and speculative or philosophic knowing. In the terminology of the earlier The Aesthetic Object the "contemplative" function of reason is distinct from and independent of the "cognitive" function. In the terminology of these Essays the "imagination" functions in its own way, not dictated to by the logic of science or the logic of metaphysics (pp. 101-02, 139-40). Doubtless this is what he means when he says, as he does several times throughout Essays, that the poem writes itself (pp. 20, 24, 29, 36, 347, and many others). What Jordan is saying is that unless a writer lets the poem get the whiphand of him, he is no poet and the result is not poetry.

In the broad sense in which Jordan uses "cognitive," the poetic activity can legitimately be called cognitive. But Jordan would have been more enlightening and more convincing if he had given us at least a sketch of the rules and devices of the logic of the imagination. What are its laws, principles, regulative operations? All he gives us are general considerations about the principle of analogical identity. But it is not easy to discover the meaning of this important principle from the context. In his words:

Metaphor therefore has the same status in the function of imaginative thought that the syllogism has in the functions of speculative thought and that the inductive methodology has in reflective thought. The logic of speculative thought has its principle of contradiction; the logic of reflective thought has its principle of causation (in cultural connections generally stated in subjective terms as the principle of purpose); the logic of imaginative thought has its principle of analogical identity (p. 140).

I am not raising the more difficult questions which will occur to the professional philosopher when he reads this passage. I am asking only the easiest and most obvious question: If metaphor has the same status in the function of imaginative

thought that the syllogism has in the functions of speculative thought, why can't we be given its rules, so that when a poet uses metaphor wrongly we can point out to him his error as we point out his to the man who tries to make his syllogism work on four terms or forgets to distribute its middle at least once?

Grounds are not lacking to assure us that the reason aestheticians cannot give us a sample of "the logic of the imagination" is that the imagination of the creative artist works in a genuinely free fashion, in the sense at least that it obeys no laws which can be inducted from extant works of art. In spite of this-be it noted in passing-the critic still can find ground for his judgments, not in inductive laws formulating the principles governing past accomplishments, but in a grasp of the intention of the work as gathered by the critic from the work itself. In any case "the logic of the creative imagination," in all but the most general and abstract sense, is a term difficult to assign specific content to. The most important difference between it and ordinary logic lies in the fact that it has no undisputed normative force in respect to future creative activity, whereas ordinary logic has. The logic of Shakespeare's imagination is not Marlowe's or Jonson's. Nor is the logic of Elizabethan drama that of the Spanish theatre of the Golden Age, or of Ibsen's or Shaw's theatre.

#### V

The realist who doubts that language is constitutive of the world points out, adapting to our purposes a recent phrase of Hartshorne, that language was not invented and preserved primarily by artists but by the more agile and "practical" individuals. Nor can it be denied that the constitutive theory seems absurd to common sense. How can we reply to this realistic objection? Let us first observe that, whether we call those who employ language in its constitutive function "poets" or anything else does not make any substantial difference. This is why it was important to point out that the constitutive hypothesis is not one which has been fathered by idealistic philosophers alone. However, the common sense argument cannot easily be

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dismissed. Are we then faced with a contradiction? No, if we accept a distinction which Jordan does not employ, or at least does not explicitly elucidate, and without which great confusion can come about. We must distinguish, on the one hand, between the self-conscious and specialized making of poetry that we are acquainted with in our society, and the pervasive, continuous, and more or less unconscious use of language in its primary or constitutive level by men of imagination. The first is self-conscious and socially recognized as "art." The second is poetic activity, although it need not be recognized as such, and is the primary means of giving order to our world.

For Jordan's thesis does not commit him to argue that it is the self-conscious, specialized poet—the poet in the narrower sense—who creates culture through the constitutive use of language. All it requires of him is that he distinguish between the primary or fundamental or constitutive use of language and the secondary or practical use, whose function is communication. Nor does it require that he conceive of the constitutive function as earlier in time. Jordan suggests that it is "earlier," but this claim is not essential to his argument.

The distinction between the broad and the narrow sense of poetry is implied, I noted above, by Jordan. But he does no more than adumbrate it and his failure to elucidate it adequately leaves us with a constellation of problems on which the reader would like to have much more light than he gets.

#### VI

But if it is true that poetry is literally the creator of culture, this fact is not easy to harmonize with the conception of poetry put forth in Chapter IV, entitled "Poetry and the Stability of Culture." For in this chapter, it turns out, the poet no longer creates the real world, but (and I am following the text here almost word for word) all he does is to use the philosopher's "product," the philosopher's "ideas" and polish them and refine them and adopt them to the generality of men. The philosopher does not have command of the devices whereby the ideas may

be presented to men in the mass. It is the task of the literary artist, whose genius is that of the technician and whose activity is the expert handling of formal and methodological devices in the shaping of materials furnished him, to translate ideas into the language of men (pp. 161-62). This seems to be a far cry from the exalted position of the poet as creator and legislator.

It would seem, moreover, that it is not merely for "ideas" that Jordan would have the artist go to the philosopher, but for the elaboration these may be given. Speaking of the subjectivity of modern literature and of the way in which it is excessively preoccupied with love, Jordan writes: "Since no state of mind is capable of universality, being always particular, the attempt to universalize love results in a legion of abstractions and falsifications. The proper objectification of love, and the only manifestation of it that is capable of aesthetic expression, is the family as a cultural object. The Holy Family is the type; but no form can be given to the mere psychological feeling of love" (p. 155). The poet's genius is that of technician—so long as he objectifies love in the proper manner. Sapho, Catullus, the Provençals, Boccaccio, the Arcipreste de Hita, Shakespeare and his fellow Elizabethans, Swift, the author of Lady Chatterly's Lover, the writer of Remembrance of Things Past, and that of The Counterfeiters—bring the brooms and let us sweep them where Jordan has already thrown Yeats, Joyce, James and "the bulk of the moderns." If a poet is going to sing of love, let him sing of Mary and Joseph and the Child, or of variants in modern dress of Mary, Joseph and the Child, on the penalty of liquidation in the name of Jordan's philosophy.

This point, however, is a relatively minor one. For if the poet cannot let his will get the whiphand of his poem, neither can he let the philosopher get the whiphand, and he cannot because, as Jordan so truly remarks, the poem is not written by the poet, (and a fortiori, least of all by a philosopher), "but writes itself by decree of the universe" (p. 347). But minor as is this point, it has its source in what I take to be a radical inconsistency in Jordan's doctrine on which it is essential to touch. That the poet would be advised to get his ideas from the philosopher is not only inconsistent with Jordan's profound analysis

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of the manner in which the imagination works freely to create objects, and creates the world of culture, but it also suggests that the adviser has failed to grasp the limitations of philosophy vis-a-vis his own view of the function of poetry. The poet has his own limitations, and one of them is that, qua poet, he has no way of telling "ideas" from verbiage. If the philosopher wants to give him-as the Spaniards say- cat for hare, he takes it innocently and adds it to his pot. But the reason for this is that he takes ideas as he takes experience, life, nature and God. As regards this tetrad. Jordan clearly shows that they are not the reality the poetic imagination synthesizes but are used by the poet "in some way and in some sense and to some degree and are all to be exhibited in form and design by the techniques of art" (p. 288). One could go farther. "Ideas" have a way of often lying heavy in the artist's mind, like the stones in the wolf's belly in the fairy tale, and not feeding him. When they do feed him they do so in a peculiar way. For what he is interested in is not "the truth" of the philosopher but in the "reality." in Jordan's term and, I believe, in his sense, of the object of his imaginative synthesis. If "the truth" of the philosopher were the reality or "the truth" of the poet, why did Jordan have to distinguish them and assign its own proper logic to each, as we have seen he did? To reverse the order and to suggest to the poet that he go to the philosopher for ideas is to give up the thesis as to the constitutive role of mind or language in the creation of the world of culture. Nor can these observations be set aside because in one long passage (pp. 175 ff.) Jordan collapses the functions of the philosopher and the prophet into those of the poet and constructs a composite man who has all the virtues of the three and none of the limitations of any one of them. Even if poets, to the extent that they are poets, were also prophets and philosophers—a doctrine that can only be accepted by straining to the maximum the coefficient of elasticity of these terms-it would still be necessary for Jordan and everybody else seriously interested in the questions that he discusses in his book to distinguish in mind if not separate in fact the roles of each.

There are many other comments, criticisms, qualifications,

one could make about this forbidding and challenging book. I have said nothing about Jordan's criticism of the place given "experience" in modern thought, his behavioristic discussion of genius, his remarks on taste, and his analysis of the relation of morality to poetry. Other reviewers would have treated, of course, the place of "objectivity" in Jordan's aesthetics differently than I have done. There is much left to be said. I doubt, however, whether any future criticism by whoever undertaken, if it is serious, could manage to dismiss the tremendous achievement of Jordan's contribution.

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# HERESY AND EPITHET: AN APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF LATIN AVERROISM, I

STUART MAC CLINTOCK

What does it mean, and what has it meant, to call someone an "Averroist"? Does it indicate unequivocally that the thinker so named holds certain specific philosophical theses? Is it a term of disapprobation, a catchword to be applied easily, by means of which a variety of novel, unpopular, unattractive, or heretical ideas can be lumped together and dismissed? One intention of the present analysis is to suggest that like so many labels attached to mediaeval philosophers—Christian Aristotelianism, Christian Neo-Platonism, Augustinianism, and so on-the designation "Averroism" ought not to be employed without severe qualifications. Its past uses by historians and philosophers ought to be examined with great care, in order to determine whether these uses have been largely pejorative, whether definite philosophical issues have been involved, or whether the situation may be still more complicated. In the history of this problem, we have come a long way from Renan's picture of a radical and unregenerate Aristotelianism persisting unchanged for hundreds of years, but there remains an enormous distance yet to be traversed, before anything like a comprehensive description is to be attained. The excellent research on the 13th century master of arts Siger of Brabant has already revealed that "Averroism" in that century is, as Gilson puts it, "multiform"—that is, there seems to have been a large variety of philosophical positions held by the philosophers associated under the designation.1

¹ The fountainhead of the modern discussion of "Averroism" is, of course, Ernest Renan's Averroès et l'Averroisme (Paris, 1852; available in several later editions and reprintings). Renan's fundamental but often sketchy account was supplemented by a monographic study of great value:

The situation after the 13th century, however, badly needs to be clarified by additional detailed research. Bruno Nardi and Anneliese Maier have exhibited a nice understanding of the extra-

P. Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant et l'Averroïsme latin au xiiie siècle (1st edition, Fribourg, 1899; 2nd edition, 2 vols., Louvain, 1911-1908). Mandonnet completely reversed Renan's judgment, seeing in Siger only a blind follower of Averroes and an unreconstructed advocate of heresy. Mandonnet's publication of authentic writings of Siger (with conclusions inimical to Christian teachings) raises grave difficulties in the interpretation of Dante. who had placed a certain "Sigieri" in Heaven, in the circle of blessed philosophers (Paradiso X, 133-36). To state the matter roughly, it has to be assumed either that Dante was not a thorough-going Thomist, or that he was not acquainted with Siger's philosophy in any detail. The discussion raged about these poles for some years-Bruno Nardi denying Dante's Thomism, while Mandonnet and others affirmed it, suggesting more or less plausible reasons for Siger's presence in Heaven. An important study indicating that Siger was by no means an unthinking advocate of Averroes slipped into oblivion during this time: F. Bruckmüller, Untersuchungen über Sigers De anima intellectiva (Munich, 1908). In addition to this dissertation, another careful and well-balanced study from this time that has likewise been neglected is by A. J. Rahilly, "Averroism and Scholasticism," Studies, II (1914), 301-24; III (1914-1915), 686-713. Then in 1924 the eminent mediaevalist Martin Grabmann made a manuscript discovery which seriously affected the entire cast of the controversy; he found, in Clm 9559, a whole set of previously unknown commentaries on various works of Aristotle, one of which was, in the table of contents, assigned to a certain "magistro Sogero." Grabmann's analysis of the commentaries left him no doubt that they were all by the same philosopher (although they seem to be reportationes), and he did not hesitate to attribute them en bloc to Siger of Brabant. (Grabmann, "Neu aufgefundene Werke des Siger von Brabant und Boetius von Dacien," Sitzungsberichte BAW, 1924, Heft 2 [Munich, 1924]; see also his "Neuaufgefundene 'Quaestionen' Sigers von Brabant zu den Werken des Aristotèles," Miscellanea Francesco Ehrle, I [Rome, 1924], pp. 103-47). Fernand Van Steenberghen published the questions on the De anima (Siger de Brabant d'après ses œuvres inédites, I [Louvain, 1931], pp. 21-156), along with brief summaries of the other unpublished works. Van Steenberghen presented the results of his analysis of Siger's doctrine in two fine studies: Les œuvres et la doctrine de Siger de Brabant (Brussels, 1938), and Siger de Brabant d'après ses œuvres inédites, II (Louvain, 1942); this last contains an excellent bibliography of the preceding literature concerning the problem of "Averroism," and, in the course of his argument, a fairly thorough examination of much of this literature. The importance of Grabmann's manuscript discovery is well pointed up by Van Steenberghen, for if the questions on the De anima in Clm 9559 are authentic, they indicate an evolution in Siger's thought, because the author of these questions denies the unity of the intellect and presents the Thomistic solution nearly verbatim, an attitude very different than that displayed in the questions De anima ordinary complexities surrounding the question of what "Averroism" might be during this later period, but they stand nearly alone in this knowledge; even Gilson is content to dismiss, with

intellectiva published by Mandonnet. If this is so, the problem of the interpretation of Dante is solved: Siger was a convert to Thomism, and Dante, a convinced Thomist, could thus easily place him in Heaven. At this point Nardi, firm in his conviction that Dante was by no means a Thomist, denied completely the authenticity of the Quaestiones de anima, as attributed to Siger by Grabmann and Van Steenberghen. ("Il preteso tomismo di Sigieri di Brabante," Giornale Critico della Filosofia Italiana. XVII [1936], pp. 26-35; "Ancora sul preteso tomismo di Sigieri di Brabante," ibid., XVIII [1937], pp. 160-64; and various subsequent articles.) Nardi's argument is, very crudely, this: there is little external evidence, contemporary or later, to indicate that Siger ever modified his views under the pressure of Aguinas' criticisms (excepting the documents under analysis. of course); this being so, it is somewhat hasty scholarly procedure to attribute a writing to a man because the table of contents of the manuscript ascribes another writing in the manuscript to that man, especially when internal evidence provides no indisputable corroboration. In any case, the problem of the authenticity of these commentaries, and the problem of the propriety of Siger's place in Heaven, remain unresolved; in the last few years there have been only minor exchanges between Van Steenberghen and his supporters, on the one hand, and Nardi and Gilson, on the other. In his latest publication on the matter, Van Steenberghen recognizes that the problem of attribution is not settled beyond all doubt: "Siger of Brabant," The Modern Schoolman, XXIX (1951), pp. 11-27. Recently Anneliese Majer has published evidence raising doubts as to the authenticity of the questions on the Physics in Clm 9559, as far as Siger of Brabant is concerned: see her "Nouvelles questions de Siger de Brabant sur la Physique d'Aristote," Revue philosophique de Louvain, XLIV (1946), pp. 497-513, and her "Les commentaires sur la Physique d'Aristote attribués à Siger de Brabant," ibid., XLVII (1949), pp. 334-50. Miss Maier announces a find of questions explicitly assigned to Siger, whose conclusions differ conspicuously from the doctrines held in the Munich questions. Between her two articles falls a defense of the authenticity of the Clm 9559 questions by J. J. Duin, "Les commentaires de Siger de Brabant sur la Physique d'Aristote," ibid., XLVI (1948), pp. 463-80. Miss Maier has the better of this exchange. Very generally speaking, the research on Siger has benefited because of its implications for Dantesque interpretation; the study of "Averroism" before Siger's time, and in the 14th, 15th, and 16th centuries, has been on an extremely small scale indeed, with most of the fundamental monographic analysis remaining to be done. Grabmann and Van Steenberghen have contributed to the history of the faculty of arts at Paris before 1260 (the former in various monographs; the latter in the introductory portions of his study on Siger), and Nardi has shown how Albertus Magnus distinguishes the philosophical and theological domains in his commentaries: "Note per una storia dell'Averroismo latino," Rivista di Storia a few strokes of the pen, the entire "Averroist" tradition as authority-bound, sterile, and doomed to early extinction through

della Filosofia, III (1948), pp. 8-29. Nardi has explored the citation and use of Siger by later philosophers such as John of Jandun, John Baconthorn, Paul of Venice, Nifo, Pico, and others (Sigieri di Brabante nel pensiero del Rinascimento Italiano [Rome, 1947]). Constantin Michalski has examined a great many interesting manuscripts dealing with aspects of 14th century "Averroism," but falls into some superficiality and distortion in his haste to confirm Renan's idea that "Averroism versus Alexandrism" characterized the history of psychology during this period. (For a listing of the main Michalski articles, see the bibliography in Van Steenberghen II.) There has been some excellent work done on the problem of "Averroism" at Bologna in the early 14th century: Grabmann, "Studien über den Averroisten Taddeo da Parma," Mittelalterliches Geistesleben, II (Munich, 1936). pp. 239-60; also his "L'aristotelismo italiano al tempo di Dante con particolare riguardo all'Università di Bologna," Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica, XXXVII (1946), pp. 260-77; A. Maier, "Eine italienische Averroistenschule . . .," in her Die Vorläufer Galileis im 14. Jahrhundert (Rome, 1949). pp. 251-78; C. Piana, "Nuovo contributo allo studio delle correnti dottrinali nell'Università di Bologna nel sec. XIV," Antonianum, XXIII (1948), pp. 221-54; S. Vanni Rovighi, Le Quaestiones de Anima di Taddeo da Parma (Milan, 1951). These are all excellent descriptions and presentations of some of the basic source manuscripts for this period in the faculty of arts at Bologna. Two other brief articles follow Renan in stressing that Padua was the center of Italian "Averroism": E. Troilo, "L'Averroism padovano." Atti della Società Italiana per il progresso delle scienze. Riunione XXVI. Venezia 1937, III (1938), pp. 255-86; and A. D. Sartori, "Gaetano de Thiene, filosofo averroista, nello studio di Padova (1387-1465)," ibid., 349-63. A more comprehensive new study on Cajetan: S. da Valsanzibio. Vita e dottrina di Gaetano di Thiene (Padua, 1949), is valuable. It may be true that Padua was the center of Italian "Averroism" in the late 14th and 15th centuries, but in the early 14th century Bologna was the most active and flourishing faculty of arts south of the Alps, and reveals to us many teachers meeting the superficial prerequisites for "Averroism" (unity of the intellect, etc.), as the documents cited by Grabmann, Maier, Piana, and Vanni Rovighi establish. Paul Oskar Kristeller has even been able to show that Petrarch's famous "Averroists" can by no means be associated with Padua, and in all probability belong to Bologna (see his "Petrarch's 'Averroists,'" Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance, XIV [1952], pp. 59-65. This volume is the Mélanges Augustin Renaudet). In sum, although some excellent work has been done, it is not too unreasonable to say that for the period after the 13th century many parts of Renan's original study have yet to be superseded-even after 100 years. Finally, the present bibliographical note is not intended to be comprehensive; there has only been an attempt to set forth the highlights in the recent history of the problem, and there has naturally been selection according to that principle.

sheer stagnation. But the very history of philosophy attests to the vitality of the tradition, whatever it may consist of, or at least to the vitality of the designation, for Cremonini in the 17th century was still preferring the commentaries of Averroes to all others, and late in the 16th century Marcantonio Zimara was commonly known as an "Averroist"—to name but two obvious cases. From before the time of Siger of Brabant through to the 17th century Averroes was read as the Commentator on Aristotle, and every generation throughout this period reveals its quota of philosophers who are, or who could easily be, dubbed "Averroists." It is here being asked: what do all these thinkers share, if anything? A common attitude toward the nature of the intellective soul? A common sympathy toward Averroes' Neo-Platonic rendering of Aristotle? A common blind reproduction of the Commentator's interpretation of the Stagirite? An unwarranted trust in the capacities of unaided reason, as manifested in a constant opposition of the conclusions of natural reason to the doctrines of the Christian Revelation? A common tendency in the direction of doubt, insincerity, heresy, and even atheism? It is here suggested that, far from taking "Averroism" as an obsolescent and disappearing species of subversive thinkers, it would be more enlightening to consider the tradition as symptomatic of the essential inability of Christian thinkers to assimilate Greek philosophy without modifications which would profoundly alter the fundamental character of that philosophy. Or, to phrase it somewhat differently, throughout the mediaeval period, when the domain of natural reason was being radically separated from the domain of faith, the rigorous rendering of Aristotle that Averroes presented maintained a steady appeal, which waned only when new translations from the Greek pointed up the Neo-Platonic predispositions of the Commentator, and revealed that the original spirit of the Stagirite was rather

<sup>2</sup> E. Gilson, "La doctrine de la double vérité," in his *Etudes de philosophie médiévale* (Strasbourg, 1921); this view is recapitulated in his *La philosophie au moyen âge*, 3rd ed. (Paris, 1947), pp. 687-94.

On this late "Averroism," see Renan, Averroès et l'Averroïsme, ed. H. Psichari (Paris, 1948), pp. 265-311. For some of the "Averroist" background for Pomponazzi's solution of the problem of immortality, see the brilliant remarks by J. H. Randall, Jr., in The Renaissance Philosophy of Man (Chicago, 1948), pp. 257-79.

different (although no less rigorous) than the flavor that Averroes introduces to the texts.

In addition to being a fairly carefree application of labels on my own part, however, these generalizations are perhaps premature. For the pretensions of the present study are extremely modest: I propose to begin the examination of this vast and complex problem in only a small way-in a rather detailed comparison of specific doctrines held by two eminent "Averroists," and in an attempt to reach some decision in terms of philosophical issues as such, rather than falling back comfortably on the commonplaces repeated in documents of condemnation and in histories of philosophy. What follows will investigate certain problems concerning the nature and status of the intellective soul, as these arise in the philosophies of Siger of Brabant and John of Jandun. Histories usually select the latter as the next important figure in the tradition after the former, and since there are some direct ties between them, there seems to be ample justification for beginning an analysis of "Averroism" with a comparison of their views on this crucial matter of doctrine.

#### I

Siger of Brabant seems to have been a master in the arts faculty at Paris by the early 1260's; his first mention is in a document dated 1266, in which the Papal Legate, Simon de Brion, is dealing with doctrinal dissension in the faculty of arts. These doctrinal disputes involved, briefly, the problem of how to deal with the non-Christian conclusions evident in certain writings of Aristotle, and they mounted in intensity during the next decade. Thomas Aquinas himself entered the arena in 1270, composing a treatise On the unity of the intellect against the Averroists, systematically denying that the intellective soul is a separated substance unique in its species for all individual men; this work is generally considered to have been directed primarily against the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Denifle and Chatelain, Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, I (Paris 1889), pp. 449-57.

teachings of Siger of Brabant.<sup>5</sup> In 1270 also, Etienne Tempier, Bishop of Paris, was led by the seriousness of the conflict to issue a condemnation of 13 philosophical theses, most of which were being advocated by the masters in the arts faculty according to their understanding of the strict meaning of Aristotle—e.g., the eternity of the world, that God can know nothing outside himself, the unity of the intellect, and so on.<sup>6</sup>

This condemnation does not seem to have inhibited Siger and his fellow masters in any respect; he continued to publish small tractates throughout these years without any noticeable modification of his views, or any but the most perfunctory submission to the Bishop's strictures. About 1272 he replied to Aquinas in his *De anima intellectiva*.' The quarrels concerning these interpretations of Aristotle reached a peak of strong feeling during 1272, and there began a definite schism in the faculty of arts, which lasted for three years. Siger seems to have been the leading light of one party to the split, insisting that Aristotle's premisses

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> De unitale intellectus contra Averroistas, ed. Leo W. Keeler (Rome, 1946). Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, Textus et Documenta, Series Philosophica, no. 12. Although Siger is not mentioned explicitly in the body of the text, scribal notes in two early 14th century manuscripts of the work state that it was written in opposition to Siger. Op. cit., xii.

<sup>\*</sup> Chartularium, I, pp. 486-7.

Edited by Mandonnet in his Siger de Brabant . . ., 2nd. ed., II, pp. 145-71. There is no real evidence for this date; it is merely assumed that Siger completed his reply before Aquinas went off to Italy. Father M. Chossat was the first to establish that Siger's De anima intellectiva was probably in reply to Aguinas, rather than the other way around, as Mandonnet had believed; Chossat concluded, on the basis of citations from John of Jandun and John Baconthorp, that there is a lost treatise of Siger's to which Aguinas was replying in his De unitate intellectus. (Chossat, "Saint Thomas d'Aquin et Siger de Brabant," Revue de philosophie, XXIV [1914]. pp. 553-75; XXV [1914], pp. 25-52.) B. Nardi, in his Sigieri de Brabante . . ., pp. 11-38, offers convincing evidence from Nifo that there is a missing De intellectu from the pen of Siger; this is not, however, the same as the missing treatise suspected by Chossat, for Nifo states explicitly that the De intellectu was sent to Aquinas in reply to his De unitate intellectus. On the other hand, the missing De intellectu is a work distinct from the De anima intellectiva, despite the fact that John of Jandun refers to the latter as a tract "De intellectu"; matters that Nifo says were discussed in the De intellectu (whether the soul can know the separated substances in this life) are clearly not taken up in the De anima intellectiva.

and method of reasoning could provide no other than the unfortunate conclusions under discussion. The ecclesiastical authorities were well aware, and very much troubled, by the subversive possibilities of this radical and uncontrolled rendering of the Stagirite, and so in 1275 the breach in the arts faculty was forcibly healed, and Siger's party was cautioned, under pain of severe punishments, to exercise restraint with regard to matters that might tend to disrupt the orderly calm of the university and to undermine the Faith in any way.\*

Once again, however, these warnings and directives seem to have had little restraining effect on these independent traditions in the faculty of arts, and so finally in March of 1277 Bishop Tempier condemned a list of 219 erroneous propositions, including all the renderings of Aristotle made necessary in the strict interpretations of the arts masters, and excommunicated all those convicted of holding such doctrines. Some months preceding this condemnation, however, Siger of Brabant, along with a certain Bernier of Nivelles, had been specifically singled out by the Inquisitor Simon du Val for having taught heresy. The document involved indicates the Inquisitor's intention of proceeding against the two men, and directs them to present themselves to his tribunal for prosecution. Whether this may indicate that these masters had already left Paris, under fear of the Inquisitor's punishments, is not

<sup>\*</sup> In connection with this schism in the faculty of arts, see *Chartularium*, I, pp. 521-9. The authorities, of course, had been suspicious of the Aristotelian corpus ever since its introduction, and had issued interdictions against its use in 1210, 1215, and 1231, and had only admitted it to the curriculum in 1255.

Ohartularium, I, pp. 534 ff.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> E. Martène, Thesaurus Novus Anecdotorum, V (Paris 1717), cols. 1795-1814. Martène assumed that this document was dated in 1277, i.e., after Tempier's condemnation, but additional manuscript evidence has shown that the date 1276 is, in all probability, correct. See B. Nardi, "Note per una storia dell'Averroismo latino," Rivista di Storia della Filosofia, III (1948), pp. 120-2, for a summary of the new evidence. Although Bernier of Nivelles and a certain previously unknown Gosvin de la Chapelle are mentioned for prosecution along with Siger in this new manuscript, most of the contemporary opinion seemed to consider that another master, Boethius of Dacia, was especially marked for prosecution. At least two of the manuscripts of the list of 219 heresies contain scribal comments referring to this Boethius, as well as to Siger.

known, but it is certain that Siger vanishes from the university scene at this point—perhaps leaving, perhaps forcibly removed. The only remaining bit of information concerning Siger is the date of his death, 1284, in Orvieto, perhaps murdered by his clerk."

Once again, despite Tempier's condemnation of 219 doctrines. and despite Siger's personal destruction, the independent tradition of interpretation in the arts faculty continued undeterred throughout the last quarter of the 13th century. It was clearly stated by many masters that Aristotle taught the eternity of the world, that final happiness could be attained in this life, that God could know nothing outside Himself, that personal immortality was unlikely, and other conclusions severely at variance with central doctrines of Christian philosophy. Arriving in their analyses of Aristotle at such conclusions, the masters in the arts faculty merely added a perfunctory statement to the effect that these conclusions were purely philosophical, based on evidence derived through the senses, and may be shown to be inadequate, if the truths of Faith tell anything at all to the contrary. Faith gives us the truth always, although by the method of philosophy we may sometimes arrive at contrary answers, which must then be considered as the product of the partial and inadequate character of unaided reasoning. Without getting involved with the details at this time, the point is that there seems to have been little more than the most casual submission to the condemnations of 1277, for commentaries after that date show scarcely more concern for the conflict of conclusions of reason with truths of faith, than do pre-1277 documents.12

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant..., I, p. 259, pp. 262-86. It is possible that Siger had directly appealed from the Inquisitor to the tribunal of the Curia, supposedly more lenient, and that he was being kept confined, without additional punishment, at the Curia at the time of his death.

<sup>&</sup>quot;secundum theologos" in commentaries as early as the 1240's, see O. Lottin, "Psychologie et morale à la faculté des arts de Paris aux approches de 1250," Revue néo-scolastique de Philosophie, XLII (1939), pp. 182-212. This article is reprinted in his Psychologie et morale aux xuº et xuº siècles, I (Louvain 1942), pp. 505-34. B. Nardi has assembled impressive evidence showing Albertus Magnus' care at distinguishing the two enterprises; see

In the early part of the 14th century, this continuing tradition of a strict and independent interpretation of Aristotle in the faculty of arts is very well exemplified in the person of John of Jandun. Master of arts by 1310, Jandun was extremely active in teaching for nearly the next 15 years, leaving us a large body of commentaries on Aristotle and some independent treatises. Caught up in the enterprise of the *Defensor pacis* with Marsilius of Padua, in 1324, he fled to Ludwig of Bavaria sometime during the next two years. Excommunicated in 1327, he seems to have died in August of 1328, after having accompanied Ludwig to Italy, and after having been awarded by him the bishopric of Ferrara, a preferment he apparently never attained.<sup>13</sup>

Although the Papal bulls against Jandun always associate him with Marsilius of Padua as "heretic" and "heresiarch," there is no other evidence that he shared in the actual composition of the Defensor pacis.<sup>14</sup> What, then, may be said as to the specific reason

his "Note per una storia dell'Averroismo latino," Rivista di Storia della Filosofia, II (1947), pp. 197-220. R.-A. Gauthier supplies testimonies of the same kind from the last part part of the 13th century: "Trois commentaires 'averroïstes' sur l'Ethique à Nicomaque," Archives d'Histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age, XVI (1948), pp. 187-336. It cannot be denied that post-1277 documents perhaps exhibit a little more recognition of the superiority of the truths of faith, doubtless in the face of the condemnations, but this seems to be only a token recognition, and there is apparently little change in fundamental attitude among the arts masters, who considered the differences to be merely those of domain and method. On the other hand, this is hardly evidence of insincerity and doubt on their parts; not until the early 14th century, with John of Jandun, is there ever a suspicion that the assertions of the primacy of faith were not always entirely straightforward and sincere. See E. Gilson, "La doctrine de la double vérité," pp. 51-75.

Valois, "Jean de Jandun et Marsile de Padoue, auteurs du Defensor pacis," Histoire littéraire de la France, XXXIII (1906), pp. 528-623) has not yet been superseded. Treatments of Jandun's philosophical views have, generally, appeared as by-products of other studies: Gilson, "La doctrine de la double vérité," or Nardi, Sigieri di Brabante..., or A. Maier, An der Grenze der Scholastik und Naturwissenschaft (Essen, 1943), passim, and her Die Vorläufer Galileis im 14. Jahrhundert, passim. In a forthcoming volume on John of Jandun and the problem of Latin Averroism, I hope to supplement these studies in some ways.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> This has been very carefully gone into by Alan Gewirth, "John of Jandun and the *Defensor pacis*," Speculum, XXIII (1948), pp. 267-72, who

for his condemnation? To begin with, in all probability it was not solely for his adherence to the tradition of strict interpretation of Aristotle, i.e., understanding him to hold for the unity of the intellect, the eternity of the world, and other anti-Christian views. If this alone had been the reason for his condemnation, we might expect to find a large proportion of the masters in the faculty of arts at this time also being prosecuted and excommunicated. John Buridan, to take but a single well-known example, also saw that Aristotle came to conclusions at odds with the Faith (although it is true that in the case of the intellective soul he supported the view of Alexander that the soul was generated and corrupted with the body), and he stated these oppositions many times, yet we can search the annals in vain for the slightest suspicion against his own integrity, sincerity, and orthodoxy.<sup>15</sup>

No, too many other masters in the arts faculty were equally well aware that it was not possible to interpret Aristotle in any other manner without altering his method and his meaning; it is unlikely that Jandun's adherence to this tradition of strict interpretation, in which the discrepancies between the conclusions of reason and the truths were always noted and the superiority of the truths of faith always asserted, was alone the cause of his excommunication. But rather, as with Gottschalk, as with Abelard, as with Bacon, as perhaps with Ockham, as with other mediaevals disciplined by the ecclesiastical authorities, it was not so much the content of what Jandun advocated as the offensive manner in which he advocated it. In other words, the grounds on which Jandun was condemned were not purely doctrinal or philosophical, but were in addition partly political, in terms of his adherence to a minority view within the Church organization (the Franciscans and Ludwig of Bavaria in their dispute with the Papacy), and partly personal, in the sense that he seems to have exhibited a

concludes that Jandun did not participate in the actual writing of the treatise, although he may have been a philosophical adviser to Marsilius.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> For some representative texts of Buridan's on this head, see *Johannis Buridani Quaestiones super libris quattuor De caelo et mundo*, ed. Ernest A. Moody (Cambridge, Mass., 1942), pp. 75, 84, 123, etc.; and see also Buridan's set of questions on the *De anima*, edited [Paris] 1518, ff. 23vb, 24ra, 24va, 25rb, etc.

restless, contentious, aggressive, and outspoken character, reluctant to submit to discipline, and proud in his own competence.

In any case, there is little evidence for Jandun's existence after 1328, and all the testimony in the documents favors his untimely and incommunicant demise in Todi sometime toward the end of August of that year." The questions before us, however, are not biographical, but are rather concerned with determining in exactly what sense the designation "Averroist" may simultaneously be applied to Jandun and to Siger of Brabant, and it is to their respective views concerning the intellective soul that this study will now turn.

#### II

For the purposes of the present comparison, it will not be necessary to decide every single one of the involved questions in connection with the intellective soul, such as the specific natures of material, possible, or passive intellects, and their various operations. It will perhaps be sufficient to present the solutions to but two of the important issues that arise in the mediaeval analyses of Book III of the *De anima*. First, in what sense, if any, is the soul the form to the body's matter? Second, is the active aspect of the intellective soul a single unique entity in which all men somehow share, or are there intellective souls multiplied according to the number of individual men? These questions are, obviously, not isolated and unrelated; the answers given will turn out to be mutually interdependent—shaping, and being shaped by, each other.

In his De anima intellectiva, Siger of Brabant offers a clearcut statement of his opinions on these central problems, or rather,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> C. K. Brampton, "Marsiglio of Padua," English Historical Review, XXXVII (1922), pp. 501-15, analyzes the conflicting data and concludes in favor of that date and place. Lynn Thorndike, A History of Magic and Experimental Science, III (New York, 1934), pp. 282-83, cites a manuscript source which would indicate that a Johannes de Gauduno, or Ganduno, was alive at Paris around 1341. If this is our John of Jandun, which Thorndike feels is unlikely, the problem of what he was doing between 1328 and 1341, and the problem of how he was restored to Paris, remain to be explained.

a clear-cut statement of what he thought Aristotle had to say about The De anima intellectiva is very consciously written as an exposition of Aristotle's meaning in Book III of the De anima. Siger denies that the intellective soul is the form of the body, in the customary sense of providing being to matter, i.e., standing as the activity of the matter, the principle of its process, the figure imposed on the wax. The testimony of Aristotle is too strong on this point; the intellect is clearly stated to be, in some way, separable from the body, and, as such, cannot be its substantial form. The intellective soul is properly explained only in terms of its operation in understanding, and this operation of understanding, although it needs the body and the perceptions that the body supplies, takes place by no corporeal activity, and in this sense can be said to be separated from the body. Furthermore, a form separable from its matter cannot be said to be the source as such of Consequently, Siger concludes, the the composite's being. intellective soul is not the form of the body in the sense of providing its being, but functions as its form only when conjoined to it during the actual operation (or activity, or process) of knowing."

From what has been said, it now appears how the activity of understanding is attributable not to the intellect alone, but rather to the whole man. This is not because understanding takes place in the body, or because the phantasms are in the body. But since(?) man understands, this is in virtue of that part of him that is the intellect, whence, because the intellect in the act of understanding is an agent by its own nature intrinsic to the body, the activities of intrinsic agents, whether they are motions or activities without motion, are to be attributed to the composites that are made up of the intrinsic agents and that for which they are thus acting intrinsically, and are called by the philosophers intrinsic movers, or activities intrinsic to something—their forms and their perfections.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Siger of Brabant, *De anima intellectiva*, ed. cit., p. 154: Sunt igitur unum anima intellectiva et corpus in opere, quia in unum opus conveniunt; et cum intellectus dependeat ex corpore et phantasmate in intelligendo, non dependet ex eo sicut ex subiecto in quo sit intelligere, sed sicut ex obiecto, cum phantasmata sint intellectui sicut sensibilia sensui. Et est attendendum quod, cum illa quae habent opus commune non qualitercumque se habentia illud exerceant, quod intellectus per naturam suam unitus est et applicatus corpori natus intelligere ex phantasmatibus.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Ibid., pp. 154-55: Et apparet ex iam dictis qualiter non solum intellectui sed homini attribuatur intelligere. Hoc enim non est quia intel-

Just as the pilot may be spoken of as the act or perfection or principle of process of the ship, at that time he is actually engaged in navigating it, so the intellect may be spoken of as the form of the body, when the individual is actually indulging in the activity of understanding. But only in this sense of being somehow appropriated to the body during the activity of thinking; the intellective soul is separable, and it would, for Siger, be going entirely beyond the Aristotelian texts to say simultaneously that there are as many intellective souls as there are individual men, and that each of these individual intellective souls is united to its body as form to its matter, providing it its being.

Throughout his *De anima intellectiva* Siger is concerned with the precise analysis of Aristotle's meaning, and with achieving an exact comprehension of Aristotle's intentions, and his claim is that both Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, eminent philosophers though they may be, have misunderstood the Stagirite, and perhaps have gone beyond his original discussion, when they render him in the latter fashion.<sup>19</sup> The intellect is the form of the body, but only in the sense that it is appropriated to the body during the actual process or activity of comprehension.

It must be said, according to the intention of the Philosopher, that the intellective soul is separated from the body in being, not united to it as the form to the wax, as Aristotle is fond of repeating, and as his argument shows. However, the intellective soul is united to

ligere est in corpore neque quia phantasmata sunt in corpore. Sed cum homo intelligat, hoc est verum secundum partem eius quae est intellectus, unde quia intellectus in intelligendo est operans intrinsecus ad corpus per suam naturam, operationes autem intrinsecorum operantium sive sint motus, sive operationes sint sine motu, attribuntur compositis ex intrinseco operanti, et eo ad quod sic intrinsece operatur, immo etiam apud philosophos intrinseci motores, vel intrinsece ad aliqua operantes, formae et perfectiones eorum appellantur.

Note Siger's criticism of Aquinas (Ibid., p. 154): Thomas etiam intentum non arguit, sed solum quaerit eius ratio quomodo compositum materiale intelligeret ut homo, si anima intellectiva in essendo est separata a materia et corpore. Iam autem hoc dicetur quando assignabitur qualiter anima intellectiva est unita corpori et qualiter ab eo est separata. Et iterum, apparet hominem ipsum non intelligere ex causa quam assignat; quia, si sic, adeo quod intelligere esset in corpore et in organo, ut etiam prius dictum est.

the body in operation, since nothing understands without the body and its phantasms . . . 20

Postponing temporarily the question as to whether Siger is blindly reproducing Averroes, or whether he is trying to approximate the original sense of Aristotle, and, in either case, whether his attempt succeeds or fails, let us instead consider John of Jandun's solution to this problem of the manner in which the soul stands as form to the body's matter. His answer may well seem familiar after Siger's. The soul is by no means the substantial form of the body, in the sense that Albert or Thomas would give it, as dans ei esse formaliter. The form of any body may be spoken of in two ways: first, as the perfection which provides the body with its substantial being—as this perfection, the form is conjoined to the body in such a manner that the very mode of its being is coextensive with the being that it provides the body, i.e., its nature is exhausted by its serving as giver of being; and second, a form can function as an operative principle, acting in the body, it is true, but conjoined to it only during the actual process or operation itself-as such a principle, it has a mode of being separate from its conjunction with the body. Jandun rejects the first of these possibilities, when he is considering the soul-body relationship, on the ground that this position, which he takes as that of Alexander of Aphrodisias, would then force him to conclude that the intellective soul was generated with and corrupted with the material body. His rejection, incidentally, is not in terms of conflict with Christian doctrine, but rather in terms of conflict with the philosophical principle that the corporeal cannot affect the incorporeal in any way. It is the second of the ways in which form can stand with respect to matter that Jandun approves for the soul-body relationship, deeming it consistent with the intention of the Philosopher and his Commentator. intellective soul is not distinct from the body with respect to place and subject, naturally; indeed, its proper activity depends upon its intimate association with, and existence in, the body, but this is a

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., p. 154: Dicendum est igitur aliter secundum intentionem Philosophi, quod anima intellectiva in essendo est a corpore separata, non ei unitas ut figura cerae, sicut sonant plura verba Aristotelis, et eius ratio ostendit.

union of function only, of operation, and not one of being. Just as the intelligence that moves the heavens is called its form, so the intellective soul that moves the body in the activity of understanding is called its form; in neither case, however, are they forms that formally provide being—dans esse formaliter.<sup>21</sup>

The obvious approximation of John of Jandun's solution to the answer previously summarized from Siger of Brabant is no mere coincidence; Jandun freely acknowledges that his solution is following that of Siger: "You ought to know that this solution of the problem of how men understand anything was proposed by the revered teacher of philosophy Remigius of Brabant, in a certain treatise of his On the intellect which begins 'Cum anima sit aliorum cognoscitiva . . ." <sup>22</sup> Jandun is clearly reduplicating Siger's solution, in which the intellective soul is not the substantial form as such of the body, but only its form when appropriated to it during the actual process of understanding that the individual manifests. There is an intellective soul in the body when understanding is taking place.

How do Siger and Jandun come to this conclusion regarding the relationship of soul and body? To take them at their expressed word, they are trying to understand and explicate the meaning of Aristotle's text, and the Stagirite does state that the intellective part of the soul is, in some sense, separable from the body and its corporeal influences, and able to stand in a separated fashion. Given this proposition, our two "Averroists" find it absolutely impossible to make this soul the substantial form of the body, for substantial forms are inherent to their composites, and have their reality exhausted, so to speak, by the being that they provide the composites.

Let us now return to Siger, however, in order to complete his account of the nature and status of the intellective soul. In

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> This short summary is made from Jandun's questions on the *De anima*, Book III, question 5: Utrum anima intellectiva sit forma substantialis corporis humani. *Quaestiones in libros tres De anima* (Venice, 1552), esp. ff. 57va-59ra.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Jandun, Quaestiones . . . De anima, ed. cit., f. 60ra. The editions all refer to "Remigius," but the *incipit* given is that of Siger's De anima intellectiva; furthermore, Nardi has signalled manuscripts properly reading "Segerus" and "Sirges." See his Sigieri di Brabante . . . , p. 21.

what sense is the active aspect of the intellect eternal, impassible, unmixed, and immortal, as Aristotle so clearly but laconically states? If separated from the body in its mode of being, although conjoined to it in its mode of operation, must it not be considered as a single unique substance? Yes, it must, Siger argues; the intellective soul is an immaterial substance; any immaterial substance is unique with respect to species; therefore, the intellective soul must be unique with respect to species.

A nature which is separated from matter in its being is not multiplied according to the diversity of matter. But the intellective soul, according to the Philosopher, has a being separate from matter, as was previously shown. Therefore, it must not be multiplied according to the diversity of matter, nor according to the diversity of human bodies.<sup>23</sup>

Siger offers several additional arguments, all to the same effect, and all presented with the greatest caution and deliberation. He cannot see any alternative conclusion possible, if Aristotle's principles and methods are rigorously followed out. On the other hand, he is well aware of the crisis that this solution creates, with respect to Christian doctrine, and he concludes:

Therefore I say that, because of the difficulty of the premisses and of certain other matters, I have long been in doubt as to what the method of natural reason should hold in this problem, and what the Philosopher felt in this matter; and in the case of such doubt the Faith must be adhered to, as transcending all human reason.<sup>24</sup>

It is impossible to avoid seeing in these words reflections of the doctrinal controversies in connection with the interpretation of Aristotle, that were raging in the arts faculty at Paris during the 1260's and 1270's. Clearly the consequences for the Faith of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Siger of Brabant, De anima intellectiva, ed. cit., p. 165: Natura quae in esse suo separata est a materia, non multiplicatur multiplicatione materiae. Sed anima intellectiva, secundum Philosophum, habet esse separatum a materia sicut prius visum fuit. Ergo non debet multiplicari multiplicatione materiae, neque multiplicatione corporum humanorum.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> Ibid., p. 169: Et ideo dico propter difficultatem praemissorum et quorumdam aliorum, quod mihi dubium fuit a longo tempore, quid via rationis naturalis in praedicto problemate sit tenendum, et quid senserit Philosophus de dicta quaestione; et in tali dubio fidei adhaerendum est, quae omnem rationem humanam superat.

reading Aristotle in the fashion mentioned—as denying that the intellective soul is the substantial form of the body, and declaring it to be capable of subsistence separate from the body, unique for all men—had become apparent to philosophers at Paris, and clearly such readings had been subject to violent assault. nas' De unitate intellectus was a formidable attempt to solve the problem in Aristotle's own terms—to handle the issue on its own rational merits—while conservative Augustinians like Bonaventure seized this opportunity to reiterate their denunciation of the whole enterprise of independent philosophy guided by unaided natural Siger had composed an earlier set of questions on Book III of the De anima (the so-called Quaestiones in Tertium de anima) in which he had presented virtually the same solutions as have been just outlined, but without the statements of doubt in the face of the teachings of the Faith, and without the statements of the primacy and certainty of these teachings. It is tempting to explain these differences between the two documents of Siger's in this way: the attacks on the strict rendering of the arts faculty had been severe enough and prolonged enough to make Siger insecure in his position—reluctant to present his argument over-aggressively and extra-certainly—and thus, when he got around to composing the De anima intellectiva, some years after the Quaestiones in Tertium de anima, he felt it necessary to ease the harshness of his interpretation by adding qualifying remarks affirming his final confidence is the presentations of the Christian Revelation. I have always been convinced myself, he seems to be saying, that no other solution to these problems of the soul is probable, given the Aristotelian premisses and method; nevertheless I recognize the plausibility of alternative arguments, and that these problems are open ones, from a purely philosophical point of view. If we want certainty, definiteness, and final truth, however, we adhere to the doctrines of the Faith, which surpass all the rational capacities of man to apprehend. It is always possible that the inadequacies of our reasoning powers may be corrected, and we may sometime reach rational conclusions corresponding to the teachings of Christianity, but as far as the present problem is concerned—the literal interpretation of these texts of Aristotle's—I myself cannot see, at the present time, that any other analysis is more than faintly possible.

Van Steenberghen prefers to read such passages in a slightly different fashion, i.e., as exhibiting Siger's doubt and hesitancy as to the basic justice of his position, under the remorseless pressure of replies like that of Aguinas. He sees the Siger of the De anima intellectiva as taking a middle position between an earlier radical "Averroism," manifested in the Quaestiones in Tertium de anima, and a subsequent complete adjustment to the opinion of Aquinas, as presented in the Quaestiones in libros tres de anima, whose authenticity remains in doubt. If the latter work is set aside, however, as not proved authentic, Van Steenberghen's idea of a supposed intellectual development in Siger is considerably weakened, for passages in the De anima intellectiva such as have just been paraphrased then reveal rather a Siger stubborn in his insistence on his own interpretation, in the face of years of the most bitter criticism. But at the same time this is a Siger deeply troubled by the difficulties that his interpretation raises with respect to the Faith, and he is firm in his adherence to the superior experience of Revelation, in order to defend himself from what must have been violent charges of unorthodoxy. There is no change evident in Siger's analysis of Aristotle; only a heightened recognition of the conflict of Aristotelian conclusions with Christian doctrine.28

<sup>25</sup> Van Steenberghen's view, in which he brilliantly traces Siger's "evolution" from a radical "Averroism" in the Quaestiones in Tertium de anima through to a complete agreement with the position of Aquinas, in the Quaestiones in libros tres de anima, can be found in his Les œuvres et la doctrine de Siger de Brabant, pp. 146-60, and in his Siger de Brabant d'après ses œuvres inédites, II, pp. 629-62. In the first of these analyses Van Steenberghen states (p. 149) the difference between the first two of Siger's writings in an unexceptionable manner: their conclusions are essentially in agreement (although perhaps stated more clearly in the De anima intellectiva): they vary rather with respect to a difference in attitude, in that the second states Siger's argument with less confidence, in the sense that he claims that his interpretation is only a working-out of the problem strictly on Aristotelian principles, and that the truth is always what the evidence of the Faith presents to us. But this difference between the two documents does not, it seems to me, render the authenticity of the Quaestiones de anima any more plausible, because, from the point of view of the ideas involved, there appears to be little essential change, as I have

Let us go on, now, to John of Jandun's solution of the problem of the unity of the intellect, which we find stated, once again, in terms extremely close to those employed by Siger of Brabant in his *De anima intellectiva* (as a consequence of this correspondence, Jandun has never been called a hesitant or middle-ground "Averroist"). In its separated state, the soul is one in its substance through which all men understand, because no immaterial substance can be diversified according to species.<sup>24</sup>

mentioned. There is no trace of a Siger modifying his analysis of Aristotle in any important way; all that he does is explicitly concede that these conclusions of philosophy may be inadequate in the face of the certainties of the Faith, a concession doubtless forced upon him by the heated criticisms of Aquinas and other theologians, and by the condemnations of 1270. Other modern commentators have presented evidence that Siger modified early views, without claiming anything with regard to his possible later conversion to Thomism. Chossat (art. cit.), for example, indicates, on the evidence of John Baconthorp, that Siger early held for a more radical "Averroism," claiming that the intellective soul was in no sense the form of the body, but only its mover, as the intelligence moves the heavens; these views, Chossat points out, are reversed in the De anima intellectiva, which thus represents Siger's trimming his sails to the Thomist assault. I have not seen the Baconthorp texts myself, but I suspect that Chossat has overstated the change in Siger: because a) Siger never does anything more than claim that the intellective soul is not the substantial form of the body, and his denial is always within that context; b) when Siger says that the soul-body relation is like that of the intelligence-heaven relation, he is using an analogy only, and does not mean that the soul is primarily the source of the body's motion, but is rather the extrinsic principle of its activity, which is fundamentally understanding. In any case, I find it difficult to know a philosopher's ideas from an account of them given by an opponent; Siger's early position here is in a missing work, and only reported to us by Baconthorp. Nardi ("L'origine dell'anima umana secondo Dante," Giornale Critico della Filosofia Italiana, XII [1931], pp. 433-56, XII [1932], pp. 81-102, esp. pp. 96ff.) also cites Baconthorp in connection with Siger's supposed changes after 1270, but here the evidence indicates only that Siger claimed that the condemnations of 1270 did not really strike at his views in any important sense; there is, as Nardì says, no hint of any modification of doctrine. In sum, I find virtually no sound evidence supporting any serious shift in Siger's views after 1270; all that can be detected is a more explicit recognition of the superiority of the truths of Faith, if these be otherwise than the conclusions of philosophical analysis.

<sup>26</sup> John of Jandun, Quaestiones . . . De Anima, ed. cit., f. 63ra: . . . arguitur auctoritate Averroys quod intellectus non est plurificatus numeraliter in diversis hominimus, sed est unus secundum suam substantiam

He admits that this interpretation of Aristotle leads to very grave difficulties: "It seems to me especially troublesome that the intellection of Socrates and Plato with respect to some single object is, according to its substance, one and the same in number." 27 Jandun is well aware of the force of the famous commonplace—hic homo intelligit—and his whole effort is to give this phrase some meaning in terms of the Aristotelian text as explicated by Averroes. He continues, presenting an exhaustive accounting and examination of this and similar difficulties raised by other interpretations of the text, but he is unable to find any of them faithful to the real sense of the Stagirite. Advocating the unity of the intellect does not mean, he decides, that Socrates and Plato comprehend the same object in a single act of understanding, or that if one person acquires an intellection, all others must thereby acquire the same No, the highest capacity of the sensitive souls of individual men, the cogitative power, may be prepared (by phantasms derived from sense experience) in diverse ways, and diverse acts of intellection may, as a consequence, result in the different individuals.28

Jandun is making an obvious point, and one which he conceives to be unaffected by his advocacy of the unity of the separated intellect: that acts of intellection are completely dependent upon evidence provided by the sensory organs of particular individuals, and, this being the case, that diverse acts of intellection clearly do take place simultaneously in distinct individuals. The activity of the intellective soul is available to all men in common, but the intellections that are activated vary according to the varying phantasms present to different individuals. Jandun would never do

per quam omnes homines intelligunt, et hoc multipliciter probat. This citation is actually the principal argument in oppositum, but it is a succinct statement of the position that Jandun upholds, or at least denies the efficacy of argument against.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., f. 63va.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Ibid, f. 64ra: . . . dico quod quantumcunque sit unus numero intellectus quo omnes homines intelligunt, tamen non sequitur, si ego acquiro aliquem actum intellectus, s. scientiam vel speciem vel intellectionem, quod tu acquiras illam eandem; quia possibile est quod phantasia mea sive cogitativa non sic erit in debita praeparatione et propinqua ut sit movens, et sic tu non acquires nec elicies talem actum, neque intellectus tuus ex tuo phantasmate recipiet talem actum, et sic tu non eris intelligens, sicut ego aut converso.

otherwise than affirm that hic homo intelligit, but the use that he makes of Aristotle in support of his position is somewhat different than, say, that which Thomas Aquinas makes.

Jandun rejects, one by one, the alternative views (especially those of Albert, Thomas, and Aegidius of Rome): he does not see how Aristotle can be read otherwise than advocating a separable intellective soul, and, once separated, it follows automatically, by well-established Aristotelian principles, that this separated intellect must be unique for all men. This involves considerable philosophical difficulties, no doubt, but the Christian alternative is even more troublesome, from the perspective of natural reason.

Therefore, although it is difficult to understand in what way there can be made a single entity, from matter and a subsistent form not inherent to it, it is much more difficult to understand the relation of intellective soul and human body according to the Catholic position.<sup>29</sup>

The important word here, of course, is *understand*, for, rather than assuming that Jandun is being skeptical, or even disrespectful to the Faith, it seems easier to take it that he is only doubting whether the orthodox position that the soul is infused into the body in an act of creation, can be established philosophically, i.e., according to Aristotelian principles and methods.

Furthermore, Jandun realizes that his answers to the problem of the intellective soul, although assumed to be consistent with Aristotle's original text, are at radical odds with the doctrines of the Faith. And so he consistently adds a conclusion to the following effect, when these answers appear to conflict with Christian teachings: although these views are those of Aristotle and his Commentator, and cannot be disproved demonstratively, nevertheless I say otherwise, namely that the intellect is not one in number for all men, but rather is diversified according to the diversity of human bodies, to each of which it is perfection, dans esse simpliciter. However, I cannot prove this demonstratively, because I do not know how, and if anybody does know how, let

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Ibid., f. 65va: Quamvis igitur difficile sit intelligere quomodo ex materia et forma subsistente non inhaerente fiat unum, tamen multo difficilius est hoc intelligere de anima intellectiva et humano corpore secundum positionem Catholicam.

him rejoice. I myself assert this conclusion to be true, and I hold this certainly, but by faith alone.<sup>30</sup>

It is perhaps now evident that there is a remarkable correspondence between the answers that Siger of Brabant and John of Jandun provide to these crucial questions concerning the nature of the intellective soul. This soul cannot be regarded as substantial form to the body's matter, because it is not inherent to the body. being somehow separable from the body, as Aristotle indicates. As an immaterial separable substance it must be unique in its species, and thus cannot be diversified, in its essential mode of being, according to the number of individual men. It does serve in one way as the form of the body—appropriated to it temporarily during the actual process of knowing-but it never serves as its substantial form. Its activity is available to diverse men diversely prepared by their respective collections of phantasms, and diverse acts of intellection may thereby take place simultaneously. Try as they will (and both men give the most serious consideration to other possible interpretations). Siger and John cannot find rational justification in the Aristotelian texts, or in using Aristotelian principles and methods, for the Christian view that there is a multiplicity of individual intellective souls, each of which is the substantial form of a particular body, infused in it by an act of creation, and capable of separate subsistence after the body's dissolution.

Could we not now safely break off the discussion, firm in the conviction that a solution to the problem of how "Averroism" is used has been reached, at least with regard to these two masters of arts? They hold identical doctrines of the soul—it is not the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Ibid., f. 66ra: Sed quamvis haec opinio sit Commentatoris et Aristotelis, et quamvis etiam haec opinio non possit removeri rationibus demonstrativis, tamen ego dico aliter et dico quod intellectus non est unus numero in omnibus hominibus, immo ipse est numeratus in diversis secundum numerationem corporum humanorum et est perfectio dans esse simpliciter. Hoc autem non probo aliqua ratione demonstrativa, quia hoc non scio esse possibile et siquis hoc sciat, gaudeat. Istam autem conclusionem assero simpliciter esse veram et indubitanter teneo sola fide. Several other extensive passages to the same effect, in connection with other philosophical conclusions, may be found cited in E. Gilson, "La doctrine de la double vérité."

substantial form of the human composite, and it is a unique, separately-subsisting, substance—and it is clear that this interpretation can be traced directly to Averroes' commentaries on the De anima; have we not now attained a satisfactory working definition of "Averroism," from this examination of two of its chief practitioners, which can be applied as a touchstone to the opinions

of other philosophers?

It is the contention of the present study that, although this is a perfectly acceptable definition of "Averroism," and one that has been generally used by philosophers and historians, it is far too simple and facile an answer to the problem. This may be the answer customarily given by historians, but, if this paper is to have any justification, it must at least pretend to supply more than the conventional answers. The agreement between Siger and John can, from another perspective, be reduced to a superficial verbal correspondence, and, when their doctrines are examined from this perspective, it will be seen that, despite this superficial agreement, actually the gulf that separates their fundamental philosophical inclinations is very deep and very broad. Far from being duplicates of each other in a single consistent tradition of Aristotelian interpretation, Siger of Brabant and John of Jandun provide, using the same language and terminology, diverse answers to very different problems. To give this suggestion some content and meaning, however, a fresh start will be necessary.

(To be concluded.)

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#### NOTES AND OBSERVATIONS

# PLATO'S "PARMENIDES": A REPORT ON NEW SOURCE MATERIAL ROBERT BRUMBAUGH

Western philosophy has been continuously influenced by Plato's Parmenides, with its extraordinary abstract treatment of the one and the many, though few Western philosophers have claimed that they understood the dialogue, and none have been able to give convincing defence of an asserted understanding of it. New evidence of this continued influence, and new source material of help in interpretation, is provided by the publication of the final section of Proclus' Commentary in vol. iii of the Corpus Platonicum Medii Aevi. This concluding section of Book vii of the Commentary is missing in the Greek Proclus mss., but extant in the Latin text of Moerbeke's medieval translation, which is the basis of the present edition.

The volume contains, in addition to the final part of the Commentary, a critical text of the Parmenides through the first hypothesis, as it appears in the lemmata of the Latin Procfus, a new fragment of Speusippus (whom Proclus quotes explicitly on a crucial metaphysical point), a new one-page summary of the Stoic-Peripatetic controversy over counterfactuals (which appeared only in an unintelligible fragment in the Greek Proclus manuscript, but is here given from the Latin version), and the marginalia of Cusanus on this final section of the Proclus in his Latin manuscript. There are, thus, primary sources in Hellenic, Hellenistic, Medieval and Renaissance philosophy appearing for the first time in this modern volume. The continuity of the Platonic tradition could hardly be more dramatically emphasized.

It is hard to avoid a provincialism in appraising a work of this scope and significance; one is tempted to concentrate on some single aspect of technique or single period of intellectual history, at the expense of the book as a whole.

My own temptation, for example, would be to discuss the

critical apparatus of the Latin lemmata in detail. This is certainly worth discussion. In the *Parmenides*, Plato uses a tight, mathematical style, in which an uncertainty as to the correct text can be as disturbing as a misprint in a modern mathematical or logical demonstration, and in spite of excellent and extensive critical work, there remain many textual uncertainties. In this edition, the reading of the Proclus manuscripts, both Greek and Latin, are given; this makes new precision in appraising the text as cited by Proclus possible, and adds to our resources for textual criticism very significantly.

But Proclus' own interpretation deserves attention in its own The conclusion of the Commentary (carefully edited and accompanied with an English translation, to facilitate rapid preliminary reading) is a perfect type-specimen of the virtues, vices, and the Neo-Platonic doctrine of its author. Proclus' erudition, scholarship, and philosophic insight are evident in his concluding appraisal. So, however, is his insistence that the first hypothesis is the most significant part of the dialogue (he ends his commentary there, though Plato included seven other coordinate hypotheses), and his ability to interpret a text counter to its clear meaning. Plato ends the first hypothesis with the assertion, by Aristoteles, that certainly all this cannot be true of the One. For Plato, a One which transcends intelligibility and existence, and is unknowable, is (one would judge from this passage in context, and parallel passages) to be dismissed as an impossibility; for Proclus, it is just such a One which must be accepted, and for him this need to accept the unintelligible postulate is the constructive point of the dialogue. Scholars interested particularly in Neo-Platonism or the Christian tradition of "negative theology" will be particularly appreciative of the chance to study this work as a whole.

In the course of this final section, Proclus quotes Speusippus' assertion that the Pythagoreans had a non-existent One. Mr. Klibansky has had to introduce a delicate reconstruction at a crucial point in the text, but it is entirely convincing, and well done. This fragment seems to resolve a problem regarding Speusippus: Aristotle attributes this doctrine to him, but it has not been certain whether this is Aristotle's extension, or a position

actually taken. If, as I belive, there is a classical tradition including Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, Eudoxus, and Speusippus which is singularly anticipative of twentieth-century speculation, we can expect more scholarly interest in these figures over the next ten years, and this new fragment should be central in any adequate reconstruction of Speusippus' view.

Again, any study of the achievements of the thirteenth century, inspired by recovery of Greek sources, must take account of William of Moerbeke and his special tactics of translation. This version of the Proclus Commentary is interesting both as a source in Medieval studies, and as an example of Moerbeke's translations. Extensive Latin-Greek and Greek-Latin indexes in the present volume show the system of equivalences used in the literal renderings which this translation represents. As a device to present to competent philosophers and scholars the exact literal sense of Greek texts, there seems more to be said in favor of Moerbeke's versions than is usually thought, and some contemporary studies of Aristotle are moving toward an analogous English rendering.

Renaissance philosophy, with its resurgent Platonism, was no doubt partly conditioned by the Medieval knowledge of Plato, which in general (via the Meno, Phaedo, and first parts only of the Timaeus and Parmenides) made Aristotle's paraphrases seem more justified than they are, and made Plato and Neo-Platonism far harder to distinguish than they might have been. The new Cusanus marginalia show the impact of the Neo-Platonic interpretation of the final part of the Proclus Commentary on the thought of one of the important thinkers marking the transition from Medieval to Renaissance philosophy.

Modern philosophy, having become preoccupied with methods and formal logic, and run itself into a great debate over counterfactuals, has recently recognized to its surprise that the essential positions in this controversy were anticipated in Hellenistic thought, and interest in the history of logic is growing rapidly today, Proclus' summary of the Stoic and Peripatetic positions in this controversy, here published for the first time from the Latin version, not only enables us to fill in what has been an annoying incomplete fragment in von Arnim's volumes on the Stoics, but helps to direct attention to the fact that the

Academy has a place in the history of logic along with the Stoic and Peripatetic schools. For the historian of logic, this page of the Commentary will be of considerable interest; and may even tempt him to inquire into Proclus' own position as a logician. The contemporary tone of the positions presented in this very lucid summary is a coincidence that is quite fascinating.

These primary source-materials should, it seems, be called to our attention as such before we go on to further detailed study and critical appraisal of the volume in which they appear. It is exciting to realize that the day for the recovery of new primary sources in philosophy is by no means over, and, to the Platonist at least, equally exciting to realize more fully his own place in the stream of a major and continuous Western speculative tradition.

Yale University.

#### ANNOUNCEMENTS

Dr. W. Heisenberg has been appointed Gifford Lecturer in the University of St. Andrews for the academic year 1955-56. As the Gifford Lecturers in the University of Glasgow, Rev. Dr. Leonard Hodgson has been appointed for the terms 1955-57, and Dr. C. F. von Weizsäcker for the terms 1957-59.

At the annual meeting of the Metaphysical Society of America, the following officers were elected: President, Charles Hartshorne, the University of Chicago; Secretary, John E. Smith, Yale University; Treasurer, Mrs. Charles A. Fritz, Jr., the University of Connecticut. John Wild, the Society's retiring President, was elected Councillor. Requests for information about the Society should be directed to its Secretary at 207 Linsly Hall, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut.

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy has been formed. It will hold its second meeting at Goucher College on the evening of December 28th. Those who would like to become members are invited to write to Mrs. A. C. Sprague, Yarrow West, Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania.

#### BOOKS RECEIVED

- Argow, Waldemar: The Case for Liberal Religion. Yellow Springs, O.: Antioch Press, 1954. 155 pp. \$2.50.
- Barth, Karl: Against the Stream: Shorter Postwar Writings. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. 252 pp. \$3.75.
- Barrell, Joseph: A Philosophical Study of the Human Mind. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. xii, 575 pp. \$6.00.
- Bergmann, Gustav: The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism. New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1954. x, 341 pp. \$4.75.
- Black, Max: Problems of Analysis. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1954. xi, 304 pp. \$5.00.
- Bonifazi, Conrad: Christendom Attacked, a Comparison of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. London: Rockliff, 1953. xv, 184 pp. 21s.
- Brumbaugh, Robert S.: Plato's Mathematical Imagination.
  Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1954. xviii, 301 pp.
  \$8.00.
- Burkhardt, Hans: Das Abenteuer ein Mensch zu sein. Wolfshagen-Scharbeutz: Franz Westphal Verlag, 1954. 141 pp. 9.80 DM.
- Chen, Whung-Hwan: Über Platons Dialog Parmenides. Formosa: 1954. 24 pp.
- Collins, James D.: A History of Modern European Philosophy.
  Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Company, 1954. x, 854 pp.
  \$9.75.
- Everett, Millard S.: Ideals of Life. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1954. xiv, 736 pp. \$5.00.
- Friedberg, Felix: Thoughts About Life. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. 40 pp. \$2.50.
- Guitton, Jean: Dialogues avec Monsieur Pouget. Paris: Editions Bernard Grasset, 1954. 258 pp. 495 fr.
- Gutkind, E. A.: Community and Environment. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. xiii, 81 pp. \$3.75.

- Hocking, William Ernest: Experiment in Education. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1954. xvi, 303 pp. \$5.00.
- Hyde, Lawrence: I Who Am, a Study of the Self. Reigate, England: The Omega Press, 1954. x, 222 pp. 15s.
- Jung, C. G.: The Practice of Psychotherapy, Volume 16 of the Collected Works of C. G. Jung, Bollingen Series XX. New York: Pantheon Books, 1954. xi, 377 pp. \$4.50.
- Kimpel, Ben: The Symbols of Religious Faith. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. x., 198 pp. \$3.75.
- Lossky, N. O.: Analytic and Synthetic Propositions and Mathematical Logic. New York: International Universities Press, 1953. 16 pp. \$.75.
- McGill, V. J.: Emotions and Reason. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1954. xiii, 122 pp. \$3.25.
- McKeon, Richard: Thought, Action and Passion. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954. ix, 305 pp. \$5.00.
- Muckle, J. T.: The Story of Abelard's Adversities. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1954. 70 pp.
- Mukerjee, Radhakamal: The Social Function of Art. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. xxii, 280, xv pp. \$10.00.
- Murray, A. R. M.: An Introduction to Political Philosophy. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. vi, 240 pp. \$4.75.
- Neumann, Erich: The Origins and History of Consciousness, Bollingen Series XLII. New York: Pantheon Books, 1954. xxiv, 493 pp. \$5.00.
- Patton, Kenneth L.: Man's Hidden Search. Boston: Meeting House Press, 1954. 123 pp. \$2.50.
- Pieper, Josef: Über die Gerechtigkeit. Munich: Kösel-Verlag, 1953. 144 pp. \$1.95.
- Runes, Dagobert D.: Letters to my Daughter. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. 131 pp. \$2.50.
- Rupp, Gordon: The Righteousness of God: Luther Studies. New York: Philosophical Library, 1953. xiii, 375 pp. \$7.50.

- Ryle, Gilbert: Dilemmas. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1954. 129 pp. \$2.00
- Schanck, Richard L.: The Permanent Revolution in Science. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. xvi, 112 pp. \$3.00
- Schneeberger, Guido: Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, eine Bibliographie. Bern: Francke Verlag, 1954. 190 pp. 16 fr.
- Schrödinger, Erwin: Nature and the Greeks. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1954. 97 pp. \$2.00
- Sheldon, Wilmon Henry: God and Polarity. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954. 712 pp. \$8.00.
- Swabey, Marie Collins: The Judgment of History. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. x, 257 pp. \$3.75
- Uexküll, Thure v.: Der Mensch und die Natur: Grundzüge einer Naturphilosophie. Bern: A. Francke Verlag, 1953. 270 pp. \$1.95.
- Untersteiner, Mario: *The Sophists*, translated by Kathleen Freeman. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. xvi, 368 pp. \$6.00.
- van Riessen, H.: De Maatschappij der Toekomst. Francker: T. Wever, 1953. 350 pp. fr. 8.90.
- Wahl, Jean: Les Philosophies de l'Existence. Paris: Armand Colin, 1954. 175 pp. 250 fr.
- Wheelwright, Philip: The Way of Philosophy. New York: The Odyssey Press, 1954. xv, 617 pp. \$4.50.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Translated into Italian, with notes and introduction, by G. C. M. Colombo. Milan-Rome: Fratelli Bocca, 1954. 331 pp. 3,000 lire.
- Wyschogrod, Michael: Kierkegaard and Heidegger, the Ontology of Existence. New York: Humanities Press, 1954. xii, 156 pp. \$3.00.
- Anuario de Filosofia del Derecho, Tomo I. Madrid: Instituto Nacional de Estudios Jurídicos, 1953. xi, 543 pp. 100 pesetas.

- Buddhist Texts Through the Ages, edited by Edward Conze et al. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. 322 pp. \$7.50.
- OEuvres Philosophiques de Condillac, Volume III. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1951. xii, 605 pp. 1,728 fr.
- Dictionary of European History, edited by William S. Roeder. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. viii, 316 pp. \$6.00.
- Relazioni e Discussioni, 1951-1952, Associazione Filosofica Ligure. Milan-Rome: Fratelli Bocca, 1953. 160 pp. 1,000 lire.
- Studies in Islamic Cultural History, edited by G. E. von Grunebaum. American Anthropologist, vol. 56, no. 2, pt. 2, memoir no. 76. Menasha, Wisc: American Anthropological Association, 1954. xi, 60 pp.

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